


MUSLIM STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

From Sir Syed Ahmad Khan To
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah
(1857-1947)



Dr. S. Qalib-i-Abid

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To My Wife
Who has supported,
encouraged and inspired me.

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PREFACE

This book had been in the making ever since my return from the U.K. in 1986 after my Ph.D. research which was published under the title The Muslim Politics In The Punjab, 1921-47 (Vanguard Books, 1992). I was extremely fortunate in having collected research material, during my research in London, Leeds and Cambridge, for a book on the struggle for Pakistan. It took almost eight years in writing, drafting and re-drafting the manuscript in order to maintain a reasonable length. Some material therefore has been eliminated inevitably, so as to leave out some unnecessary account of events.

In writing of this book my sincere and grateful thanks are due to many. First and foremost, my thanks are offered to Professor David N. Dilks, my research supervisor in the University of Leeds, currently Vice Chancellor of the University of Hull. Professor Dilks had been supportive in many ways, more than the words and phrases can communicate. I also owe particular debt of gratitude to Professor Dr. Bimal Prasad of Nehru University, Delhi, who joined the University of Leeds in 1982 as a visiting professor. I am deeply grateful to him for sparing time for frequent sittings with me and allowing me to benefit from his knowledge and insight whilst discussing some important issues relating to the freedom movement in India. I was able to exchange views with other eminent Indian scholars like Professor S. R. Mehrotra at the India Office Library and Records, London. Professor Mehrotra also delivered a series of lectures at various British Universities on freedom movement in India which were thought-provoking for me.

Similarly, Professor Eugene Irschik of University of California Berkely was also kind enough to offer his comments on various matters relating to my conclusions on freedom movement in India. I am also deeply grateful to

Professor Dr. Syed Razi Wasti, my teacher and research supervisor in Government College, Lahore during post-graduation. I was able to benefit from Prof. Wasti's comments on a number of occasions. I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Z.H. Zaidi for throwing light on various aspects of Quaid-i-Azam's life and policies.

I am much obliged to all of my Indian, American, British and Pakistani colleagues, friends, post-graduate students and research scholars for helping me to put my ideas in a better perspective and for many valuable suggestions, while posing some important questions at the same time.

I also owe a heavy debt of gratitude to some renowned British administrators of their time like Sir Gilbert Laithwaite (private secretary to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, 1936-43). Sir Penderel Moon, private secretary to the governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy. Sir Evans Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab and Sir George Abell (private secretary to the viceroy, 1946-47) for stimulating discussions. I am also thankful to Mrs and Mr. Alan Campbell-Johnson (press attache to Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy) for agreeing to an interview to discuss some matters relating to the Lord Mountbatten's viceroyalty.

I am also grateful to the staff of India Office and Records Library in London; special thanks are due to Dr. Richard Bingle, Mrs. Biswas, Mr. Saleem Ahmad and Mr. Martin Moir, for providing me various manuscripts at my request and for invaluable, sympathetic and helpful attitude whenever I met them.

Sincere thanks are also due to my publisher, Mr. Niaz Ahmad (Sange Meel Publications, Lahore) for coaxing me gently through my friends and colleagues into completing this work within the period it has taken it to complete. Haji Niaz Ahmad has published a good number of books on the Struggle for Pakistan over the years and wishes to add much more to the stock in the future.

Last but not the least, I am deeply grateful to my wife, Dr. Massarrat Abid, for her encouragement and support; together we spent long hours discussing and exchanging views on matters relating to the Lord Muntbatten's viceroyalty. Massarrat's book, Partition And Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-51., (Vanguard Books, Lahore) was also a source of inspiration ; many of my ideas contained in this book are triggered off by my wife's work. To Massarrat I also ow gratitude for moral support, without her help this work would never have been completed.

Finally, to friend goes all the applause, for blemishes I alone take all the responsibility.

S. Qalb. Abid

20 January 1995.

SIR SYED AHMAD KHAN : THE PIONEER OF PROGRESSIVE CULTURE IN INDIA

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was among a very few leaders produced by Muslim India, who like the Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah made a tremendous contribution in guiding the destinies of the Indian Muslims. He is widely acknowledged as the father of Muslim India and the most eminent Muslim figure of the 19th century, who played a prominent role of a bridge-builder between the British rulers and the Indian Muslim; and therefore it is noticed that Muslim politics especially in the later half of the 19th century had been greatly woven around the remarkable personality of Syed Ahmad Khan. Having fully realized the state into which Indian Muslims had fallen after the failure of the war of Independence (1857), Syed began to work with an extraordinary devotion for the improvement of their conditions. He knew fully well that the British had come to stay in India for a longer time and that his community had no choice but to make a lot of adjustments. In the aftermath of the "Indian Revolt" (as the British called it) Syed's top priority was to establish a rapprochement between the British and Muslims and Islam and Christianity. This was due to the reason that the British considered Muslims, who had been the rulers of India in past, as the most dangerous element under the Raj. Under these circumstances the Muslims were advised by Syed to be extremely loyal to the British and should not repeat the events of 1857; for such events, would again be advantageous to the Hindus at the cost of the Muslims.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had a great political philosophy, understanding and vision of the environment and he therefore

decided to divert the Muslim mind to more fruitful and constructive works. It so happened that the learning of English language had become a passport to government service and making progress as a whole. Syed had a much more difficult task to cope with as the Muslims tended to be much more orthodox than the Hindus in this direction. Syed therefore had to make hectic efforts in persuading the Muslims to learn English language arguing that the learning of the Western Education was not anti-Islamic, that Islam was a religion of progress, and that it posed no great problem of conscience. It may be mentioned that Syed was far-sighted enough to visualize that the British would also encourage his educational programme since it did not clash with British policies in India. He was also wise enough to have laid great emphasis on the two-nation theory after being frustrated by the revival of extremist Hindu organisations and their demands emerged to hurt Muslim interests. In this way Syed made a substantial contribution in awakening political consciousness of the Indian Muslims, creating a separatist movement and eventually paved the way for its consolidation. This movement brought about productive results in a very short time; the Aligarh movement provided a core of educated Muslims who later played a key role in the freedom movement consequently leading to the creation of Pakistan.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was born on October 17, 1817 in an eminent and reputable family having connections with the Mughal Court at Delhi until the reign of Akbar Shah II, the father of Bahadur Shah Zafar. Syed's father, Mir Muttaqi, a broad-minded gentleman was a descendent of the Holy Prophet, Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him); his maternal grand father, Khawaja Fariddudin was a renowned mathematician worked as Principal of the Calcutta Madrasa in the 1790s; he had also served the East India Company during Lord Wellesley's time. Before coming to India it is maintained that Syed's ancestors had been oppressed during the Unmayyds rule and had to flee to Iran and then after sometime settled in the Herat province of Afghanistan. It was perhaps during the reign of a great Mughal Emperor, Shah Jehan (1628-1666) that this noble family shifted to India.

During his childhood, Syed was imparted the conventional education, (as happened in the Muslim families of the day) such as reading of the Quran, the study of Persian language using Bostan and Gulistane Saadi, or little Mathematics and Astronomoy. Until the death of this father, Syed spent a comfortable life ; but soon the family wealth, property and possessions began to squeeze; stipends, jagirs and the Royal patronage reduced and lapsed. In these conditions Syed had to enter the service of the East India Company; it may be noted that his family did not approve of Syed's joining the British Company. Anyway, Syed served at various places such as Agra (1839-41), Mainpuri (1841-42), Fatehpur Sikri (1842-46), Delhi (1846-54), and Bijnour (1854-58). By 1857, Sir Syed rose to the position of Sadre Amin (Sub. Judge in the Judicial service of the Company). In the meantime, Syed continued with his literary activities. In 1847, Syed published his monumental work, Asarus Sanadid, which helped him to become a member of the prestigious Royal Asiatic Society. He also produced an edition of the Aain-i-Akbari. By this time Sir Syed had been concentrating on literary and cultural matters in the typical Indian milieu.

The year 1857 (call it a mutiny or the war of Independence) is always remembered with a great deal of sadness and pain. It was a final blow to the idea of the Mughal Empire resulting in a total collapse of the Muslims in all walks of life. The finale of the Mughal dynasty came about in 1857; as such it disintegrated with a great deal of speed after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707; and yet another blow was Nadir Shah's attacks on India in 1739. The result was that the foreigners, especially the British company went ahead with its designs to have territorial aggrandisement, pursuing their policy of 'divide and rule'. Nawab Siraju-ud-Daula was defeated in the battle of Plassey and then put to sword. The British then chose to rule through puppet Nawabs like Mir Jafar. These Nawabs were made powerless to the extent that they were not allowed to grant lands and jobs to Muslims, hurting the upper class Muslims in particular. Soon Mir Jafar was deposed and Mir Qasim was appointed in his place. In 1764 Mir Qasim, Shah Alam (the Mughal Empror) and the Nawab of Oudh fought against the British at Buxur and were

defeated. This battle established the British hold on strong footing; but they followed a tactful way. The East India company (EIC) exhorted the Diwani, collecting revenue and looked after the civil administration of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, sometime adopting extremely cruel methods. It is relevant to point out that the Hindus were getting stronger whereas the Muslims were facing the political and financial losses. This situation caused a tremendous hatred and discontent among the Indian Muslims.

Furthermore the year 1857 and its immediate aftermath is also highly significant; in that year a great revolt against the British was launched in India. These events were a trauma for the Muslims; the British were strong enough to suppress the war of independence. But the methods used by them shocked the civilised world. The destruction of Delhi as a centre of Muslim culture was horrendous; Bahadar Shah Zafar, 80 years old was tried and exiled to Rangoon; Lt. Hodson shot three Mughal princes and later 24 princes were tried and executed; a vast ocean of blood was seen; some Muslims were shot dead and their dead bodies were thrown into the river Jumna. The Muslim citizens of the Delhi were required to pay 25% of the value of their property as a fine (Hindus had to pay only 10%). The Muslims were perceived to be more dangerous to the British rule; Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) says in his autobiography "the heavy hand of the British fell more upon Muslims than on the Hindus". As a matter of fact the British believed that the Muslims were responsible for the 1857 uprising and therefore were subjected to ruthless punishment, aimed at crushing their power once for all.

The traumatic events of 1857 were a watershed in Sir Syed's life; he was posted at Bijnoor - he was forty years old and had an extremely difficult task ahead. The news of 'revolt' had greatly perturbed the European citizens; Syed assured them that their safety was his prime concern and therefore Syed did his utmost to save the white-skinned. As soon as the normalcy returned, Syed wrote an Urdu pamphlet titled *Risalah Asbab-i-Baghawat-i-Hind*; it was later translated into English. Syed analysed the causes of the revolt. He strongly criticised some measures

adopted by the British administrators before the revolt; that Indians were not appointed members of the legislative councils; that interference in religions was regrettable; that there had been no intermingling of the rulers and the ruled; that the revolt was an outcome of the frustrations and accumulated wrongs of decades forfeiting the trust of the people who had been humiliated and degraded most often. Syed also blamed the missionary activities, for it was widely believed that the government had been financing and sponsoring these activities. He also pointed out that in village schools Urdu alone was taught whilst Persian and Arabic were completely ignored. The Muslim parents reckoned that it was a deliberate attempt on the part of the British to relegate Islam and popularise Christianity in India. Syed also pointed out that the indigenous industry was deeply hit due to the competition of cheap machine-made goods imported from British; he also criticised currency policies of the EIC. In the final analysis Syed tried to correct the wrong impression of the British that the Muslims were responsible for the revolt of 1857. He also started a magazine titled The Loyal Mohammadans of India. Besides other things, loyal services rendered by some eminent Muslims were also reminded to the British.

In 1863, Sir Syed founded a Scientific Society in Ghazipur with a view to opening the minds of the Indians to the European literature, science and technology. It was widely acknowledged as a great educational and social enterprise; its main purpose was to translate the standard English works in various subjects into Urdu for educating the Muslims. Later on Aligarh became the headquarter of the Society; its membership increased manifold. The society employed a good number of translators, owned a press and published a weekly newspaper (Aligarh Institute Gazette) widening the range of its activities by offering comments on such public issues as the reform of Railway management and the Native Marriages bill of 1869. Both the Society and the *Aligarh Gazette* chose to highlight the advantages to the Indians of the British rule and encouraged Europeans to become members by participating in meetings of the Society and by contributing articles.

In 1869, a great opportunity came to Sir Syed when his son (Mehmood) was awarded scholarship for higher studies at Cambridge. With a view to investigating the methods of education in Britain, Syed decided to accompany his son; both the father and the son stayed together for nearly seventeen months. It was during and after his visit to England that Syed planned a 'Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College' modelled after Cambridge University; he was convinced that the medium of Instruction should be English in his proposed College. In 1870, Syed set up a committee and five years later, on 24 May 1876, with the assistance of British administration and with the help of subscriptions from Muslim princes and landed aristocracy, the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College was opened on Queen Victoria's birthday. In 1877, Lord Lytton (the Viceroy) formally laid the foundation stone of the College. In 1878 intermediate and in 1881 B.A. classes were started; in 1881 a civil service preparatory class was also introduced. In 1887 the College started to prepare students to join the Engineering College at Roorkee. In a very short period of time, the College grew into a cluster of magnificent buildings, playgrounds and spacious lawns, teaching punctuality and discipline to its students. The government gave also a great deal of support; many eminent Britishers also made personal donations; the Viceroy Northbrook contributed a handsome amount of ten thousand rupees. Even in its early stages, the College seemed to be a great success. It was noticed that the MAO College admitted Muslim students from all over India including a good number of those belonging to the Punjab. It may be mentioned that Syed frequently visited Punjab where his educational plans were greatly appreciated by the eminent Muslim leaders of the province.

For more than a decade the MAO college was run almost single-handedly by Sir Syed and his son, Mehmood. But later Syed decided to have a good deal of association of European staff, even though some of his associates deeply criticised the rich salaries paid to the foreigners; Syed, however pressed on to recruit this staff having in mind to raise the standard of teaching and also to be able to have a liaison between the government and the Muslims. Syed's estimates proved right; educationists

like Theodore Beck, Theodore Morison, Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Thomas Arnold were among the distinguished European staff who took keen interest in the welfare of the college and raising its standard. Sir Syed also added (1897) twenty one names to the role of trustees using his descretionary powers; Moulvi Mehdi Ali Khan (Mohsin-ul-Mulk) Moulvi Mushtaq Hussain (Viqar-ul-Mulk) and Altaf Hussain Hali became the three great pillars of the Allgrah movement. During his last years Syed dreamed of developing the MAO College into a University. But the government was opposed (it will be discussed later) and it was not until 1920 that the British government agreed to promote the College to the rank of a University.

Sir Syed Ahimad also provided another platform to the Indian Muslims by establishing the Mohammadan Educational Congress (later to be known as Muslim Educational Conference) in 1886. The aim Syed had in mind was to gather together Muslims from various provinces upon a common platform of public activity and to encourage the study of western science and literature by Muslims. The Conference presented a twelve point programme in the beginning. So far as educational programme was concerned it was decided that: (a) efforts would be made to spread advanced western education among the Muslims; (b) inquiries would be made into the state of religious instruction in English schools established by Muslims; (c) to support the instruction of Eastern learning and religious subjects, which Muslim teachers were giving everywhere on their own and to make provision for it so that it could be kept up regularly; (d) efforts would be made to look at the state of instruction in the vernacular schools, which was given on traditional lines and making preparations for restoration of schools which had decayed. Enquiries were to be made to discover as to why Muslim Youth were given inadequate Quranic instruction and to promote more intensive memorising and study of the Quran. The Conference held its annual meetings preferably in a different town; Muslim academicians from all over India gathered to discuss educational issues and proposals; and various educational committees were formed to help the Conference's programme. Various resolutions were passed by the Conference

such as to seek help from various Muslim Anjamins for scholarship for poor students; appealing to the government to allow Muslims to receive religious education in government schools; pressing the Allahabad University for the exclusion of Cox's history which contained chapters offensive to Muslims; compelling every Muslim to give at least one percent of his income for the growth of Western education amongst the Muslims of his district. These resolutions and Syed's power of persuasion had deep impact on various Muslim educational associations; these Anajamins established educational institutions for Muslim youth; Mohammadan Colleges of Karachi and Hyderabad (Deccan) should be mentioned in particular. Similarly, due to the influence of the Muslim Educational Conference, Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam was established in Lahore; the Anjuman established a men's College and later women's College and a medical College; its annual meetings were attended by the leading literary and political figures of the Aligarh movement like Deputy Nazir Ahmad and Moulana Altaf Hussain Hali. In 1899 Allama Iqbal (the poet philosopher of Pakistan) made his national debut by reciting his famous poem Nala-i-Yatim (Orphan's cry) and the audience were deeply moved and touched. It may be noted that due to the electrifying effects of the Aligarh movement, the annual sessions of the Conference and the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam became national phenomenon and highly sacred for Muslims.

Even though the Conference's main emphasis was on its educational programme, it was also expected to safeguard political rights of the Muslims such as securing for them a fair proportion of jobs (places) for educated Muslims and their adequate representation on various political and administrative bodies. Sir Syed was convinced where majority's opinion was to be a decisive factor, it was essential for the electors to be United by the ties of race, religion, manners, customs, culture, and historical traditions. He sincerely believed that the Muslims could be outmanoeuvred by the Hindus. In the second session of the conference (December, 1887) Syed, therefore laid emphasis on two points; one was that in case the higher service were to be filled by competitive examinations in India, they would all go to

the nation (Hindus) that had an early start in education; secondly that the representative government in India would result in the permanent subordination of Muslims to Hindus. Syed believed that it was going to be a game of dice in which one man (Hindu) had four dices and the other (Muslim) only one; he would prefer to have a distinct political personality for Indian Muslims.

As a matter of record, for a long period of time Sir Syed had great faith in unity giving historical statements such as that "India was a bride whose two beautiful eyes were Hindus and Muslims"; that he regarded Hindus and Muslims as his two eyes; that he did not care about religion - Hindus and Muslims were religious words; and that Hindus and Muslims must try to be one mind in matters which affected their progress. In 1878, Lord Lytton nominated Syed on the Imperial Legislative Council and Lord Ripon renewed his term of office. Being a member of this prestigious council, Syed strove for the welfare of both Hindus and Muslims, for he considered co-operation between the two essential for the progress of two great communities of India. But later Syed had to change his mind realizing that the interests of the two communities were not always identical. Many developments persuaded Syed to change his attitude. The linguistic controversy (Urdu-Hindi) played key role in this matter. Muslim rule in the upper provinces had left Urdu as the lingua franca; from 1835 onwards this language served as the court language and means of communication. In 1867, Hindus of Benaras started an agitation to stop the use of Urdu from official courts and substitution of Hindi, written in devanagiri script. The Hindus resented Urdu on the plea that it was developed during the Muslim rule over India which they despised. The Hindu Sabhas sprang up in Benaras and elsewhere with a central office in Allahabad, the aim being the adoption of Hindi as the official language. This pressure bore fruits; in the 1870s Hindi was adopted as the language of lower courts, first by the Lt. Governor of Bihar and then in the C.P. The Hindu agitation thus gained momentum. These circumstances had a shocking effect on Sir Syed's mind; he was deeply disappointed and remarked that it was no longer possible for the Hindus and Muslims to be partners, also concluding that in this game

eventually the Hindus would be the losers. However, in response, the Muslims established Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Urdu in the Punjab and elsewhere. Later on after more assaults were made by the Hindus on Urdu, Mohsinul Mulk (1837-1907) and Viqarul Mulk (1841-1917) established Urdu Defence Association and Anjuman-i-Tarraqi-i-Urdu as an adjunct of the Muslim Educational Conference.

Sir Syed's separate policy was also intensified due to the extremist movements launched by the narrow-minded Hindu leaders like B.G. Tilak (1856-1920). Tilak was a leader of the Arya Samaj's reactionary movement who kept on reminding his nation about the struggle against Muslims and the British - and back to Vedas. The result was that serious communal riots broke out in 1893 and 1894 due to which 75 precious lives were lost and about 300 were seriously wounded. Tilak also started "Anti-Cow Killing Society" (Cow protection Society) provoking the Muslims; he also advised his countrymen to re-organise the festival of Ganesh (the Elephant God) which included theatrical performances and religious songs based on the legends of Hindu mythology, shrewdly exploiting the hatred against Muslims. In a matter of three years there were more than 50 centres celebrating the Ganesh festival in Poona itself. It so happened that during the 10-day celebrations bands of young men paraded in the streets singing verses with a view to intensifying the feelings against the Muslims. Tilak also decided to organise an annual Shivaji festival; later it was regularly celebrated in Benaras, Calcutta, Karachi and Madras. It may be mentioned that Shivaji had murdered a Muslim warrior, Afzal Khan and he had become a Hindu hero, called Lord Shivaji. Tilak also agitated against the Government ban upon music before mosques as offensive to the Hindu sentiments.

It may also be mentioned that the Indian National Congress did little to allay Muslim fears. The Congress was founded by a retired Civil servant, A.O. Hume with the blessing of the Viceroy Lord Dufferin. Hume arranged the first session of the Congress (1885) in Bombay and at his suggestion W.C. Bannerjee was elected president of the Congress. By and large the Muslims

viewed the Congress as a platform for projecting Hindu aspirations. This proved correct when Congress was dominated by some fire-brands like Tilak and other Hindu extremist leaders like B.C. Pal and Lala Lajpat Rai, who had been offending the Muslims by their extreme political and religious views. Under these circumstances, Sir Syed felt concerned and thought that the Muslims should guard their interests, and that the Congress would not look after their interests. As the Muslims were numerically fewer and educationally backward, Syed thought that they would be mis-guided by the Congress and that would jeopardise his programme of educational uplift. He, therefore, advised Muslims to keep away from the Congress forbidding them to join it. The Muslims generally kept aloof from the Congress; only 33 Muslims participated in its session of 1886. Hume requested Badruddin Tyabji to preside over the next session so as to attract Muslims. In the meantime Syed Amir Ali had requested Tyabji to attend a Conference of Muslims separately from the Congress. Amir Ali's National (since 1883 Central) Mohammadan Association had refused to participate in the Calcutta Congress in 1886. It may be safely concluded that the Indian Muslims, as a community, had from the very foundation of the Congress stood aloof from it chiefly due to the advice of Sir Syed.

Syed was also a greatest Muslim thinker and a religious reformer. He stood for a rational approach in this matter; the aim was to interpret Islam as a natural faith. His maternal grandfather, Dabirul Doula Faridu-ud-din Ahmad was a man of remarkable talents and was more distinguished for literary attainments. Syed's father was a favourite disciple of Hazrat Shah Ghulam Ali of Delhi. Syed read the text of Quran and later began to read Arabic - Sharh-i-Mulla, Shrah-i-Tehzid, Maibaz, Mukhtasar Ma'ain and Mutavval; he also read Qaduri and Sharh-i-Vaqaya etc. While writing on religious subjects, Syed argued that there is a strong affinity between Islam and Christianity; the motive behind this argument was that Syed liked to bring about a rapprochement between the Government and Muslims and between two great religions (Islam and Christianity). Syed's contribution on religious matters could be divided into three

groups. He wrote about half a dozen pamphlets before 1857; between 1857 and 1869 the most noteworthy are the *Tabyani-ul-Kalam* (a bilingual commentary on the Bible) and *Risala-i-Taam-i-Ahl-i-Kitab*. He argued that Islam did not forbid Muslims and Christians eating together; he also argued that Islam did not approve of treachery and rebellion (in normal circumstances) and that Jihad (holy war) was only allowed to get certain legitimate goals. It may be mentioned that Syed was deeply influenced by the teaching and methodology of Shah Wali-Ullah; he considered Shah Sahib as an authority. He believed that even though the Prophets communicated one Din to mankind, each one of them brought a different shariat which was adopted according to the prevailing conditions of their times.

The third group of Syed's religious writings are from 1869 to 1898; *Khutbat-i-Ahmadiya*, *Tehzib-ul-Akhlaq* and the *Tafsir-ul-Quran* belong to this phase. It so happened that in 1861, Sir William Muir (Lt. Governor of N.W.P.) published The life of Mohammad in four volumes, attacking Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) and Islam in many ways and which led to Islam-Christianity controversy in India. Syed prepared a reply and in 1870 (in London) published his famous *Khutbat-i-Ahmadiya*, which was a critical survey of the life and teachings of Prophet Muhammad (PBH) from the Muslim point of view and as an exposition of the rationalistic side of the Islamic system. But once again, Syed preached conciliation and understanding between Islam and Christianity. He interpreted Islam as a natural religion; that there was no contradiction between the word of God and the work of God (the laws of physical science and the scientific process). Syed proposed a dynamic exercise of Ijtihad to help to bring into being a sense of political community with the aim of discovering the nature and demands of Islam as a religion. Sir Syed's *Tafsir* (commentary on the Quran) was perhaps his greatest work, even though his critics questioned his ability to undertake the job. He was unable to complete the commentary, it covered about three-fifth of the Quran; he discussed a limited number of verses, relating to most important questions of his time. It consists of seven volumes; six of which were published during Syed's life time; the bulk of the *Tafsir*

deals with the interpretation of things involving supernatural phenomena which Syed tried to explain in terms of natural causation; that is why he was called a naturist.

The impact and influence of the Tafsir has been tremendous; the Tafsir could truly be described as the crowning glory of Syed's intellectual works, throwing a new light on many of the obscure verses and apparently incomprehensible passages of the Quran.

After his return from England (October, 1870) Syed published a weekly periodical, *Tehzib-ul-Akhlaq*; the first issue appeared on 24 December, 1870. Syed reflected simplicity, honesty and other homely virtues by inaugurating a movement for improving morals and manners of his community; he argued that the Muslims should accept what was sound and attractive in European manners and social life. During the first six years of its existence (1870-76) Syed's Journal served the cause of religious and social reforms among the Muslims. Syed was assisted by other eminent Muslims such as Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Viqar-ul-Mulk, Moulvi Chiragh Ali, Syed Mehmood, Moulana Altaf Hussain Hali and Moulvi Zakauddin. However, it may be mentioned that the largest number of articles in the Journal were contributed by Syed himself; of 226 papers Syed wrote 112. It was he who tried his utmost to improve the conditions of his community by bringing them at par with modern culture and by diverting their attentions into more useful channels. Syed did not wish to have a collision between the Government (or Christianity) and the Muslims (or Islam). It can be proved by the fact that out of 500 copies of his famous pamphlet, The Causes of the Indian Revolt, Syed sent 498 to England for the members of the British Parliament and other interested Englishmen. No Indian knew anything at all about it. Not only did some British authorities suggest punishment for Syed but some of his own community members turned against him and were able to procure Fatwas from 60 Moulvis, Muftis, and Qazis pronouncing Syed as the most hateful of Kafirs; some called him a "Dajjal".

But Sir Syed, a most remarkable specimen of progressive humanity, a man with high spirits and moral courage, continued to do what he believed was right: to improve the conditions of the Indian Muslims.

MUSLIM POLITICS FROM PARTITION OF BENGAL TO THE KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

By the turn of the century communal antagonism gained a great deal of momentum. Sir Syed died in 1898 and in 1900, Anthony MacDonnell (1844-1925) Lt. Governor of the U.P. (an anti-Muslim mind) extended recognition to Hindi language as demanded by Hindus, undermining the position of Urdu language; this decision was condemned by the Muslim leaders, but the war against Urdu had entered a crucial phase. The Muslims were feeling much threatened and restive, their associations were now explaining to the government more zealously that the elective system did not provide them a fair chance to make progress; under the joint electorates they would be swamped by the Hindu majority; and demanded the extension of separate electorates in Councils and all local bodies. It may be noted that even in Muslim majority areas of the Punjab, Hindus got themselves elected, using unfair means.

Events in the beginning of the 20th century were proving that Sir Syed's apprehensions and reading of the Hindu mind were sound and well-founded. G.N. Curzon (1859-1925) a diehard conservative, came to India in 1898 to rule her with an iron hand; efficiency was his catchword. It was during his viceroyalty that Bengal was partitioned into two parts. Under the British, Bengal was as large as France, with a population of 78-1/2 million, nearly as populous as contemporary France and Britain combined; it included Bihar and Orissa and, until 1874, Assam. The Eastern region was notoriously under-governed; in 1892, a proposal was on the cards for the adjustment of Chittagong, but was opposed by officials and Bengali pleaders due to

opportunistic attitudes. In February 1901, Sir Andrew Fraser (the Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces) sought the readjustments of the boundaries of Orissa; the file reached Curzon after 14 months. In 1902, Curzon had in mind to redistribute the boundaries of not only Bengal but also Bearar, the C.P. Madras, Bombay and Sind. In 1903, a plan emerged for severing the Eastern and predominantly Muslim regions of the Bengali speaking area and unifying with Assam, giving a new province with a population of 31 million, of whom 59% would be Muslims. This closely-guarded secret plan was leaked out; the new scheme was published in December 1903 and there was a hue and cry against it. The Hindu press wrote angry articles; Congress leaders like S.Banerjea, R.Tagore, N.Sen and Motilal Ghosh held demonstrations; a boycott of British goods followed. The Congress also passed a resolution condemning the partition plan. As the agitation against partition grew in force, Curzon toured Eastern Bengal to study the problem by himself on the sight.

In April 1904, Sir Andrew Fraser, Lt.Governor of Bengal wrote a note on the political aspects of partition. In December 1904, after his return from England, Curzon sent the scheme to the Secretary of State for approval; it was approved with marginal amendments and was published in July 1905; and the date for proposed adjustments was fixed as 16 October when the new province would start functioning. The new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam would have an area of 186540 sq.miles and a population of 31 million (18 m. Muslims, 12 m. Hindus); it would be consisting of Assam, Eastern and Northern Bengal, Chittagong, Dacca (Capital) and Rajshahi divisions (except 2 districts). It may be mentioned that in an undivided Bengal Muslims were lagging badly in education.

The first Governor was Sir Bampfylde Fuller who arrived when on 16 October the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam officially came into being; Fuller found him in a position of extremely difficult circumstances. Whatever might have been the reasons for the partition, the Hindus, their Press and the Congress interpreted it as a sinister move against national unity

and solidarity (vivisection of Bengali homeland), and partiality towards Muslims. Demonstrations were held; Hymns and national songs like Bande Matarum were shouted; Arya Samaj took a prominent part in preaching the Swadeshi doctrine; their preachers were touring the length and breadth of country, rousing interest in indigenous goods; Swadeshi stores were opened in many towns. Congress met under Gokhale's leadership and held stormy proceedings condemning the partition. Poet Tagore went so far as to suggest a boycott of Calcutta University. The Hindu merchants pressurised the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to put pressure on the British Government to reverse the decision on partition, if they wished to sell their products in India. Fuller also annoyed the Hindus by his remark, that "of his two wives, the Mohammadan one was favourite".

In the middle of Hindu agitation, Lord Minto was appointed Viceroy; John Brodrick was replaced by John Morley, for the Conservative party was defeated in the elections of 1905. Earlier Curzon had resigned due the difference of opinion with Kitchener (C-in-C in India) in which Brodrick had sided with Kitchener. Anyway, Morley's appointment was celebrated by the Congress, hoping that he would consider their demands more wisely and sympathetically. Morley (the Liberal) was cajoled by the Hindus describing him "as a man of enormous learning, a radical but pliable"; they admired and adored Morley and attached high hopes that now the British Government would consider their claims patiently, wisely and sympathetically. The immediate problem which confronted the new Secretary of State and the Viceroy was the Hindu agitation on the partition of Bengal. But very sensibly, Minto in his very first letter to Morley informed him that the partition was decided after a great deal of thinking; that official opinion approved of it; that the agitation against it was due to nefarious designs; that the Muslims were satisfied; and that the Hindu agitation was settling down. Morley, therefore, made a statement that the partition was a "settled fact" and there was no question of its annulment.

The Congress leaders were thus annoyed; a wave of indignation and defiance was noticed; and a full-fledged

campaign against Fuller had also been initiated. Fuller's policies were denounced by decribing them as "atrocious attitude, utter worn headedness, unfitness to hold such a high office" and demand that Fuller be remove from Governorship. In December 1905, during the Congress session, Gokhale made some critical remarks against the Govenment; B.K.Ghose, B.N.Dutt and some other extremist Hindus made fiery speeches and began the terrorist movement in Bengal. R. Tagore, B.C. Paul, A.Ghose were behind the Swadeshi movement in Bengal. But soon Minto had to make some moves to appease the anti-partition leaders. As a matter of fact, the Prince of Wales (later King George V) had planned to visit India in 1906; the Viceroy did not wish that the Prince's visit to India should be made uncomfortable. Minto, therefore, consulted S.Banerjea and Gokhale and succeeded in establishing a friendly atmosphere; it looks certain that Minto would have blamed Curzon for the partition of Bengal and might have given some hope of its annulment to the Hindu leaders. Morley also tried to win Hindu support by condemning some of Fuller's policies. It may be mentioned that it was a rare occasion when the Government did not support the Governor of a province. Fuller threatened to resign; the Viceroy would have liked to placate the anti-partition leaders and thus without having any consideration accepted Fuller's resignation. The agitation had paid off; the Muslims were depressed, for they were let down and sacrificed. The Muslims had been benefitted due to the partition; trade, industry, education, agriculture and other walks of life were showing signs of progress. Due to communal, jealousies, the anti-partition movement gained more momentum after Fuller's removal. The Congress was able to get the support of some British Parliamentarians like W.Wedderburn and H.Cotton who pleaded for the reunion of Bengal in order to bring peace in India. Likewise Ramsay MacDonald (later P.M.) and K.Hardie also visited India to help the Congress on the same issue.

THE SIMLA DEPUTATION (1906)

The Hindu agitation against the partition and some other factors convinced the Muslims to put in more efforts to safeguard their interests. On 20 July 1906, Morley (in the House of Commons) announced that he would consider proposals for reforms; the initiative should come from the Government of India. The Indian Councils Act of 1892 had also convinced the Muslims that the Government was planning to introduce representative Government. On 4 August 1906 Mohsin-ul-Mulk (Secretary of the Aligarh College) wrote to his Principal, W.A.J. Archbold, who was vacationing in Simla. The theme was that Archbold was requested to advise whether the Muslims should send a memorial to the Viceroy and to get his permission to receive a deputation. Minto saw this letter on 8 August and sent it to Morley; on 10 August. Archbold informed Mohsin-ul-Mulk that Minto would receive a Muslim deputation. Later Mohsin-ul-Mulk directly got in touch with Minto's private Secretary, Col. Dunlop Smith. The draft of address was written by Maj. Bilgrami (Nawab Imad-ul-Mulk) and was approved by a meeting at Lucknow. Minto was not given an advance copy of the address - not even by 19 September (1906) and was therefore unaware of the contents.

On 1 October 1906, Minto received the Muslim deputation of 35 prominent Muslim leaders from all over India in the Ball room of Viceregal Lodge at Simla; the delegation was led by Aga Khan (only 29 year old) who had close connections with the British. The long address was also read by the Aga Khan; it was moderate in tone claiming for Muslims a fair share in such extended representation as was now being planned for India: that the Muslim share should be calculated not merely on their numerical strength but also by reference to their political importance and the contribution they had made to the defence of the British Empire; the insufficient Muslim representation on the Bench, local bodies, higher bodies of the Universities was also brought into the Viceroy's attention. The address proposed that a fixed proportion of Muslims on Municipal and District Boards should be elected by separate electorates; that the proportion of

Muslims on provincial councils should be established with due regard to the Muslim Community's political importance, that a proportion to be returned by an electoral College composed of Muslims only; and that a similar arrangement should be adopted for the Imperial Legislative Council, appointment by election being preferred over appointment by nomination. The Deputaion also demanded a share in case of appointment of Indians on the Viceroy's Executive Council, and sought help for establishing a Muslim University. In the end the Deputaion expressed their feelings of loyalty to the British Raj.

Muslim demands and claims were examined by the Viceroy and the British Government. Minto, in his reply welcomed the representative character of the Deputaion and sympathized with the Delegation's views and aspirations. He agreed with the Deputationists on some points and assured that their political rights and interests would be safeguarded by him. The acceptance of the Muslim demands proved to be a turning point in the history of India. The Hindu press of Calcutta started a smear campaign against the Muslim Deputationists; even Moulana Mohammad Ali called it a "Command performance"; and some other leaders gave the impression that the Simla Deputaion was engineered by the British Government so as to have a check on the Indian nationalism. But it is not fair to accept such accusations and allegations. In the first place, it may be argued (in order to counter the allegations) that there is no reason or proof to suggest that Mohsin-ul-Mulk had become a puppet in British hands. Moreover, some recent writings on this subject reveal the fact that Mohsin-ul-Milk had to take loan (a substantial amount - 4000 Rupees) from King King and Company of Bombay. The amount was advanced to Mohsin-ul-Mulk personally, and it remained unpaid for a long period of time. Money was borrowed so as to defray the expenses for the Deputation; this loan was taken at 7% interest on the personal surety of Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk. The Nawab died on 16 October 1907. The Bankers got intouch with Aga Khan, Haji Musa Khan and Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk and gave reminders and notices that the amount must be deposited.

The Foundation of the All-India Muslim League

The Muslims had been pressing the Government to grant them the right to separate electorates, accepting the facts of life in India; politics in India was already communal in character. As a matter of fact, under the joint electorates the Muslims found it almost impossible to be elected on local bodies; no Muslim could become a member of the Senate under Curzon's Indian Universities Act. It is interesting to note that even in predominantly Muslim areas of the Punjab, Hindus, were elected due to the leverage used by their moneylenders. The Viceroy (Minto) had therefore officially recognized a fact that the Indian Muslims formed a distinct political community. But the Muslims had until now no clear-cut programme for the future only short-term planning was undertaken. Sir Syed had advised them to keep away from the political movements; but Hindu religious revivalism and hostility towards the Muslims led them to change their minds. The Congress also failed to allay Muslim fears; the Aga Khan had tried to convince Sir Feroz Shah Mehta that the Congress must accept the facts of life in India in order to make it attractive to the Muslims. But these efforts (and many more) were fruitless. The Hindus did not give in to these demands.

By 1906 the Muslim leaders were convinced that they must have their own political party which should protect and safeguard their rights; the Simla Deputation had strengthened their belief that a united force could have a tremendous impact on the Government policies. In pursuance of this belief, in November 1906, Nawab Salimullah of Dacca sent around a circular proposing the foundation of a political party under the name of All-India Muslim Confederacy for the protection and advancement of Muslim interests, combating the growing influence of the Congress, and encouraging Muslims of talent to enter public life. In the end, the circular requested all those who intended attending the forthcoming session of the Mohammadan Educational Conference to come prepared to discuss the

scheme at a special meeting. The annual session of the Conference was held in the last week of December, 1906 at Dacca. It was attended by 3000 delegates, so far the most representative gathering of Muslim India; Khwaja Salimullah's proposal was discussed on 30 December, Syed's 'ban' on political activities was lifted. The Nawab moved a resolution establishing a Muslim political party to be known as All-India Muslim League. Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk delivered the presidential address. The Central office of the League was at Aligarh and Aga Khan was elected its President. It is important to be noted that one of the resolutions passed at its very first meeting was the endorsement of the partition of Bengal and condemning the Hindu agitation for its annulment. The objectives were also clearly defined to be: (1) promoting feelings of loyalty to the British; (2) protecting and advancing the political rights and interests of Muslims and to represent their claims and demands to the Government; (3) preventing the rise of communal antagonism between Muslims and other communities. In 1908, a London branch of the Muslim League was established by Syed Amir Ali, who had retired to England. The inaugural meeting was held in London on 6 May 1908 (at the Caxton Hall) presided over by Amir Ali and Ibn-i-Ahmad acted as Honorary Secretary; some eminent Englishmen also attended its session. This branch played a key role in presenting the Muslim case on many occasions before the British Government, meeting the Secretary of State, other authorities and members of the British Parliament whenever it became necessary. From its organization to 1910, the League held its meeting every year except 1909; the first session was held at Karachi (1907) and the League's constitution was finally settled, fundamental objectives remained much the same as defined in December 1906. In 1908, the League met at Amritsar; Khan Bahadur Yousaf Shah was Chairman and Syed Ali Imam presided, constitution of the League was formally adopted, and a campaign for achieving the right to separate electorates (as promised by Minto earlier) was also undertaken.

Morley-Minto Reforms

Even though the Government had accepted the principle of communal representation through separate electorates, as for the details, Morley took the plea that he needed some more time for finalising the reform scheme. Morley was in touch with Minto and had appointed a committee to sort out the details. The matter was delayed due to some hurdles such as: proposal after proposal, amendments and various adjustments of claims and counter claims. In 1908, Morley came up with the idea of an electoral College which was a complete negation of the Muslim demand for separate electorates to which both Minto and Morley were already committed. The Muslims, therefore, registered their protests; Sir Shafi also wrote letters to Col. D. Smith (P.S. to Minto); and the League in India and in London, under Syed Amir Ali also emphasized the need for separate electorates. Finally, Morley announced his reform scheme in the House of Commons on December 12, 1908; in February a bill was presented by him in the House of Lords - and was passed after some marginal amendments. In April, the Bill was presented in the Commons, it was passed and became the Act of 1909.

The new Act enlarged the size and functions of the Imperial and provincial legislative councils; the Imperial council was now to be consisting of 60 more members (33 nominated and 27 elected). The provincial councils would have 50 members in big provinces and 30 in the smaller; the method of election was partly indirect and partly direct; and small non-official majorities were given at the provincial level but official majorities were given at the provincial level but official dominance was to continue at the Centre - it was thought to be essential. The new councils were not given any substantial authority. However, for the Muslims, the welcome change was the introduction of separate electorates. The Aga Khan and other Muslims appreciated it being an ideal solution of the communal problem. Eventually these communal electorates led to the creation of Pakistan. As expected the Congress and other Hindu organizations started a campaign against separate electorates; the Hindu Mahasabha also criticised and opposed. In 1910, the

Congress session vehemently criticised separate representation for the Muslims and demanded its removal from the Act of 1909. The anti-separate electorates campaign continued until the creation of Pakistan in 1947; only once, in 1916, the Congress accepted this system of representation, in order to win Muslim support.

Muslim politics from 1906 to 1911 remained complacent, cool and unperturbed; but from 1911 to 1914 the Indian Muslims were worried and terrified. The Muslims were alienated by the Government when at the Delhi durbar on 12 December 1911, the King George V announced the annulment of the partition of Bengal. As mentioned earlier, protests against the partition were in full swing, for it was beneficial to the Muslims of Eastern Bengal, providing them considerable opportunities especially for the down-trodden. And the trouble was created by the vested interests - Hindu lawyers and the Hindu press. The Muslim cared little about the Hindu agitation, for the Government had taken a firm stand, saying on a number of occasions that the partition was a settled fact and that under no circumstances would it be revoked. The Hindu agitation, therefore, gained more momentum. Moreover, when the Act of 1909 was passed giving separate representation to the Muslims, the Hindus were enraged once again. The extremist Hindu leaders in particular took a serious notice and did their utmost to put more pressure on the Government to cancel its decisions which according to their point of view were favouring the Muslims; some terrorist activities were also noticed. In January 1911, a Hindu member of the Imperial Legislative Council presented a resolution for the abolition of separate electorates; some Hindu leaders went so far as to criticise Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (died in 1898) for inculcating the two-nation theory. In the same year, in June (1911) John Jenkins, a member of the Viceroy's Council, presented a proposal for the annulment of the partition of Bengal and for the transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi; he suggested that these changes should be announced by the King on the occasion of the upcoming coronation Durbar at Delhi. The new Viceroy, Lord Harding, (Minto left in 1910) approved of the idea. As a follow up, a secret plan was made

and presented to the council; the plan was approved and the Viceroy got intouch with the new Secretary of State (the Marquess of Crewe) giving him all the details. Crewe approved of the plan; the King was also infomed - whcih pleased him.

In the meantime, the King left England in November and reached India in early December. By this time the Hindu agitation was dying out ; the anti-partition leaders had given up all hopes. On 12 December 1911, the King announced (at his coronation Durbar at Delhi) that partition was annulled by a Royal proclamation. This decision put a new life in Hindus; they were excited, deeply moved, thrilled and were extremly jubilant. The cheerful Hindus now expressed their loyalty to the Raj; the Congress thanked and expressed its gratitude to the King, to Lord Harding and his Government. But for the Muslims the annulment of the partition was sudden, startling, and a death-warrant; they were now disappointed sullen and disillusioned, for the Government had been telling them that the decision on partition would not be re-considered. The newest situation gave Muslims the impression that the Government had bowed before the Hindus due to their terrorist activities and that the loyal attitude of Muslims and little effect on the Government. The Muslims, therefore, lost all faith in the Government and its pledges, as they had been betrayed by the British. The result was that the Government had alienated the Muslims. Khawaja Salimullah of Dacca ("the wounded soldier") decided to retire form politics; after a great deal of frustration and depression, Nawab Salimullah died. The Nawab was convinced that the annulment of the partition of Bengal was an evidence of depriving the Muslims of the benefits of the division; Viqar-ul-Mulk also protested; and Moulana Mohammad Ali also recorded his anger and bitterness later on. The theme of Muslim grievances was that the Muslims should do all they could to strengthen their political movement in order to protect their interests. The Muslim League changed its creed from loyalty to "a form of self-government suitable to India". In the immediate aftermath of the annulment of the partition, some Muslim leaders began to think in terms of having a closer association with the Congress, now developed as a force to reckon with.

Similarly, some other developments and circumstances compelled the Muslims to have a complete overhauling of their attitude and re-orientation of their policies. The failure of the movement to establish a Muslim (Aligarh) University also provided plenty of ammunition for the Muslim resentment against the Government. The M.A.O. College was established in 1877; Sir Syed had expressed the hope that it would develop into a Muslim University in the near future. A scheme was, therefore, drawn up, and efforts began to upgrading it to the level of an affiliating University. But for the time being it remained a dream and the scheme remained on papers only. In 1903, the Aga Khan tried to revive it during his presidential address to the Muslims Educational Conference. The Government agreed to accept the proposal in case the Muslims raised a substantial amount of 30 lakhs so as to meet the expenses; it was huge amount to be raised by the poor Muslim community. However, efforts continued; the Aga Khan donated one lakh; old boys of Aligarh made hectic efforts. Moulana Mohammad Ali and Shoukat Ali and their press also appealed for contributions. The required amount was raised and the Government was requested to grant the charter; but in August, Raja Sahib of Mehmudabad received a letter from Harcourt Butler (Member Education, Govt. of India) saying that the proposed Muslim (Aligarh) University would not have any jurisdiction over College outside Aligarh; the Government also did not like the word Muslim University - it would be Aligarh University instead. The Muslims protested on the plea that if their University was not allowed to guide Muslim education in India, (by not affiliating) the main object of the scheme and the Aligarh movement would not materialise. Sir Shafi demanded that the movement must continue; Moulvi Mushtaq Hussain also decided to press on, accusing the Government of lack of sympathy with the Muslims. As a matter of fact, the Government feared that such an all-India Muslim highest seat of learning would propagate the pan-Islamic ideas and would become a tool of the Muslim youth; Lord Crewe had, therefore, (on this assumption) disapproved of the scheme. It may also be noted that some other influential Englishmen had also used the plea that the Muslim University would be undesirable because of

its "Communal teachings"; Hindu extremist leaders had also been opposed to the demand warning the Government that the proposed institution would be propagating Pan-Islamism in the future.

The Government of India also regarded the M.A.O. College as 'the seat of trouble'. But the Muslims were annoyed as their request of a Muslim University was turned down. As for the funds of the University, Mohammad Ali tried to divert the money of the purchase of Turkish bonds; some wished to spend it on establishing more Schools and Colleges; Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed (Secretary of the Muslim Educational Conference) however rejected these ideas out of hand. He insisted that the funds must be spent on the very project, the Muslims had in mind originally, and that the Aligarh University could be raised to the status of an affiliating University with the passage of time. Moulana Azad differed with this idea; he argued that the long-term aim of the Muslims must be the promotion of pan-Islamism and blamed that the Aligarh movement had paralysed the Indian Muslims.

Furthermore, the Government also collided with the Muslim opinion in July and August of 1913 on the issue of a religious incident, the Cawnpore mosque affair. What happened was that as a road-widening scheme, the Cawnpore municipal authority proposed to dismantle a washing place attached to the side of the mosque; it was decided to run a metalled road through Machelli Bazar. The trustees of the mosque agreed but other Muslims protested and got in touch with the Governor of the U.P., Meston. In the mean time the demolition work started; the Muslims protested but the Government took no notice, which led to the agitation and the police opened fire. In the ensuing riots at least 33 people were killed and more than 30 seriously wounded. The Muslims were deeply hurt. Raja Sahib of Mehmoodabad requested Harding to intervene. For Metson was determined to crush the Muslims. The Viceroy was also advised by Whitehall to take notice of the agitation personally. Harding, therefore, visited Cawnpore along with Sir Ali Imam (a member of the Viceroy's Council) ordered the release of the 106 prisoners awaiting trial. This small gesture was appreciated by the Muslims; the Muslim community of Cawnpore expressed

confidence in the Viceroy's intervention and hoped for a judicious decision. An arcade was to be built over the public road to make up for the lost accommodation. This compromise, however, infuriated the autocratic Governor and his staff; Meston did not forget this episode and tried to take revenge later on.

The Khilafat Movement in British India

Khilafat was one of the most important institution so far as Muslims were concerned; Hazrat Abu Bakar was the first Caliph and after him Hazrat Umar, Hazrat Usman and Hazrat Ali were appointed Caliphs. Amir Muawiyah changed the institution of Khilafat into Mulukiat (Badshahat) by nominating his son Yazid as his successor, which led to the tragedy of Karbala. However, the Umayyads were replaced by the Abbassids. After the sack of Baghdad (1258) the Khilafat passed into the hands of the Fatimid rulers of Egypt and finally to the Ottoman sultans of Turkey in the first half of the 16th century. The Mughal rulers did not recognize the Ottoman sultanate as their spiritual leaders; the Khutbah was read in their (Mughal) own name. However with the decline of the Mughal Empire, the name of the Ottoman Caliph was mentioned in the Friday (Juma) prayers; the Sunni Muslims renewed their allegiance to the Khalifa and invoked Allah's blessings on him. And therefore for the Indian Muslims the world Khalifa had a special significance. The Ottoman Empire was the Muslim power which had maintained a semblance of authority; the Indian Muslim looked upon it as the bastion of Islam.

In the Balkan wars Turkey was reduced in Europe to Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the Straits. The Muslims believed that the Western powers had been involved in a war against Islam. Eminent Muslim leaders like Moulana Mohammad Ali and Moulana Zafar Ali tried to help Turkey; Zafar Ali went to Constantinople in 1912 to give some financial help. A medical mission was also despatched to Turkey under the leadership of Dr. M. A. Ansari. Some other leaders like Moulana Azad, Mushir Hussain Qidwai, Moulana Shoukat Ali, Shibli Noumani also gave support to Turkey.

Turkey had not able to recouperate the losses of the Balkan wars when the first world war began. The British declared war (4 August 1914) against the Central Powers. The British India also inevitably became involved. In November Turkey made a fateful decision deciding to fight against the Allies. With a view to neutralizing the Muslims, Sir Edward Grey (the British Foreign Secretary) promised that the status of Caliph and the Holy places of Islam would be protected. More promises were made; point twelve of Wilson's "Fourteen points" had proclaimed that "the Turkish portions of the present Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty". On January 1918 Lloyd George (British Prime Minister) declared that the British were not fighting the war to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Thrace which were predominantly Turkish in race. But the fact of the matter was that during the war, the Allies had signed four secret agreements dividing the Turkish Empire: (a) The Constantinople agreement (18 March 1915) between Britain, France and Russia; (b) The secret Treaty of London (26 April 1915) between the same three powers; (c) The Sykes-Picot Agreement (16 May 1916) between Britain and France (d) The St. Jean de Mourienne Agreement (17 April 1917) between Britain, France and Italy. Later on, Lloyd George and the French Prime Minister, Clemenceau gave their fullest support to the Greek Prime Minister to capture Turkish territories.

In the meantime, the Ali brothers, Moulana Azad and Moulana Zafar Ali Khan wrote articles and editorials in their press, supporting the Turkish cause; Al-Hilal, Zamindar, Comrade, and Hamdard, should be appreciated for propagating the pro-Turkish feelings. In 1915, the Muslim League and the Congress held their sessions at Bombay. A resolution was presented by Jinnah that a committee be formed to draft a scheme of reforms in collaboration with the Congress. The joint deliberations of the League and Congress resulted in the famous Lucknow Pact (to be discussed in details, later on). In 1916 Jinnah appreciated the Lucknow accord; he also warned the British Government against the implications of its interference with the future of the Khilafat. Jinnah also requested the Government to consider the feelings of the Indian Muslims while

taking any decision against Turkey, reminding the Government that the Muslim loyalty to the Government should be appreciated. In 1918, the League held its session at Delhi; A.K.Fazl-ul-Haq, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr.M.A.Ansari once again urged the Government to have a soft corner for the Turks. In October 1918 Turkey was defeated by General Allenby's armies; his tactics offered poor Turks only a choice between rout and surrender. It was within two months after the conquest of Baku, the Ottoman government sued for peace and armistice. The Armistice of Mudros was signed on 30 October 1918 between Turkey and the Entente powers; the armistice with Germany followed on 11 November.

The aftermath of the peace settlement also agitated the Turkish mind and also troubled the Muslim World. Constantinople was occupied by the Allied forces; the British forces marched into Mosul; and the supreme Allied Council authorised Greece to occupy Smyrna and the Adjacent region. The Greeks landed on 15 May 1919; it was a blessing in disguise, for the Turks considered the Greeks a subject race and could not tolerate their superior position. It was a great challenge which acted as a powerful stimulant for the Turkish nation. At this moment the Turks were blessed by the God in the shape of a great leader Mustafa Kamal Pasha. On 19 May Kamal reached Samsun to organise the resistance movement declaring that they would not submit to foreign rule. On 22 June, at Amasya, Kamal declared that efforts would be made to protect the territorial integrity of the fatherland; that the Sultan's government was incapable of carrying out its duties. On 23 June, the Ministry of Interior issued a circular that Kamal had been dismissed. Kamal Atatürk and his associates, however, continued their struggle without any fears.

These anti-Turkish developments were extremely shocking for the Indian Muslims - a matter of sadness and pain. In May 1919, Muslims in Britain urged the Government to be sympathetic to Turkey, honouring its pledges. In June, Seth Yaqub Hasan (secretary of the League's deputation) presented a petition to the Prime Minister, dealing with issues such as the future of

Constantinople, the integrity of Turkey and the issue of Khilafat. Sir Theodore Morison also helped the Muslim point of view by writing articles. The Government was not prepared to accommodate these views; all section of Muslim opinion in India were enraged. In December 1918, some leading Ulema like Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal became active and alongwith Hakim Ajmal and Dr. M.A. Ansari formed the All-India Khilafat Committee at Bombay, and its branches were established in all provinces; on 17 October 1919 the Committee observed the Khilafat day - a complete Hartal (strike) was observed, Muslims kept fast and offered prayers. Umar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, A.K.Fazlul Haq, Abdul Aziz Ansari, Hasrat Mohani and Abdul Bari became extremely active. In November 1919, the Ulema from Deoband and Farangi Mahal established Jamiat-i-Ulamai Hind holding a meeting in Amritsar in the same month. At the same, the Khilafat Conference also held its meeting at Delhi, chaired by A.K.Fazlul Haq, appealing to the Muslims to abstain from participating in the official celebrations of victory.

In the meantime, M.K.Gandhi had intervened; Gandhi, Motilal Nehru and Pndit Malaviya were present in the Khilafat Conference of 1919. The Hindu leaders wished to give a tough time to the Government and therefore advised that Indians must adopt non-cooperation and boycott during their struggle against the British. In December 1919, the Khilafat Committee and the Congress met at Amritsar. There was much fraternisation between the two bodies. The Conference decided to send a deputation to the Viceroy and the British Prime Minister to present their views. The publication of the Rowlatt Bill, giving the British-Indian executive a wide range of repressive powers against sedition and the Amritsar Massacre of April 1919, when General R.E.H.Dyer fired on a crowd of demonstrators killing at least 375 and wounding at least 1200, had inflamed almost all sections of Indian opinion irrespective of community. In February 1920 Gandhi formally launched a non-cooperation movement, and in June 1920, after an all-parties Hindu-Muslim Conference at Allahabad, joined with Moulana Azad, the Ali brothers, Moulana Hasrat Mohani and some others to formulate a detailed

programme of non-cooperation with the Government. In September 1920, the Congress met at Calcutta and formally adopted non-cooperation as its creed. In July 1921 at Karachi as decided by the Khilafat committee, on 19 January 1920 a deputation under the leadership of M.A. Ansari, consisting of prominent Khilafatists and Congress leaders met the Viceroy (Lord Chelmsford). They demanded the preservation of the Turkish Empire and of the sovereignty of the Sultan as the Caliph of Muslims. The Viceroy told the delegation that he sympathised with them and was in touch with London, also pointing out the fact that the matter was before the peace conference to be decided jointly by the Allies rather than the British alone. Chelmsford reminded that the fact of the matter was that Turkey was an enemy of the British and therefore could expect little help; he, however, promised help for the deputation which was to proceed to London to lay their demands before the Government. The deputation led by Moulana Mohammad Ali left for Europe - the places also to be visited were: Hijaz, Nejd, Syria, Yemen, Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq). In March 1920, the deputation presented their demands in London; Lloyd George rudely replied that all defeated states would be treated at par; the Turks must also bear the brunt and consequence of the defeat. The delegation tried their utmost to argue their case in Britain, France and Italy but with little success and a lot of failures.

After the failure of the deputation there was a great deal of resentment in India. On 15 May 1920, the Government published the peace terms offered to Turkey; there was a complete disintegration of Turkey. Gandhi protested; the Central Khilafat Committee held a public protest and decided to adopt non-cooperation. In June 1920, a meeting of Hindus and Muslims was held at Allahabad to put pressure on the Government. In July, Azad and other Ulema issued a fatwa declaring India Dar-ul-Harb; there were two alternatives for Muslims, Hijrat or Jihad - Hijrat (Migration) was the only alternative due to the weak conditions of Muslims. Hijrat Committees were formed in all cities, persuading Muslims to emigrate to Afghanistan. It is recorded that about 18000 Muslims left India to settle in

Afghanistan. But there were plenty of problems for the refugees and for the host country. Eventually due to a lot of hardships, looting of caravans on the way, killings and deaths due to illness, the Hijrat movement had to be given up.

On 11 August 1920, the treaty of Sevres was signed between Turkey and the Allies; it deprived Turkey of all rights in Cyprus, Egypt and the Sudan, transferred the Arab areas of Turkey to British and French mandate, gave some Aegean Islands to Italy and allowed Greece to administer Izmir for five years. Italy was given special rights in Anatolia and Adalia and France in Cilicia and western Kurdistan. Mecca and Medina were to be given to Sharif Husain of Mecca, an ally of the British. The sultan had become a British puppet and therefore he had signed the treaty. But the treaty was not put to effect; Mustafa Kamal Pasha (Ataturk) came to the rescue. However, in October 1920, the Khilafat deputation returned to India. Moulana Mohammad Ali pressured the Aligarh College to join in the revolt against the British; he also laid the foundation of a national University, Jamia Millia at Aligarh (later shifted to Delhi). In 1921 the movement gained further momentum; in November the Prince of Wales visited India, a complete strike was observed in Bombay. Gandhi was intouch with the Viceroy and pressurising him by putting various demands; but the Viceroy refused to give in to these demands.

In the meantime, an incident happened which proved to be a great setback for the Khilafat movement. Of a sudden, on February 1922, a clash took place between the police and the stragglers of a procession at Chaura Chauri (a village of Gorakhpur, U.P.). The police officers opened fire and then returned to their police station. The angry-mob set fire to the police station burning alive 22 constables. After consulting the Congress Committee - but not taking the Khilafat Conference into confidence - Gandhi called off the anti-Government movement. He observed a 5-day fast and made a pathetic confession of his mistakes in the Young India of February 16. The grand structure of Hindu-Muslim unity which Gandhi had so assiduously built was damaged. In 1913, the Muslims had

changed their policy, committing to the achievement of self-government for India, the repudiation of the policy laid down by the Aligarh school of thought. However, the Khilafat Conference and Jamiat-ul-Ulema had no choice but to accept the decision of Gandhi making the Muslims more vulnerable.

On the other hand, in July 1919 and in August (1919) Kamal and the nationalists became more powerful and demanded the resignation of the Turkish Cabinet, giving them ultimatum. In October the Grand Vazir had to resign ("for reasons of health"); on 11 April 1920 the Sultan dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. On 23 April 1920, the Grand National Assembly began its session; Mustafa Kamal was elected president of the Assembly. Kamal then launched an intensive movement appealing to the national pride of the Turks and succeeded in arousing his nation. In fact, Kamal had to face five armies: Armenians in the East; the French in Cilicia; the Italians in Adalia, the Greeks in Smyrna; and the British in Constantinople. In 1920, Kemal was able to eject the French - towards Aleppo.

He also settled important problems of foreign relations by undertaking a reorientation of foreign policy. On 13 March 1921, he concluded an agreement with Italy based on economic concessions; the Italians, therefore, left Turkey. On 16 March 1921, Kemal signed a treaty with Russia, settling some boundary disputes; Soviet Russia was now a friendly nation. On 20 October 1921, Kamal struck a deal with France (the Franklin - Bouillon agreement). After securing Russian help and neutralizing the French and Italians, Kamal concentrated all his strength on defeating the Greeks. From 24 August to 10 September, the battle of Sakaria turned the tide in favour of the Turks; Greeks were driven back to the Mediterranean sea. Lloyd George (15 September) appealed to the Allies to defend the Straits; the response from France and Italy was negative. On 19 September, Harrington's French and Italian troops discreetly withdrew. The Turks now moved closer to the British troops. But the armistice was signed at Mudanya on 11 October 1922 which represented a complete surrender to the demands of the Turkish Nationalists. Lloyd George was deeply humiliated due to

his policy of encouraging Greece's imperialist adventures in Asia Minor; a week after the Mudanya Armistice he handed in his resignation.

After the Mudanya accord, the road was paved for a comprehensive discussion of all peace problems; on 27 October 1922, invitations to a peace conference at Lausanne were sent both to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) and to the Sultan. This ill-considered action precipitated the end of Sultanate; on 1 November 1922, a long and heated discussion took place in the G.N.A.; and the obvious move was to depose the Sultan and appoint his successor as Sultan-Caliph. But Kamal declared that the Sultanate should be abolished and the Caliphate alone should be conferred on Wahid-ud-Din's successor. On 16 November the Sultan requested the Commander of the Allied forces to help him save his life; the next morning he stole out of his Palace and boarded a British warship which took him to Malta. Wahid-ud-Din toyed with the idea of going to the Hijaz and establishing himself as Caliph; but the Arab world was extremely busy, dividing itself into nationalist states and therefore did not bother about the living symbol of unity of Islam. The 26th Sultan of the House of Osman died at San Remo in 1929. On 18 November 1922, the G.N.A. proclaimed the ex-Sultan's cousin, Abdul Majid, Caliph with the clear instructions that his duties would be confined to spiritual matters only.

In the meantime, the peace conference opened at Lausanne on 21 November 1922; Turkey's Chief representative was Ismet Pasha whereas Curzon was the head of the British delegation. Ismet Pasha did not accept Curzon's dictation and therefore for two months the conference was suspended; but in April 1923 it was resumed - Curzon had been replaced. On 24 July 1923, the parties signed the Treaty of Lausanne, embodying virtually all of Turkey's demands; it was a victory for Kamal Ataturk and his associates. Kamal's government had been recognized internationally and Turkey had regained her independence and secured the unity of her ethnic territory and national pride restored. But at home, the new Caliph (Abdul Majid) did not hesitate to defy Kamal Ataturk and took his duties seriously. On

24 November 1923, the Aga Khan and Syed Ameer Ali (a privy councillor) wrote to Ismet Pasha urging the imminent necessity for maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam by placing the Caliph-imamate on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations, and thus impart to the Turkish State unique strength and dignity. This letter was published in Turkish newspapers; Journalists responsible were arraigned before a Tribunal for high treason but were acquitted on 2 January 1924. On 3 March, the G.N.A., accurately reflecting the feelings of the country voted for the deposition of Abdul Majid, the abolition of the Caliphate and the banishment from Turkey of all members of the Imperial family. A deputy (member of the G.N.A.) who had visited India and Egypt declared that a number of representative Muslim bodies in these countries had authorised him to offer the Caliphate to Mustafa Kamal Pasha. But Kamal was unmoved saying that he would not accept, for "those who were offering had no powers to execute my orders - they were subjects of a King." Kamal later abolished religious courts; the ministry of Shariat and Auqaf was established. Ataturk had rejected the idea of Pan-Islamism by calling it a nefarious movement which not only retarded the modern secular development of Turkey but also entangled her in adventures and responsibilities that were no concern to the people of Turkey. He also held the view that Pan-Islamism had been a chronic source of friction with foreign powers.

In conclusion, the Khilafat movement failed to achieve its true objectives. As a matter of fact this movement had little to do with India; it was not realised by the Khilafatists that their objectives were neither practicable nor wholly justifiable. Perhaps it was due to these factors, Muslim leaders like M.A.Jinnah (later to become the Quaid-i-Azam) Sir Wazir Hassan, Raja Sahib Mehmoodabad, Mian Fazl-i-Husain and Sir Mohammad Shafi who had been more pragmatic did not actively participate in this movement. It may also be pointed out that allegations were made by some that the Khilafat Fund had been embezzled; accusations were also made that large sums of money had been unaccounted for; the treasurer of the organization was found to be diverting money to the promotion of

CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE: FROM MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS TO THE ACT OF 1935

When the Morley-Minto reforms (The Government of India Act of 1909) came into effect, different political organizations reacted in different ways. The political and constitutional advance was much less than the Indian political parties had in mind, they had demanding for and hoped to achieve. For instance the Act of 1909 did not meet many of the demands raised by the Punjabi Muslims. For one thing, separate electorates were not made a part of the new reforms in the Punjab; for an other, even though the elective system was introduced, its proportion was lower than other major Indian provinces. The Muslims complained; in the Muslim League's session (in 1910) they expressed their anger, dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction, The elections held under the new reforms further proved that their fears were well-founded. The Muslims fared very badly in the elections of 1912; it was noticed that even some of their best candidates had also been defeated. The Government nominated some Muslims, but they were hardly adequate to represent the Muslim case; the Muslim Press, and their political parties, therefore, criticised the system of joint electorates and continued to press their demands of adequate representation at all levels.

The Indian National Congress was also critical; Pandit Malaviya presided over the Lahore session of the Congress in December 1909 and bitterly criticised some provisions of the Act of 1909, especially the Muslim right to separate electorates (although partially introduced) as an injustice to his community (the Hindus). The Congress also disapproved of all special measures introduced by the Government to benefit the Muslims. In 1910 when the Congress

held its session at Allahabad the criticism was little milder. The Congress President, Wedderburn, was trying to bring about rapprochement between the Hindus and the Muslims, in other words between the Congress and the Muslim League; but these efforts failed. In 1911, the Congress session was held at Calcutta; even though the criticism against the introduction of communal electorates continued, the Congress thanked the Government for the annulment of the partition of Bengal.

In the meantime, the Muslims had been deeply annoyed with the Government due to many reasons. Very briefly, the frustration in the Punjab and some other factors at all-India level convinced the Muslims that Sir Syed's argument to keep the Muslim away from the Congress was no longer valid. Firstly, the partition of Bengal (as mentioned in an earlier chapter) was revoked after a vigorous Hindu agitation; its annulment had shocked the Muslims at large and their policy of unconditional loyalty to the British also received a severe blow. In 1911-12, the Government further alienated the Muslims by helping the Christian states against Turkey during the Balkan wars. Moreover, the Government was also refusing to accept some genuine Muslim demands such as to establish a Muslim University. In these circumstances, the Muslims realised that some sort of understanding with the Congress was essential. The radical group of Muslims, with the support of progressive group in the Punjab favoured a Congress-League accord. The result was that both the organizations drew closer as the time went by. In 1913, the League changed its creed, demanding the introduction of self-government in India; the Congress had warmly welcomed and appreciated this newest change of policy. It was calculated by the Congress that it was the right time when both the Congress and the League could agree on a common action on questions affecting national interests.

The main hurdle was the settlement of some basic issues of communal nature. In 1913, the Congress agreed in principle to have an amicable settlement of communal disputes in order to chalk out a programme for further political and constitutional advance. In 1915, the Bombay session of the Congress was a step forward in this direction. Mrs Annie Besant also played her part; she had hitherto been devoting her abilities towards religious matters, but now

deciding to enter the field of politics, hoping to do her best for the betterment of her countrymen. Mrs Besant laid the foundation of the Home Rule League; she also pressed B.G.D. Tilak to rejoin the Congress Party. The death of Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Ferozshah Mehta (in 1915) facilitated Tilak's re-entry into the Congress ranks. Mrs Besant also put pressure on the extremist Hindu leaders that it was essential to settle at least some communal issues in order to put pressure on the government for constitutional advance. The good omen was that the League had come under the liberal and dynamic influence of M.A.Jinnah and Moulana Mohammad Ali who wished to get in touch with the Congress in order to formulate a scheme of reforms.

In October 1916, nineteen (out of twenty seven) elected members of the Imperial Legislative council drafted a "declaration of rights", commonly known as "the memorandum of the nineteen". It was perhaps the first Indian attempt at constitution-making; both Hindus and Muslims appended their signatures - a significant event towards Hindu-Muslim Unity. It was presented to the Viceroy (Lord Chelmsford). The proposals in the memorandum could be summarized as follows: 50% members of the Imperial and provincial Executive Councils should be elected; that all Legislative Councils should have substantial elected majorities; that all Legislative councils should have control over the Budget and the right of voting supplies; that the council of the secretary of State should be abolished; that all Provinces should have full autonomy; that India should be given a position of a self-governing Dominion; and that all Indians should have the right to carry arms, to enlist in territorial units and to win commissions in the Army on conditions similar to those prescribed for Europeans.

The Scheme of the Nineteen received considerable importance in Indian political circles; it was looked at in great details and was amended after discussions at subsequent meetings of the Muslim League and the Congress. The foundations of a League-Congress entente were laid at the end of 1915, when both organizations held their annual sessions at the same place and at the same time (Lucknow); and this practice continued until 1921. Eventually, therefore, a pact was reached on the subject of further reforms in

India. The celebrated Lucknow Pact (as it came to be called) was the result of a policy of give and take, concessions by both sides. It was a matter of great satisfaction that the Congress accepted separate electorates for Muslims not only where they existed but also their extension into the Punjab and the C.P.; Muslim minorities in the U.P., Bihar, Bombay and Madras received weightage whereas in the Punjab and Bengal, the Muslims had to forgo a certain number of seats (being allocated 50% and 40% seats respectively - although the Punjab and Bengal were predominantly Muslim Majority provinces). At the Centre, one-third seats were allotted to the Muslims. Another important feature of the Lucknow Pact was that no bill or resolution affecting a community was to be proceeded with in any council if three-fourths of the representative of that community did not approve of it.

The Lucknow Pact was widely supported by various interests in India; the Shafi group in the Punjab however opposed the accord on the plea that the Punjab Muslims were not given 56% representation on the Legislative council. But the Muslims at large were happy that at the cost of their majorities in the Punjab and Bengal they had gained certain advantages in their minority provinces. The Muslims, therefore, supported administrative and financial autonomy for provinces; that 80% members of Legislative councils should be elected; that the role of the Secretary of State for India should not be more than the Secretary of State for colonies with the Governments of the Dominions; and the Dominion status was demanded for India, at par with other Dominions.

Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms

For the first time in the History of British India, the Indian leaders had been able to sort out their communal differences; the Lucknow Pact was the first and last accord between the two great communities of India, the Hindus and the Muslims. And for the first and last time so much pressure was put on the Government to introduce more reforms in India due to Hindu-Muslim Unity. The Government had no choice but to satisfy the Indian aspirations by

granting a measure of constitutional advance with hopes to convert India into a status of self-governing nation with its connections with the British commonwealth. Lord Chelmsford who succeeded Lord Hardinge in April 1916 was also planning in terms of a scheme of post-war reforms; he addressed this question by inviting political leaders for suggestions to be incorporated in his proposed scheme of Reforms. On 20 August 1917, E.S. Montagu (the Secretary of State for India) made an announcement in the House of commons; Montagu had replaced Austen Chamberlain on 20 July 1917. Montagu wished to have an increasing association of Indians leading to self-government and decided to go to India to discuss the issues involved. He landed in Bombay in November 1917; he was the first Secretary of State to visit India for purely political purposes. He met M.A. Jinnah, Sir Shafi, Gandhi, Malaviya, Tilak and Mrs Besant.

Montagu also visited all provinces and had a great deal of discussions with officials at various levels (almost from top to bottom). It was noticed that the Secretary of State was hostile towards communal electorates. However, one thing was clear in his mind: a step by step approach towards full responsible Government as stated by the August Declaration. The final outcome was the Report signed in April 1918 and issued in July 1918. A complex scheme of a divided Government called dyarchy was to be introduced; provincial administration was divided into reserved and transferred subjects. The reserved departments would be administered by the Governor (through members appointed by him); the transferred subjects would be administered by ministers. The Report retained separate electorates but disapproved of the system of communal representation; separate representation was also extended to the Sikhs, but was refused to other minorities. The Governor and his Executive Council were given special powers; the Governor was given the power to enact any bill, bypassing the Legislature by "certificate" that it was essential. The Central Legislature would be bicameral: the lower house (the Legislative Assembly) and the upper house (The Council of State); and of 100 members of the Assembly two-third would be elected and one-third nominated by the Viceroy. Provincial legislatures were also enlarged with at least 70% elected element; franchise was also extended. The Viceroy's council was to continue to be responsible to the

Secretary of State. The salary of the Secretary of State should be transferred to the British Exchequer. A council of princes was to be established. It was also decided that at the end of ten years a commission would be appointed to examine the working of the system and to advise on further constitutional reforms.

As expected, the Report was criticized; the extremist leaders reacted and condemned the proposed reforms. The Congress (1918) termed the proposals as disappointing and unsatisfactory. The Muslims were also disappointed but they did not reject the Report. Later on, two committees were established; one was presided over by Lord Southborough and the other by Richard Feetham. These committees toured India. Another committee was established under Lord Crewe. These committees made recommendations and the Government of India also gave its proposals.

In the meantime, the Government had been investigating revolutionary activities in India; an investigating committee of Jurists (the Indian Sedition Committee) under the Chairmanship of a British Judge (Sir Sidney Rowlatt) presented a Report on 15 August 1917, based on a survey of revolutionary crimes. In 1919, the Rowlatt Act was passed; people could be tried by courts with special powers given by the Act and the judgments were final and conclusive. Inevitably, disturbances and protests were noticed all over India against Kangaroo Courts; troops had to be called to restore law and order situation. The Lt. Governor of the Punjab (Sir Michael O'Dwyer) banned the entry into the Punjab of every political leader and suppressed the most popular newspapers. The trouble, therefore, broke out in the Punjab on 9 April in Amritsar when a magistrate ordered firing upon a crowd of protesters. On 13 April (1919) General Dyer ordered the shooting of an unarmed crowd in Jallianwala Bagh. Dyer had issued a proclamation banning meetings but it was not given enough publicity; even the organizers of the Jallianwala Bagh meeting were not informed properly. The meeting took place, therefore, as planned; Dyer (a crack-brained British General) ordered to fire straight at the crowd; in 10 minutes 1650 bullets were fired killing 397 and seriously wounding 1650. The Indians were outraged; hartals were observed and the Martial Law

authorities retaliated by taking strong actions. Demands were made by Indians for the recall of O'Dwyer and Chelmsford and an action was suggested against General Dyer. An enquiry committee was announced by the government with Hunter as Chairman on 14 October 1919. The Hunter committee was boycotted by the Congress. The Congress had appointed its own committee of Enquiry; it charged O'Dwyer; the Government of India and the British Government also came to the conclusion that Dyer's action was indefensible. Dyer was therefore retired from office on March 23, 1920.

The Working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms and Communal Antagonism

In June 1919, Montagu introduced the Government of India Bill in the Parliament; it was referred to a Joint Select Committee of both the Houses of the Parliament. M.A.Jinnah and Yakub Hassan presented their views before the Committee demanding full responsible Government. The Joint Select Committee presented its Report to the Parliament. Eventually the Bill (after some amendments) became an Act on 23 December 1919. The moderate opinion appreciated the Act of 1919 as a step towards the introduction of responsible Government, appealing to all walks of life to extend their co-operation for the successful working of the Reforms. The Congress, However, declared that the Act was not what they had hoped for; demands were made for an early establishment of full Responsible Government.

However, the Reforms were introduced; the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (or the Act of 1919) brought some major changes in the administration of British India; beginning of a responsible government was therefore made in the eight provinces of British India namely Bombay, Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa and Assam. The elections were held (under the new Act) in December 1920 and ministers were appointed after the elections. The ministers under the new system became powerful in their respective departments; they were empowered to make independent policies,

and also with the approval of Governor, make appointments in the transferred subjects. The responsibility of elected ministers for the transferred subjects of local self-government and education offered scope for political patronage which was often preferably dispensed to members of the minister's own religious community or caste. Moreover, while choosing ministers the British governors always tried to take into account the communal proportions in their provinces. It so happened that where Muslims were incharge of their departments, they tried to remove various anomalies in order to give a due share to their community. Mian Fazl-i-Husain in the Punjab and A.K.Fazl-ul-Haq in Bengal used the power and influence to benefit the Muslims in official employment, local government and education. But the Hindus (and sometimes Hindus and other communities like the Sikhs) viewed such policies as an assault on their long-held superior position. The net result was that the Hindu members set aside their class and caste differences and in a highly organized fashion started a movement against all Muslim ministers who were trying to improve the conditions of their backward community. Fazl-i-Husain and Fazl-ul-Haq, according to the Hindus were showing them as to how the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms could be turned to the advantage of their own community.

The Punjab and Bengal situation affected the all-India politics, with the result that a severe communal competition for power started. It were the Hindus who had opened once again one of the saddest chapters of the Hindu-Muslim relations. The official record on this issue reveals the fact that the Hindu community was not prepared to see Muslims progressing even in their majority provinces such as the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindu minorities in these Provinces favoured the return of a bureaucratic rule to replace Muslim ministers, and to prevent Muslims from securing a share of power commensurate with their numerical strength. Communal antagonism was not confined to Legislative councils, Press and ministries, it was also seen in the streets. Serious communal riots occurred at Multan (1922), Paniput (1923), Rewari (1926), Lahore (1927) also at Agra, Saharanpur and Shahjehanpur, Allahabad, Lucknow, Aligarh, Bareilly and Cawnpore. Communal rivalries were intensified due to the movements like Shuddhi (purification) and Sangathan (consolidation); the latter were founded to reclaim

Muslims to the Hindu fold and to harden the Hindu for militant action by drill and physical culture.

The Muslims retaliated by establishing the tabligh and tanzim movement in 1924; these movements were generally patronized by the Ulama but eminent Khilafatists like Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew also gave them assistance. Swami Shraddhanand (the founder of the Shuddhi Movement) was also active in reconverting the Malkana Rajputs to Hinduism; thirty thousands were said to have been reclaimed. It may be mentioned that the Arya Samaj Movement was also doing all it could against Islam and Muslims. Rajpal published a pamphlet (Rangila Rasool) attacking the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). It may also be noted that the Punjab Muslims had often attacked the High Court in Lahore for it was biased against the Muslims; the Hindus dominated the Bench - its Chief Justice Shadi Lal is also remembered for his anti-Muslim feelings. Rajpal was convicted by a magistrate and was sentenced to ten months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of 1000 rupees. The conviction was maintained by a session judge. But Rajpal challenged the decision in the High Court in 1927, and the high court acquitted him. Not only the Muslims but even the Government thought that Rajpal should not have been declared free from blame. The Muslims took the matter to the streets by taking out large processions. The Viceroy (Lord Irwin) and the Governor (Sir Malcolm Hailey) were greatly embarrassed by the judicial decision. The communal tension worsened when Rajpal was murdered by a Muslim (Ilm-ud-Din); the latter was sentenced by the court and executed. The two communities were so hostile that the Punjab Hindus ignored the death of a great Muslim leader, Moulana Mohammad Ali, and the Muslims in return took no notice of the death of a great Hindu leader, Motilal Nehru. It may be noted that Moulana Mohammad Ali had been a great supporter of the Congress. At one time the Moulana went so far that he called the Simla Deputation "a command performance". But later on Moulana Muhammad Ali was disillusioned with the Congress and the Hindus; he criticised the Hindus for not allowing the Muslims to have their due share in administration and in other spheres. In 1924, Moulana Mohammad Ali expressed his apprehensions that Pandit M.M. Malaviya and his other extremist friends had been trying to turn Congress into a purely Hindu political party. Later on, the Moulana

was more furious when he publicly stated that a fallen Muslim was better than Gandhi. Moulana Muhammad Ali was driven away from the Congress; it was an inevitable result of the Congress policy for the promotion of Hindu interests and relegating the Muslims to the background. Now Mohammad Ali who was a staunch supporter of Gnadhi's non-co-operation movement became the vehement champion of Muslim rights.

Efforts for Constituional advance after the Act of 1919

During the first three years of the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, there emerged a situation of no compromise between the Muslims the Hindus and the Sikhs. Each community, disregarding the other, pushed its claims regarding its representation in the Legislative councils, in the local bodies and in the services. With the passage of time relations (as mentioned above) between the communities went from bad to worse. Each community wanted to have the upper hand in the administration; in some cases the Hindus and Sikhs (and others) pooled their resources against the Muslims.

Meanwhile, at all-India level the Nationalists had been demanding more reforms. The government had introduced the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms with a view to satisfying the 'legitimate aspiration of the Indians for reforms'. As far as the moderate and the 'reasonable' opinion was concerned, the reforms were welcomed. But the extremist section of the Indian opinion had rejected these reforms as inadequate. Ever since, there had been constant demands, raised by the advanced section of Indian politicians for further constitutional advance in India. As early as September 1921, Mozumdar Bahadur moved a resolution in the Central Legislature asking for the establishment of autonomy in the provinces and the introduction of responsible government at the Centre. The resolution was later amended by the Assembly, asking the government to appoint a committee for the purpose stated in the original resolution. The Secretary of State, however, did not agree with the demand, on the plea that further progress was possible under the existing Act. His despatch (of November 1922) did not satisfy Indian opinion and in the following year demands were again made for the grant of constitutional advance. By 1924, the situation had become worse from the government's point of view; the Swarajist element had won

a great victory in the recent elections, and their entry into the Councils had accelerated the demand for further reforms in India. On 5th February 1924, Diwan Rangachariar moved a resolution recommending an early revision of the 1919 Act, with the object of granting full self-government dominion status to India, together with provincial autonomy in the provinces. Moti Lal Nehru tabled an amendment suggesting the summoning of a Round Table Conference to recommend a draft constitution for India. The debates took place on the 8, 13 & 18 February 1924, and the amended resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority of the Assembly.

This notable success of the Swarajist Party was due to the fact that Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and the Independent Party (consisting of 17 members) had fully supported the move. He stood for a full inquiry into the Act of 1919, and was opposed to the government's desire to avoid the issue by conducting some sort of departmental inquiry. The Quaid was in agreement with Nehru, the leader of the Swaraj Party, as the demand developed in the Assembly. It was only due to the combined pressure of Hindus and Muslims that the government agreed to institute an inquiry into the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, introduced only three years earlier. The Home Member, Sir Malcolm Hailey, expressed government's readiness 'to make a serious attempt to investigate justifiable complaints against the working of the scheme in practice; to assess the causes and to examine the remedies, in necessary'. The government also expressed its willingness to make recommendations to the British Parliament, should the inquiry suggest any advance within the boundaries of the existing Act.

This commitment first led to the appointment of an official committee with the object of examining the Act of 1919 and the possibilities of amendments, leading to the better working of the administration. It was followed by the appointment of the Reforms Enquiry Committee presided over by Sir Alexander Mudiman; the other members were Sir Mohammad Shafi (then Law member of the Viceroy's Council), the Raja of Burdwan, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Sivaswami Aiyer, Sir Arthur Froom, Sir Henry Smith, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Dr. Parajnpye.

Incidentally, Jinnah was in need of support which the Punjab and more specifically Fazl-i-Husain could provide; his Unionist Party had been successfully working the Reforms and he was opposed to the non-cooperation movement, sticking to constitutional means and getting most out of it. Jinnah also wished to be within the constitutional means. In the 15th session of the League (1923) the Quaid had failed to secure a decision in this direction. Thus with the object of giving support to Fazl-i-Husain who was in trouble (due to the Hindu-Sikh campaign) and at the same time enhancing the League's prestige, the Quaid arranged to resume the League's discontinued session of the previous year in Lahore. The Quaid during his address referred to the non-cooperation movement by calling it a mistake and a failure. He then referred to the communal friction arising from the communal claims of each community. He proposed a revision of the Lucknow Pact, which would give Muslims more seats in the Punjab and Bengal Legislative councils; he also linked the freedom of India with Hindu-Muslim unity by saying that Swaraj (self-rule) is an inter-changable term with Hindu-Muslim unity. It was resolved that India must be recognized as a federation with full provincial autonomy giving majority rights to the Muslims of Bengal, the Punjab and N.W.F.P., with separate electorates retained and the powers of the Centre to be kept to a minimum.

Meanwhile, the Government of India (due to the pressure of "Nationalists" leaders) directed its provincial governments to elicit opinion on the subject of further reforms. On the whole satisfaction was expressed on the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. With official information in hand, the Mudiman Committee assembled in Simla on 4 August 1924 and started its business. Various organizations presented their views in writing and their leaders personally appearing before the committee. The Mudiman Committee published its report in December 1924, diving itself into two groups. The official group held the view that the Act of 1919 was working in most provinces and that it had not failed as claimed by certain "advanced politicians"; the Report, however, deplored the existing communal friction. It rejected the proposal to lower the franchise qualifications; separate electorates was allowed to continue. Political parties were not satisfied; in 1925 the League urged the British Government to appoint a Royal Commission with

the object of establishing self-government in India; it was decided to establish a committee to frame a scheme for constitutional advance.

On the other hand (as mentioned earlier) India (in early 1920) was found in the grip of a severe kind of communal crisis. After the murder of Shradhanad, a most serious communal clash occurred in March 1927 at Kulkathi in the Barisal district of Bengal. A crowd of 1,000 armed Muslims came out to fight a Hindu procession passing before the mosque playing music. The armed forces opened fire to disperse the crowd and as a result 14 rioters were killed and seven injured. The affected mostly were the Bengali Muslims. The Bengal Muslim Conference raised its voice against the behaviour of the Bengal Government. An inquiry after this incident revealed that the existence of communal electorates for Muslims was generally described by the Hindus as a major cause of communal clashes in India. Needless to say, these electorates were highly desirable from the Muslim point of view, but were never considered to be an ideal form of representation. Even the leading Punjabi Muslims, such as Sir Fazl-i-Husain, Sir Abdul Qadir and Sir Muhammad Shafi considered this form of representation a temporary measure. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had introduced this system "only as a necessary evil". The Government through the publication of the Mudiman Committee Report in 1924 also made it clear that a solution of this problem was highly desirable, if further constitutional advances were to be achieved. Above all, these electorates were only considered to be means to an end; and the end in view, as far as the Muslims were concerned, was only to safeguard their legitimate interests.

Thus, before the much-awaited appointment of Royal Statutory Commission (The Simon Commission), it was thought to be highly desirable to find a way to remove this barrier. The Hindu members of the Congress Party in the Assembly met on 17 March 1927; on the same day Muslim leaders met at Dr. Ansari's house, where a modification of the existing system was discussed, but no progress was made. On 20 March, an influential group of Muslim members of the various legislatures met under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah; they discussed the possibilities of introducing

common (Joint) electorates; and at the end, a set of proposals, commonly called the Delhi Proposals, was evolved. The Muslims made a provisional offer to give up their right to separate electorates under certain conditions; the separation of Sind from Bombay; introduction of reforms in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan; one third representation for Muslims in the Central Assembly; and that Muslim representation in the their majority provinces should be on the basis of their population. The League leader had planned that once he had received a clear answer from the Hindu leaders, he would discuss the matter with the central committee of the League, Khilafat Conference, Jamiat Ulema, the Muslim members of the Council of State and the Assembly, and then might form a small committee to discuss matters with the various Hindu organizations. Even after these arrangements, the final settlement would be subject to ratification by the various Hindu-Muslim organizations of the country. It was a very long process of consultation which could not have materialized.

The Delhi Proposals were published on 20 March 1927. Sir Shafi representing the Punjab Muslims had fully agreed with the initiative in the Delhi meeting, But on his return to the Punjab, Sir Shafi changed his mind. Shortly afterwards the Punjab Muslims rejected the Proposals, without even considering it at any appropriate level. The Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey, met the Viceroy to apprise him of the latest situation: "The Punjab Muslims are greatly upset by Jinnah's statement about joint electorates..." The Viceroy in turn wrote to the Secretary of State that "Jinnah's statements did not carry any weight". The other two communities of the Punjab also rejected the Proposals. The Punjab Hindu Mahasabha met on 23 March, and passed a resolution challenging the right of the Congress to represent the Punjab Hindus in its negotiations with the Muslims. The Sikh leader, Mangal Singh, appreciated the offer of the Muslims to give up the seprate electorates, but criticized the principle of reservation of seats for them; he also opposed the idea of giving majority rights to Punjab Muslim. The Mahasabha leaders like Lala Lajpat Rai and Pandit Malaviya, who were in close touch with Raja Narendra Nath in the Punajab, had also rejected the Proposals by remarking that it meant 'heads I win: tails you lose'. Narendra Nath and Lajpat Rai argued the case of the Punjab Hindus in the

Mahasabha session in April 1927; this gathering was prepared to accept neither majority rights for the Muslim nor the principle of the separation of Sind.

The attitude of Mahasabha gave a genuine excuse to Sir Shafi to oppose the Proposals on the behalf of the Punjab Muslims. Now Sir Shafi was able to put the ball into the Hindu court. Addressing a session of the Punjab League in May 1927, he said: "Until the mentality of the Hindu Mahasabha undergoes the necessary change and that body come to realize that without Hindu-Muslim Unity the attainment of Swaraj for our common motherland is an absolute impossibility ... Until an effective guarantee of the protection of its vital interests is forthcoming, the Muslim community will continue to insist on the retention of separate electorates as an integral part of the Indian constitution". Similar views were expressed by other leading Muslims such as Sir Abdul Qadir and Allama Iqbal. Allama Iqbal reiterated that in the existing political conditions, separate electorates provided the only means of making the central and provincial councils truly representative of the Indian peoples; he strongly pleaded for the continuation of this system in the future Indian constitutions. Sir Abdul Qadir also argued in favour of retention of communal electorates, which had been in existence since the Montagu-Chelmsford reform came into effect. A few days later the Viceroy commented: "Shafi's speech made it clear that Muslim opinion has not wavered in the very least way on the subject of electorates which the Muslims still regard as their greatest safeguard." This point of view was given a good deal of support by the Governor of the Punjab and the Viceroy. The Governor wrote to the Viceroy and the Viceroy told the Secretary of State that the Muslims would not accept the joint electorates; the Punjab group led by Sir Shafi was described as 'very influential' and 'truly representative' of not only the Punjab Muslims but also the whole of the Indian Muslim opinion.

The opposition of the Punjabi Muslims to the Delhi Proposals gained strength with the passage of time. Following the unequivocal rejection of the Muslim Punjab, the Quaid visited Lahore to assess the situation for himself. Here he tried hard to prevent the provincial Muslim League from taking an independent line on the question of

electorates and to win the Unionist support for his Proposals. But he failed to enlist any support whatsoever, and left the province empty-handed. Now the Unionists were on the way to making their case even stronger; F.K.Noon came to lead the movement from another angle. By the end of July 1927, he was able to secure a declaration in favour of the maintenance of separate electorates, signed by the Muslims members of the Punjab Council. It declared that the Muslims favoured the continuation of communal electorates until they could be abandoned by common consent of Hindus and Muslims. This document was a seal of rejection on the attempts to give up the communal electorate. In addition to this, the Unionists sent Sir Zafrullah Khan (a member of the Punjab Council and joint secretary of the Punjab League) and Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, on a 6-week tour to England to 'state their views on questions which will come under review when the Statutory Commission is appointed'. Both Sir Zafrullah and Sir Shafaat met some influential politicians and gave press statements against the proposed introduction of joint electorates. They argued that the continuation of separate electorates was justified under the provisions of the Lucknow Pact; and that the Muslims felt very strongly that any change in the existing form of representation would seriously affect their welfare. They also criticized the vigorous Hindu propaganda against the communal electorates.

This propaganda by the Punjab Muslims, led by the Unionists, clearly indicated that under no circumstances were they prepared to negotiate the communal form of representation. While their representatives were busy abroad, at home they were also opposing the moves by the section of the Muslim League which followed the Quaid. The League leadership wanted to hold its forthcoming session at Madras, in order to enlist support of some U.P. members. 'Realizing that at Madras they would be swamped by the element which was in favour of joint electorates', the Punjab leadership prevented this move. The governor was very pleased. The governor sent this news to Fazl-i-Husain who was in London at the time: "Feroz Khan bestirred himself a good deal about this and it was quite clear that the advocates of the joint electorates were outnumbered. I fancy as a result that we shall certainly have a meeting at Lahore".

This decision was vital from the government's point of view particularly because of the forthcoming Statutory Commission. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had provided for the appointment of such a Commission after 10 years, in order to examine India's constitutional problems and make recommendations to the government on the future Indian constitution. However, the date of the inquiry was advanced by the British government, under pressure from the Indian leaders. The commission was appointed in November 1927. Unfortunately it contained no Indian members. Although the Congress and the Muslim League under Quaid-i-Azam decided to boycott, Sir Shafi's group of the League and the Hindu-Sikh opinion in the Punjab decided to co-operate. The study of some confidential files reveals some reasons for the Punjab's co-operation with the Simon Commission. The Hindus were pinning their hopes on the forthcoming Statutory Commission. They had many grievances against the Muslims. For example they complained against the reservation of seats for Muslims in various colleges in the Punjab; they were also against fixing of Communal proportions in the services; but the most important complaints was against the existence of separate electorates which the Muslims regarded their Magna carta.

In February 1928, Sir John Simon suggested that the Council of State, the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures should elect representatives to co-operate with the Royal Commission. The Simon Commission had completed its preliminary inquiry by March 1928. However, when the Simon Commission was making its preliminary enquiries in the Punjab, and the Punjab was electing its committee to co-operate with the Commission, the all India leaders who stood for boycott were making efforts to draft by themselves a constitution for India. The Congress invited all India political parties to co-operate in preparing a 'Swaraj' constitution. The Muslim League under the Quaid accepted the offer; "the Shafi group" did not. Later, when Congress deviated from its stand on the Delhi Proposals, the League also withdrew its support. The 'All Parties Conference' met in March 1928, but failed to reach an agreement on communal issues such as the reservation of seats for Muslims and the separation of Sind from Bombay. The Sikhs in particular were very strongly opposed to the claims of the Muslims of,

the Punjab and Bengal. The conference reassembled in May, but by that time the communal organizations had drifted further apart. This attempt also failed to resolve the long-standing communal disputes. However, a committee was formed under Motilal Nehru's chairmanship to draft a constitution for India, keeping in view the communal problem as a whole.

The Nehre Committee met in June and July 1928; on 7 July it succeeded in adopting a compromise formula whereby the demands for reservation of seats for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal were conceded for 10 years, or earlier, by agreement. But unfortunately the very next day the original agreement was altered; only the reservation of seats for minorities was permitted. The Punjab Hindus were not opposed due to any high national consideration, but due to the fear that they might lose their privileged position if the Muslim majority in the provincial legislature was guaranteed. The Nehru Committee published its recommendation in August 1928. Some Muslim claims were accepted, but all their main demands were completely rejected. Its recommendations on matters such as communal electorates and reservation of seats for the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal were particularly harmful to the Muslim interests of these provinces. The Muslim right of representation through communal electorates, on which the Punjab felt very strongly, and which was retained by the Mudiman Committee, was opposed by the Nehru Committee. It said: "It is admitted that sepatate electorates are thoroughly bad and must be done away with ... (they) are bad for the growth of a National spirit ... (they) must therefore be discarded completely ... we can only have joint or mixed electorates". The Committee also faced a serious problem in accepting the principle of reservation of seats for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League strongly opposed the grant of such a right to the Muslims. The Sikh representative, Mangal Singh, opposed the creation of a Muslim majority by reserving seats for them. In case the Committee decided to grant such a right to Muslims, Mangal Singh demanded 'adequate and effective' representation for the Sikh community in the Punjab. When the Nehru Report, was published, some Muslim leaders of the Punjab, without giving it much thought, gave their approval to it. The vice-president of the Punjab League supported the

recommendations; Sardar Habibullah, deputy president of the Punjab Council, himself a big land-owner, also approved of the report. Similarly, Dr. Alam, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Dr. Kitchlew, Maulana Abdul Qadir Qasuri commended the Nehru Report and made statements in its favour. The Hindu-dominated press gave a good deal of publicity to these statements to show that the report had been accepted by the Punjab Muslims. Muslim members of the Congress such as Azad and M.A. Ansari were also ready to accept giving the impression of a Muslim 'yes' to the Nehru Report.

Although the Punjab Muslims, like the other parties, had presented their case before the Simon Commission, they had not been able to enlist the support of the elected members of the Central and local Legislatures, as Fazl-i-Husain had desired. Nevertheless, the Nehru Report had completely failed to get Muslim support. Men like the Ali brothers 'who appeared as the erstwhile lieutenants of Gandhi during the Khilafat Movement and as staunch supporters of the Congress, now turned into restless critics'. Similarly, the League leader, the Quaid-i-Azam, who had recently returned from a trip to Europe, in spite of the efforts of the Congress leaders, refused to give his approval to the Nehru Report. Instead he took the matter to the League. By the time the League held its session, in December 1928, it was required to form its opinion on the Nehru Report, its representative character was also under threat. The Punjab group which had revolted in the previous year on the question of Simon Commission, was able to organise itself into 'First All India Muslim Conference'; the party consisted of the elected Muslim members of the Central and provincial Legislatures. It was also holding its session to present the Muslim demands against the background of the Nehru Report. Three months before the session, the Muslim Conference had invited the Quaid as well as the Muslim League to send representatives to the proposed session. The League leader was personally opposed to the existence of such an organization, claiming that only the League represented Muslim opinion. This issue came up for discussion in the League's session. A heated debate took place; M.C. Chagla and Raja Mehmedabad particularly expressed their feelings against accepting the invitation, implying that the Muslim Conference was intended to place the League in the background and that acceptance of its request would be to sign the

League's death-warrant. In the end the offer was rejected by an overwhelming majority; the Shafi group was also criticized.

The League was also asked to send its representatives to the All Parties Convention, called at the same time, to give final approval to the recommendations of the Nehru Report. A 23 members committee was appointed to present the Muslim point of view over the issue of Nehru Report. This committee participated in the convention and proposed a few amendments to the Nehru Report. The Quaid made a conciliatory speech; he argued ably and eloquently for acceptance of his amendments. But the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh representatives were vehemently opposed to any "changes to appease Muslim opinion". The Mahasabha had the strong support of the Punjab Hindus who were against any compromise with Muslims; its delegates distributed pamphlets and extracts from Lala Lajpat's speech against any revision of the Report. The Sikh representative, Mehtab Singh criticized the principle of reservation of seats; if seats were reserved for Muslims, the Sikhs demanded that 30% should also be reserved for them. In the light of this intense criticism, the convention rejected the proposed amendments one by one. Later on Jinnah presented his "Fourteen Points". The failure of the Congress to accept Jinnah's "fourteen points" and his amendments to the Nehru Report were significant turning point along the way to the partition of India. It was "the parting of the ways".

The rejection of the Quaid's amendments greatly affected the credibility of the Muslim League in the Indian politics. On the other hand the uncompromising attitude of the convention enhanced the prestige of the "Shafi group" and its newly organized Muslim Conference. Under the circumstances many hitherto influential supporters of the League transferred their loyalties to the "Punjabi Muslim group". As a result Sir Shafi proudly addressed the Muslim Conference session (Delhi, 31 December 1928 - 1 January 1929) and criticized the All Parties Convention, the Quaid and the League for 'neglecting' Muslim rights. He moved a resolution laying down Muslim demands, such as the continuation of separate electorates, a due share in the Central Legislature, reforms in Baluchistan and the Frontier Province, and separation of Sind from Bombay. The pro-

Unionist dailies such as The Civil and Military Gazette and Inqilab gave a good deal of publicity to the Conference's proceedings, and to Sir Shafi's statements, implying that the Muslim Conference was a true representative of Muslim opinion in India. Sir Shafi's resolution became the basis of the demands made by the Conference to counter the effects of the Nehru Report. Shortly afterwards (March 1929) the Muslim League also came out openly against the Nehru Report; the Quaid presented his proposals for Hindu-Muslim settlement, commonly known as "Jinnah's 14 points". These points also amounted to a complete rejection of the Nehru Report and were similar to the Muslim Conference's demands; but for the League and Jinnah there was no chance of regaining lost support and prestige. Shortly afterwards, the Punjab Governor arranged a temporary appointment for Fazl-i-Husain in the Viceroy's Council, which was later renewed for a full period (1930-35) by Lord Irwin. This particular arrangement put the League in the background, and at the same time gave a leading role to the Punjab Muslims in the Indian constitutional advance.

On 31 October 1929, Lord Irwin made an important announcement which in essence recongnized the ultimate goal of Indian political aspirations and the attainment of dominion status. It was decided that after the Simon Commission's Report had been published, a Round Table Conference would be held to determine the future constitutional advance for India. Before this announcement was made, manoeuvring began at official level in favour of giving a dominating role to the representatives of the Muslim Conference. Sir Malcolm Hailey was a great supporter of this idea. Soon, Fazl-i-Husain took charge as one of the members of the Viceroy's Council. The Unionists were very enthusiastic; Fazl-i-Husain had earlier promised to safeguard their interests in the forthcoming negotiations in London. As soon as Fazl-i-Husain became a member of the Viceroy's Council, his authority started to increase; the Punjab Governor sent a note to the Viceroy, authorising Fazl-i-Husain to nominate Punjabi Muslims to the Round Table Conference. The Viceroy authorised Hailey and Fazl-i-Husain to decide the question of Muslim representation on the Round Table Conference. Fazl-i-Husain wanted to secure the domination of the Punjabi Muslims point of view; he recommended Zafrullah Khan and Shafaat Ahmad

Khan, (son-in-law of Sir Shafi). With Sir Shafi already on the government's list, these two were "essential to counter the view of the Jinnah group in the conference".

Before the completion of arrangements for the Round Table Conference, the long-awaited report of the Simon Commission was published in May 1930. This report did not support Muslim opinion on separate electorates. It expressed the opinion that communal tensions could only be reduced by making both communities dependent on the support of the joint electorate. The Simon Commission suggested several alternative methods in this direction.

The Commission rejected the unitary system for India insisting on a Federal system, proposed to scrap the Dyarchy so that the ministers should be responsible to the elected Legislatures; every Province should have full responsible government. The Report also proposed that franchise should be extended and Legislative assemblies be enlarged; that the N.W.F.P. should be given a Legislature but not responsible government; that the separation of Sind should be further examined; that Federal Assembly should be elected by the provincial councils; that a Council of Greater India would be established to discuss common matters relating to India; and that the new constitution should be framed in such a way that it could develop by itself.

These recommendations feel short of Muslim demands on various issues regarding the future constitutional advance for India; for the Report rendered the position for Muslims much weaker than it had been under the Act of 1919. There emerged a feeling of resentment and disappointment; Chowdhary Afzal Haq resigned his seat in the Legislative Council; Allama Iqbal and Sir Shahnawaz also criticised. The Muslims, therefore, stuck to their demands raised from various quarters (Muslim Conference, the Muslim League, the Unionist Party's group etc). The Congress reacted to the Report in a different way; it had authorised its high-powered working Committee to start a "civil disobedience" movement as and when it deemed fit. Demonstrations, protests and violence was seen in the streets. The result was that the Government declared the Working Committee as an unlawful body and Gandhi and Nehru were arrested.

By this time the Labour Government was again in office in Britain; it decided to shelve the Simon Report and hold consultations with Indian leaders at a Round Table Conference in London, where matters would be finally decided. Moreover, the Government of India also asked its local government in the provinces to send their views on the Simon Report. This move was extremely important because these opinions were to be sent to London for the forthcoming Round Table Conference. Provincial Governments, therefore, sent memoranda in two parts; one consisting of the opinion of the non-official members of the Government. The latter part gave an opportunity to all the communities to air their grievances against the Simon Report. The Government of India also sent a memorandum on the subject of Reforms, after receiving suggestions from the provinces; the memo paid its tributes to those local Governments which had been working the complex dyarchical system and recommended that it be replaced by the introduction of provincial autonomy; that the Legislatures should be wholly elected; that communal electorates should be retained for the Muslims unless the two-thirds decide otherwise; and that the Governors should be given overriding powers.

The Round Table Conference

The first session of the Round Table Conference was held from 12 November 1930 to 19 January 1931; it was inaugurated by King George. The Congress was not represented at this session in protest against the British refusal to accept the goal of immediate dominion status for India; it was conducting a non-co-operation campaign in India. The plenary session (which followed from 17 November to 21 November) discussed the question whether the future constitution of India should be on a federal or unitary basis. (Sir) T.B.Sapru enunciated the idea of an Indian Federation and requested the princes to accept his idea. The Maharaja of Bikanir approved of the idea and the Nawab of Bhopal also endorsed the plea for the transfer of responsibility. M.A.Jinnah also insisted that there should be a sense of security among the minorities otherwise the

constitution would not work. The plenary session was followed by the meetings of the committee constituted to discuss various aspects such as: Federal structure, Provincial constitution, Franchise, Sind, The N.W.F.P., Defence services and Minorities. The committees on Provincial constitution and Franchise committee were able to make some progress. However, the Minorities committee, which was chaired by the Prime Minister himself, proved to be a major hurdle against an agreeable solution between the various communities; at least eight of the twenty nine members were deeply interested in the Punjab problems - it was more difficult than that of Bengal. Each community presented its stereotyped claims and none was prepared to budge from its original claims. The first session, therefore, failed to achieve any progress except that the British Prime Minister (Ramsay MacDonald) declared that the Government had accepted the proposals for "full responsible government in the provinces".

The Gandhi-Irwin Pact

The British Government as well as the Government of India had realized that there could be no settlement unless the Congress had also been taken into confidence. Wedgwood Benn (the Secretary of State) suggested to the Viceroy (Lord Irwin) to get intouch with Gandhi. Irwin persuaded the new Labour Government to allow him to release Congress leaders; the Congress working committee held its meeting at Allahabad. In February 1931, Sapru, Jayakar and others also returned to India and held discussions with Gandhi and other members of the Congress. Gandhi agreed to meet the Viceroy; the talks continued for some time (In February and early March). On 5 March an agreement was signed commonly known as the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. It was agreed that the Congress would be invited to participate in the Round Table Conference; that Civil disobedience movement would be discontinued; that Federation was to be created; that Ordinances promulgated in connection with the civil disobedience movement would be withdrawn; that pending prosecutions would be withdrawn (except in case of violence); that prisoners would be released; and that fines would be remitted. The Congress held its meeting and approved the Gandhi-Irwin settlement, committing the Congress to participate in the RTC;

Gandhi was appointed the sole representative of the Congress. In summary, concessions were made to the Congress Party which enhanced its prestige. The Muslims were depressed and expressed their fears, for the Government had gone a long way to appease the Congress.

The Second Session (RTC)

In April 1931, Lord Willingdon replaced Lord Irwin as Viceroy, and Sir Samuel Hoare became the Secretary of State in August 1931. The All India Muslim Conference (February 1931) rejected the Federal structure, calling upon the Muslims to be ready and prepared to resort to any action for asserting their just demands. A special session of the Conference was held on 5 April at Delhi; Moulana Shoukat Ali declared that the Muslims supported Jinnah's "fourteen points". The Muslim League also endorsed the line taken by the Muslim Conference. However, the second session of the Round Table Conference started on 7 September 1931; thirty one additional delegates were appointed. The main problem before the Conference (according to the British Prime Minister) was the solution of the communal issues. The Minority committee was once again the focus of attention; it was to decide such controversial matters as the form of electorate and weightage for each community in various Legislatures. The Muslim delegates made demands similar to those of Jinnah's "Fourteen Points" and refused to commit themselves to the principle of responsible government at the Centre, unless their demands for guaranteed majority representation in the Muslim Majority provinces were accepted. But agreement between the Muslim and Congress's representative, Gandhi, proved impossible. For one thing, Gandhi claimed that Congress was a truly representative body so far as Indian problems were concerned - describing other delegates as unrepresentatives.

For another, Gandhi presented a carbon copy of the Nehru Report in the Conference which had been rejected by the Muslims in 1928. Moreover, the Mahasabha leader, M.M. Malaviya, had the upper hand of Gandhi in the Conference; there were little chances of acceptance Muslim demands on the part of this doughty upholder in

its integrity of the ancient traditions of the caste Hinduism. In one of his speeches, Gandhi declared that the task of making the Hindu consent to Muslim claims was like climbing the mount Everest. Gandhi also raised hurdles by saying that "Untouchables" were Hindus and therefore they could not be separated from the main body of Hinduism. The Muslims stood aloof and did not participate in any discussion which would not ensure the satisfactory settlement of their demands. The communal disputes were, therefore, postponed for future discussions. But the British went ahead with their own plans for an Indian Federation, which would balance Congress against the Muslims and the Princes against elected Indians in the Legislature of British India. Ramsay MacDonald made it clear that the Government would settle the issues by itself; the Prime Minister asked the Chairman of the Franchise Committee to go ahead with the task of preparing a detailed scheme for the composition of the various Legislatures. This committee formed provincial Franchise Committees.

The Communal Award

The position was that the two marathon sessions of the R.T.C. and the Indian leaders themselves had failed to resolve the communal issues. In the light of (above mentioned) Prime Minister's declaration, the British Government attempted to remove this great obstacle from the path of constitutional advance. On 4 August 1932, Ramsay MacDonald announced the government's decision, commonly known as the Communal Award, with a promise to recommend to the British Parliament the substitution for the Government's decision of any agreed solution reached by the Indian leaders themselves. The Award retained separate electorates for the Muslims as well as for the other communities. It failed to give Muslims an overall majority of seats in the Legislatures of Punjab and Bengal. In the Punjab, the Muslims were given 47.6% as against a population proportion of 56.5% in Bengal where the Muslims formed 56% of the total population, they received about 48% of the total provincial seats. The Award, as anticipated, failed to satisfy all the three main communities. On his return to India, Gandhi had started his civil disobedience movement; his "fast unto death" began

in order to get the communal Award amended so far as it had effected an electoral separation between the Hindus and the "Untouchables". When it went unheaded, the Congress officially declared itself neutral towards the Award. However, other communal organizations such as the Mahasabha and the Sikh Political Parties started a campaign to get the Award cancelled by the British government. The Muslims were not pleased but felt satisfied under the circumstances that they themselves had suggested a British Award with promises to abide by the decision. This gesture led to a closer co-operation between the Muslim League and the Congress parties in the Central Legislature from 1934 to 1936.

The Third Session (R.T.C.)

In September 1932, less than three weeks after the publication of the Communal Award, the Viceroy announced the summoning of a third session of the Round Table Conference. The last session (November 17 to December 24) was held in order to prepare an outline for the new Indian Constitution. Jinnah was not invited to attend the third and the concluding session of the Conference; he later commented that the Hindu attitude (during the two sessions of the R.T.C.) led him to believe that there was no hope for unity in Indian politics; and that the Muslims were like the dwellers in no man's land. The Sikh representatives, Ujjal Singh and Sampuram Singh, also did not attend; they had resigned due to their protests against the communal Award. However, Tara Singh and the Mahasabha had accepted the invitations to attend the R.T.C., despite protesting against the Award, in effect confining their struggle within constitutional channels. The Congress was also not present. This last session was, therefore, short and unimportant; the Hindu-Sikh delegates, however, criticised the Award pleading against the Muslims and in favour of a strong Central Government; reports of various committees were looked at. The Hindu-Sikh demands to turn down the Award were rejected by the British Government, and the last session came to a close on Christmas (on 24 December). Following the last session of the R.T.C. a white paper was published in March 1933, giving a complete outline of the proposed constitution; it included a scheme of the Federal Government of India

at the Centre which would come into effect after a number of Indian States had acceded to the Federation. The White Paper was appreciated by the three parliamentary parties in the Parliament. Attlee went one step ahead and asked the Government to fulfill its promises of full self-Government and self-determination and Dominion status for India. In March 1933, Sir Sam. Hoare proposed (in the Commons) the appointment of a Joint select Committee; the motion was carried with an overwhelming majority; and the House of Lords also adopted it. The Joint Select Committee was appointed in April with Lord Linlithgow as its Chairman. The Indian representative (21+7) appeared before the Committee for presenting their suggestions, criticism etc. The Hindu-Sikh delegates pooled their resources and severely criticised the Communal Award and the Muslims. However, a Bill was prepared and introduced in 1934; the two Houses of the British Parliament (the House of Commons and the House of Lords) approved it; and the Royal assent was given on 4 August 1935, and therefore, the communal Award became a part of the new Indian constitution.

The Government of India Act, 1935

The Act of 1935 was a remarkable accomplishment so far as constitutional and political progress in India is concerned. The process of framing the new Act took about eight years of work; it was initiated with the appointment of Simon Commission under the conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, and Lord Birkenhead as the Secretary of State and continued under the Labour Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald and the Secretary of State, Wedgwood Benn. Sir Samuel Hoare (later Viscount Templewood) R.A. Butler (later Lord Butler of Saffron Walden) Linlithgow (later Viceroy 1936-43) and Sir Maurice Gwyer (later Chief Justice of India) would always be remembered with the Act due to their strenuous efforts for drawing this new Indian Constitution. The most important feature of the Act was the introduction of Provincial autonomy (transfer of power and practice of parliamentary self-government) in each of eleven Indian provinces. Power was transferred entirely from British to Indian hands. It may be mentioned that this Act (with a few amendments) served as the working constitution for Pakistan for nine years and of

India for three years. However, it may also be noted that this Act had been designed to safeguard British rule in India, not to weaken it. Even though the intentions of the framers of the Act were that the provinces should be genuinely self-governing within their allotted sphere, and that under federation there should be a genuine dyarchy or sharing of power, the Viceroy and Governors were given discretionary powers. Indians had no say over defence and external affairs; the Centre was equipped with all the powers to stamp its authority and to keep centrifugal tendencies in check. Section 102 of the Act gave the Viceroy power to direct the federal legislature to make laws for the provinces during an "emergency". Under section 93, if at any time the Governor of a province was satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the Government of the province could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Act, he might by proclamation declare that his functions to any specified extent should be exercised by him in his discretion, and assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any provincial body or authority except High Courts. The Governors used these special powers to take over the administration in all provinces except Sind.

Some other broad features of the Act of 1935 were: (a) Some notable decisions were embodied in the Act. Burma and Aden were separated from India with which they had previously been governed under one Governor-General; Sind (previously part of Bombay) was given the status of a separate province and Orissa (previously joined to Bihar) also became a separate province. The N.W.F.P. was, for the first time, invested with full provincial power. The authority of the Crown in respect of the Indian States was removed from the Government of India. It passed to the Crown Representative who exercised his functions in relation to the Indian States through the agency of the Political Department, local Residents and Political Agents.

(b) The franchise was very wide; at one stroke, the lowering of the franchise qualifications (from 2.8% to 11.5% of population (256 millions) by lowering the property qualification) increased the electorate to over thirty million and separate electorates remained. The normal life of the Assembly was five years. The upper chamber

was a permanent body, a proportion of whose members would retire and be replaced every third year.

(c) The Act of 1935 contemplated a Federation of British- Indian Province and Indian States; but the federation was never created - the bones of the federal system including a detailed separation of powers, were formed and exercised; under the Act, including the fall-back provisions for the Centre pending the Federation, an interim Government of a wholly popular-political kind eventually came into office.

The provinces consisted of Madras, Bombay, Bengal the, U.P., the Punjab, Bihar, The C.P. and Berar, Assam, the N.W.F.P., Orissa and Sind. In a Federation so established were to be included the Chief Commissioner's provinces of Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, British Baluchistan, The Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Panth Piploda. The provinces would automatically accede to the Federation; but in case of States it was voluntary. The ruler of a State would accede to the Federation by executing an Instrument of Accession which would have to be accepted by the Government and the Federation and the Royal Proclamation would be issued. But it could not happen unless one-half of the states by weight agreed to federate; and this never happened.

(d) The Federal legislature was to be bicameral; the upper chamber was to consist of 260 representative of whom 104 or 2/3 to be chosen by the rulers of the States; 140 seats were allotted to the Provinces (75 general electorate, 6 scheduled castes, 4 Sikhs, 49 for Muslims and 6 for Women, 1 Anglo-Indian, Europeans 7, Indian Christian 2, 6 to be nominated by the Viceroy. The lower house (the Federal Assembly) was to consist of 375 (125 from the States; 250 seats were allotted to the provinces (Hindus 105, Muslims 82, minorities 26, Industry and Commerce 11, Labour 10, Landholders 7, Women 9). The executive authority was vested in the Governor General; he will take advice from a council of ministers not more than ten, to be appointed by the Governor-General.

In the U.P the number of seats in the Assembly was increased to 228, of which 140 were general (20 for scheduled castes and 66 Muslims); In Bihar there were 86 general to 40 Muslims, out a

total of 152 seats. In Bombay, where the Muslims were less than 10% they had 30 seats (75 general including 15 for scheduled castes). In the Punjab and Bengal the Muslims were denied majority; In the Punjab, the Muslims (with about 57% population) were given 86 seats out of 175 and in Bengal of 250 seats only 119 were given to Muslims.

(e) As regards Centre-Province relations, A federal court was constituted for the purpose of resolving the disputes; the Federal Court of India consisted of a Chief Justice and two judges.

(f) Three lists of subjects were drawn up; the Central government administered the federal subjects where as the provincial government had full authority in provincial matters. There was a third list of Subjects called the "Concurrent list" on which the Central and provincial legislatures were both competent to legislate, but the administration of which was left to the provincial governments (subjects included were: Civil and criminal Law, factories, labour welfare, ect.)

(g) The Council of the Secretary of states was abolished and replaced by a team of Advisers (not less than three and not exceeding six) to the Secretary of State; but their advice was not binding on him; and the finances would be provided by the British exchequers.

Despite its good points, the Act of 1935 was criticised; its federal provisions were condemned by almost all the parties. Jinnah declared that the scheme of federation was totally rotten, unacceptable and unworkable. The Muslims League denounced the safeguards in the Act of 1935 but decided to utilize the provincial part of the Act for what was worth. The Congress was also opposed to the Act; it demanded complete independence. On the other hand, the Muslim League wanted to have an autonomous Muslim State or states to serve as counterpoise against the remaining Hindu India. By this time the Congress had been divided into no-changers and pro-changers or Swarajists; Gandhi had withdrawn from the political arena to carry on his social uplift programme and economic organization. Later on the Swarajists were also divided into two groups with the result that their communal party, the Hindu Mahasabha gained strength and was able to attract a number of Congress leaders by accelerating its anti-Muslim movement.

Provincial Autonomy, Congress Rule And The War

The Government had announced that the new Act (1935) would come into effect in April 1937. However, the part of the Act dealing with the Central Government depended on the condition that a sufficient number of States (as mentioned in the last chapter) would accede to the federation. As this did not happen, the constitution of the Federal union, therefore, had to be kept in abeyance. In the meantime some important changes took place; Marquess of Zetland (Lord Ronaldshay) replaced S. Hoare as Secretary of State in June 1935; and Lord Willingdon retired and Lord Linlithgow was appointed as the Viceroy in April 1936. Zetland and Linlithgow were faced with a peculiar situation; J. Nehru as President of the Congress session of December 1936 declared that they would go to the Legislatures not to co-operate with the British Imperialism, but to combat the Act of 1935 and seek to end it; that they were not going to pursue the path of constitutionalism; that they would have nothing to do with office and ministries because it would be a partnership with the British imperialism; and that they must think in terms of deadlocks and not in terms of carrying on with the office. The Congress appointed a committee to organize the election campaign (R. Prasad, B. Desai, Azad, Rajaji, V. Patel, A. N. Dev and G. B. Pant). The manifesto, among other things, rejected the Act of 1935 and demanded its replacement by a constitution framed by the elected Assembly; the real aim was to end the Act, "ordinances and other rules and regulations which had oppressed the people."

On the other hand, Muslim politics were in a confused condition during the years Jinnah was out of India. Jinnah was shocked when his amendments to the Nehru Report were not accepted and this ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity was attacked by Hindu leaders

like Jayakar and Pandit Malaviya; he was even more hurt when Gandhi and Motilal Nehru instead of supporting Jinnah, defended the politics pursued by the anti-Muslim Hindu Mahasabha party. Jinnah was also annoyed when Congress (1929) declared independence of India (Purna Swaraj) completely ignoring the Muslim League. Moreover, the Shafi-Fazl-i-Husain group and the All-India Muslim Conference's behaviour further alienated Jinnah. He might have said: enough is enough and that he had no more business in India to do. He, therefore, decided to leave India (at least for some years) to settle down and practise law in London, confining himself to appeals before the Privy Council; and later Jinnah applied to London's Inner Temple to let chambers that was vacant and the application was accepted for Jinnah was so distinguished a person. In London, Jinnah spent perhaps the most comfortable and peaceful years of his life and also established a reputation for excellence before the Privy Council. But in India, Jinnah was remembered and missed by his community due to his qualities, abilities and most of all his unpurchasability; he was requested to return to India by leaders like Liaquat Ali Khan, and to lead his community. It would to an exaggeration to say that a person like Jinnah decided to return to India due to any body's advice; the decision was definately his own. However, Jinnah returned in March 1934 to revive the moribund Muslim League. While in London, Jinnah was re-elected by the Muslims of Bombay City to represent them in the Central Assembly. In 1935, Jinnah met with Congress Presidnet (R.Prasad) for talks but failed to resolve the communal disputes; Malaviya once again was living in fool's paradise and therefore was unable to read the new sings that Jinnah was bound to rise so high where he could be the most difficult customer; Malaviya once again rejected Jinnah's demands. In February 1935, Jinnah spoke in the Assembly for the acceptance of the Communal Award and rejected the All-India Federation Scheme. The Congress leader, B.Desai, spoke against Jinnah's proposal to accept the Award; but Jinnah's argument carried the House by a vote of 68 to 15. Jinnah was, however, willing to accept the provincial part of the Act (for what it was worth) even though he shared, the Congress objection to the discreationary

powers of the Governors. He also wished that discretionary powers of the Viceroy be modified

After Jinnah's return to India, the Muslim League (on the other hand) showed fresh signs of life (which had been in a moribund condition ever since the Shafi-Noon group had rebelled against Jinnah) Jinnah always wanted the Punjab to be a vital part of the League and therefore a close association with the ruling Unionist Party and its leaders had always been important to Jinnah's political strategy. So far as the re-organization of the League was concerned it was a long-term project (which might have taken several years) but the elections were due shortly. Therefore, the best solution was to have an alliance with the Unionists; Jinnah wrote to Fazl-i-Husain (the Unionist Chief) inviting him to preside over the forthcoming session of the League; and the Aga Khan also requested Fazl-i-Husain to accept this offer. But shrewd Fazl-i-Husain refused because he did not wish to disturb the status quo in the Punjab, which could have proved extremely risky for his party. The League however held its session under Sir Wazir Hasan and among other things decided to authorise Jinnah to form a Central Parliamentary Board to fight elections. He selected the members (thirty five) from all over India. Among the names chosen were the members of the Muslim Unity Board who represented the nationalist group, a number of old Khilafatists, Ahrars and members of the Jamiatul Ulama. The Board held its first meeting in Lahore on 8 June 1936 and adopted the election manifesto, declaring that the League stood for full responsible government for India, deplored the enactment of the Act of 1935, however accepting the Communal Award but rejecting the federal and provincial constitutions and defining the election programme of protecting religious rights; to secure repealing of all repressive laws; to protect and promote the Urdu language and script - etc. On the Communal issues, Jinnah had earlier (February 1935) declared that: "So long as Hindus and Muslims are not United, let me tell you that there is no hope for India and we shall both remain slaves of foreign domination and that half the battle for independence was won if Hindu-Muslim Unity was achieved."

Similarly Bengal was also a key province for the Quaid-i-Azam; the chances of success were better in Bengal than in the Punjab.

There had been a great deal of competition between the Nawab of Dacca's United Muslim party and Fazlul Haq's Krishak Proja Smaiti. Soon a United front between these two parties was mooted; but the negotiations failed on the question of leadership. At this moment M.A.H.Ispahani and A.R.Siddique decided to attend the Lahore meeting of the League's Parliamentary Board. The Quaid gave them the task of organising the Bengal League. Soon the Quaid was requested to come to Bengal. Jinnah reached Calcutta; the United Muslim Party went into voluntary liquidation by joining the League on a limited liability basis; in other words the Nawab's party took over the "mantle of a moribund Muslim League in Bengal". This unity brought renowned leaders like H.S.Suhrawardy and Khwaja Nazimuddin into the League's fold. Initially Fazlul Haq had also agreed but later he had second thoughts and changed his mind. The result was that the rivalry between the Muslim League and Fazlul Haq intensified. Later Haq and the Congress concluded an unwritten (unholy) alliance not to hurt each other which led the Muslims calling the Proja party as "The running dog of the Congress Party"

The other two Muslim-majority provinces, Sind and the N.W.F.P. were also equally important for the reorganization of the Muslim League. In Sind and the N.W.F.P. and in the Punjab, Muslim leaders had confined themselves to getting special privileges for their community under the British patronage. In Sind, leading Muslim politicians were: Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah (1879-1948) and Sir Shahnwaz Bhutto; the tragedy was that these two could not work together. There were many political parties; Seth Abdullah Haroon (1872-1942) founded the United Party with its non-communal manifesto and was able to have Bhutto's support. G.H.Hidayatullah established Sind Muslim Party. Jinnah, on the other hand, liked to have them all working for the Muslim League but failed to get a positive result at this stage. And thus before the upcoming elections in this predominantly Muslim province (72% Muslim population) the Muslim League and Jinnah failed to make inroads. In the N.W.F.P., however, a few supporters of the League pleased Jinnah by asking him to establish the League's Parliamentary Board. But it was clear that the force to be reckoned with was the Khudai Khidmatgars and their Congress bosses.

In the U.P. the Muslim League expected to get the support of Muslim landowners who disliked the Congress programme based on socialist ideas trying to end their influence; some ex-Congress Muslims were also ready to help the League. The Nawab of Chattari and Nawab Sir Muhammad Yusuf were ready for co-operation; the Raja of Mehmudabad also came to help the League, providing financial support (which continued for a very long time) and the Rajas of Salempur and Mehmudabad joined the League's newly established Parliamentary Board. Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, however, continued his association with the Congress Party.

ELECTIONS

The elections to the provincial legislature under the Act of 1935 were held early in 1937; over 54% went to the polls. It must be noted that the League had started its reorganization in 1935 and it did not have substantial support of Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the N.W.F.P. (all predominantly Muslim Provinces) before the elections. In view of these circumstances, it was not anticipated that the League would win any substantial number of seats; the League was not even able to put up candidates for all the seats reserved for Muslims. On the other hand, Congress was the largest and most disciplined political organization in India; it had an efficient party machinery and huge amounts to spend on the elections. The results of the elections therefore showed that the Congress obtained a clear majority in Madras, the U.P., Bihar, the C.P. and Orissa. In Bombay too it was capable of forming a stable government with the help of a few sympathisers ready to accept its dictation. In Assam and the N.W.F.P. it was the largest single party; only in Bengal, the Punjab and Sind it was in a minority. In Bengal the Krishak Proja Party of Fazl-ul-Haq won a large number of seats; in the Punjab (as expected) the Unionist Party led by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan (Sir Fazl-i-Husain died in 1936) was in the driving seat. These results also revealed the fact that (at this moment) neither the Congress nor the League could claim to represent the Indian Muslims, for (as anticipated) Muslim politics remained provincialised. The League won only 109 of the 482 seats reserved for Muslims; in the Punjab it was routed and utterly failed, winning only two seats of the only seven it

contested. In Bengal, it was able to win 39 of the 117 seats - doing exceptionally well-but not in a position to form a ministry. In Sind and the N.W.F.P. the League also failed to win seats. In the Hindu majority provinces, the League secured better results; it contested 35 of 66 seats and winning 29. In Bombay the League obtained 20 seats of 29; and in Madras 11 out of 28. The Congress claim to represent Muslims was not proved; it was also rejected in the U.P. where its organization was strong but no Muslim was returned on its ticket. Nor was any Muslim elected on the Congress platform for a Muslim seat in Bengal, Sind, Punjab, Assam, Bombay, the C.P. and Orissa. The Congress did better only in N.W.F.P. due to its allies, the Khudai Khidmatgars.

The Question of Forming Ministries

After the elections, in accordance with statutory requirements, the provincial Governors had to summon the leaders of majority parties to assist in the formation of ministries. This led to a controversy over the "safeguards" between the Congress and the Government; there was a great debate on whether the Congress would accept office. The radicals in the Congress were opposed but the provincial leaders wished to become ministers and chief ministers. On 18 March 1937, the Congress working committee passed a resolution repeating the Congress aim of destroying the Act of 1935 but authorised and permitted the acceptance of offices in provinces mainly on the condition that the Governors would not use their special powers. This demand led to much controversy which was finally resolved by a long statement (on 22 June) by the Viceroy (Lord Linlithgow) requesting the Indian politicians to take advantage of the new constitution (the Act of 1935) for all it was worth. On 7 July 1937, under Gandhi's influence it was decided that "Congressmen be permitted to accept office when invited. However in the meantime ministries had been formed in those provinces where Congress was not in a majority. In March 1937, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan became the chief minister of the Punjab; his cabinet included three Muslims, two Hindus and one Sikh. As for Bengal, Fazlul Haq tried to negotiate with the Congress but failed; Haq, therefore, accepted the Muslim League's terms. Haq became, the chief

minister, his cabinet included four Muslims (of M.L), three caste Hindus and two representatives of the Scheduled Castes. Soon Haq had to depend heavily on the League's support.

In Sind, even though the United party won more seats, its leader and deputy leader failed to win their seats and therefore the Governor had to ask Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah to form a ministry. In the N.W.F.P., Congress's delay in accepting office gave an opportunity to Sir Abdul Qaiyum to taste power; but later on Dr. Khan Sahib of the Congress defeated the Qaiyum ministry. Congress ministries were also formed in Madras, Bombay, the C.P., Bihar, Orissa and the U.P. In October 1938, a Congress coalition ministry was also formed in Assam; these eight ministries continued in office until October 1939. It may be noted that when Congress decided to form cabinets, there were proposals that it must form coalition ministries with the Muslim League in order to create a better atmosphere and fighting against communal hatred. Some Muslim Leaguers under Khaliqzaman had negotiated with Congress, proposing a coalition ministry in U.P. But the Congress demanded that the League must cease to function as a separate group: that the M.L. Parliamentary Board in the U.P. must be dissolved and that the existing member of the M.L. in the Assembly must accept the Congress discipline. This was indeed a death-warrant for the League which opened the eyes of the Muslims. The negotiations, therefore, failed; no self-respecting political party could have accepted these terms only to become a part of a ministry. As a matter of fact it was not a long-term planning on the part of the Congress; the sole aim was to have homogeneous ministries from amongst those who would accept its dictation by sacrificing Muslim rights (it is happening today-in India of 1990s). It may also be noted that this was the beginning of a serious rift between the Congress and the League, eventually leading to the creation of Pakistan.

Congress Rule and the Muslims (1937-39)

Armed with powers in eight of the eleven Indian provinces, the Congress tried to do all it could to destroy the Muslims. But the League leader M.A. Jinnah was not a man to be terrified by the

Congress leaders. He was all out to defend the Muslims; in 1937 when Nehru declared that there were only two forces in the country (The Congress and the British) Jinnah declared that he refused to line up with the Congress ; that there was a third party in India and that was the Muslims. A few days later, the Quaid asked Nehru to "leave Muslims alone". But the Congress once again failed to read Jinnah's mind. After the elections of 1937, the Congress started a programme of Muslim mass-contact movement. This movement failed and proved to be another mistake of the Congress which alienated the Muslims, annoying their leaders, widening the gulf between the Congress and the League, and even more importantly widened the rift between Jinnah and Congress leaders. A few months, later, Jinnah described Nehru as "the busybody President of the Congress - who seemed to carry the responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and must poke his nose into everything except his own business:."

The aim of the Congress mass-contact movement was to reach over the heads of Muslim leaders to the rank and file of Muslim voter and to win him for the Congress policies of agrarian reforms. A circular was issued by Nehru to all provincial Congress committees to pay special attention to the enrollment of Muslim members. The office of the Congress committee started a special department and from May 1937 onwards this campaign was started. Muslim chief ministers were well aware of this mass-contact movement which tried to short-circuiting them; some Muslim leaders like Dr. Alam, Dr. Khan Sahib and Dr. Ashraf tried to help the Congress. As soon as the Congress formed its ministries, the mass-contact campaign also gathered momentum; Congress ministers toured the non-Congress provinces. Nehru was also giving statements to that effect. The result was that the challenge of the Congress was not only accepted by the Muslim League but men like Shoukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani, Khaliquzzaman and the Muslim Ulema also came to fight against the "Congress Raj". To sum up, a situation had arisen whereby it became essential for the Muslim leaders to support Jinnah. Even though the League had failed to win any large following among the Muslims, its leader (Jinnah) possessed tremendous ability, experience and political talent and represented a dynamic force in

Indian politics. Besides this, Jinnah was also proving himself as the major opponent of Congress policies, particularly against its leader, Nehru.

The idea of a common front against the Congress matured in the League's session in October 1937; Some Muslim leaders who had earlier (1936) rebuked Jinnah, were now enthusiastic to join the League. Sir Sirkandar Hayat, A.K.Fazlul Haq and Sir Muhammad Saadullah (from the province of Asam) also came to Lucknow and decided to merge forces with the League to form a United Muslim movement; they had been terrified by the Congress threats and its attempts to cut the mass base of their constituencies. Sikandar, Haq and Saadullah agreed to be led by the League on all-India affairs and also agreed to advise all those Muslim members of the League, to join it and therefore become the subjects of its discipline. Jinnah during his speeches criticised the Congress leadership for alienating the Muslims more and more by pursuing a policy which was exclusively Hindu; that Muslims could not expect justice or fair play at their hands for the Congress demanded surrender. He appealed for unity, discipline, honesty and sacrifice for the Muslim cause. Congress was also attacked for imposing its own party anthem, Bande Mataram (Hail to the Thee, Mother) as the official new anthem of government, wherever its ministries took power. The Congress was also denounced for its attacks on Muslim culture and the hoisting of its tricolour, the Vidya Mandir scheme in the C.P and the Wardha scheme of education. These were the proofs of Congress atrocities against the Muslims.

The all India Muslim Students Federation was also able to flex its muscle against the Congress. In March 1938, S.C.Bose became the Congress President; at this stage Nehru wrote to Jinnah asking "what exactly are the points in dispute which require consideration?" Jinnah was not to be trapped" he replied that the Nehru knew what were the fundamental points in dispute and that these points could not be solved through correspondence." In February 1938, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah asking him to discuss the matters with Moulana Azad; but Jinnah was adamant and replied he did not find any change in Gandhi's mentality as he was guided by Azad. Now at this stage the Congress was in trouble and Jinnah had the upper hand,

he therefore pressed Congress to accept the League as sole representative of Muslim opinion and that Congress represented the Hindu opinion because the Congress was purely a Hindu body. Jinnah clearly refused to meet Azad or any other non-League Muslim. In April 1938, Gandhi met Jinnah and was deeply depressed because Jinnah was getting stronger as the time went by. In 1938, Jinnah appointed his working committee consisting of eminent Muslims like Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Fazlul Haq, Khaliquzzaman and Liaquat Ali - it was a sort of High Command or a shadow cabinet.

The Quaid also got in touch with the Government; Lord Brabourne (the acting Viceroy) invited Jinnah to meet him. The meeting was held on 16 August 1938; Jinnah suggested that there should be no new move so far as Centre was concerned; that the British should "make friends with the Muslims by protecting them in the Congress Provinces" and that if they did, the Muslims would protect the British at the Centre; that the League should be accepted as the sole representative of the Muslims. The Quaid (in December 1938) explained that "in politics one has to play one's game as on a chess-board" and that he was ready to do business with the devil if the Muslim interests so demanded; from now on the Quaid followed a two-pronged policy to strengthen the League; the first was to win support of the Muslim masses - this he was able to have by welding the Muslims all over India.

Jinnah time and again reminded the Muslims that Congress was only a Hindu party; in October 1938, presiding over the Sind Muslim League Conference, Jinnah declared that the High Command of the Congress had adopted a "most brutal, oppressive and inimical attitude towards All-India Muslim League since they secured majority in six provinces". Jinnah also compared the Muslim majority provinces with Sudetenland (area separated from Germany after the first world war). In December 1938, the Quaid repeated all the well-known charges against the Congress and the Congress governments in the provinces. Side by side, Jinnah made a determined effort to bring all Muslim political parties under the banner of the League; a substantial number of Muslims who had been elected on non-League tickets to the legislatures, started

trickling into the League's camp. And by the end of 1938, Jinnah had succeeded in consolidating his position to a great extent. Muslim Premiers like Sikandar Hayat Khan and Fazlul Haq also gave tremendous strength; Sikandar (a favourite of the British) also met the Viceroy in support of Jinnah's claim. On one occasion Sikandar argued that the Muslims would be mad to go ahead with the Federation scheme. Sikandar hoisted the League's green flag on 9 October 1938 in Karachi; he regretted that Sind and N.W.F.P. had not yet fulfilled the expectations of the League and also vehemently criticised the Congress.

The attacks on the Congress (and the Hindu Raj) now became more and more bellicose; Sir Sikandar's sharpest attack on the Congress came in his speech at the Patna session of the League (in December 1938) in which he once again attacked Congress and assured the Muslim League that he would stand behind the League against the Congress. He also added that the Congress ministries in some provinces had been intoxicated by their newly-acquired power; that they should remember that 90 million Muslims could not be suppressed or turned out of India as a minority; that the Congress dream of Swaraj would never come true, if it did not learn to practice toleration; and that every Punjabi Muslim would be prepared to lay down his life in the defence of Islam. In May 1939, Sikandar once again criticised the Congress saying that it was heading towards the idea of a totalitarian state; he also criticised the mass-contact movement and its policy towards Muslim States; that the Muslims would not become camp followers of the Congress; that their religion, culture and self-respect were dearer than their lives; and that All-India matters affecting the Muslims must rest with the Muslim League.

Jinnah was also repeating all the charges against the Congress and declaring that all hopes of communal settlement had been wrecked on the rocks of "Congress fascism". It may be mentioned that the M.L. Council had passed a resolution on the allegations of Congress atrocities and a special committee was appointed with Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur as its Chairman, to investigate Muslim complaints against Congress and submit a report. Shortly afterwards the Pirpur report was published which condemned

the Congress governments on numerous counts: excluding Muslims from a share in the government and in the services; introduction of the Wardha scheme of education; compelling Muslims to show respect to the Congress flag and sing Bande Matrum, and extending the use of Hindi and the neglect of Urdu-etc. This comparatively restrained document was followed in March 1939 by much more lurid account of some "grievances of Muslims in Bihar" by a provincial League inquiry committee (the Sharif Report). This report mainly consisted of a fullest description of the atrocities perpetrated by Hindus at various places in Bihar. It was followed by Fazlul Haq's pamphlet "Muslim Sufferings under the Congress Rule", in December 1939. These charges were, however, repudiated by the Congress and Hindu press by saying that these were exaggerated accounts of some complaints, half-truths and untruths. But the Indian Muslims were now very much aware of the real facts, thanks to the Muslim League and its leader Jinnah who had unraveled the truth.

Muslims were convinced that the Congress had failed to inspire confidence in the minorities; that it was a Hindu party (as Jinnah had been saying all along) which followed a "close-door" policies to liquidate the Muslim League; that the Congress Muslims were stooges; that mass-contact scheme was to destroy the Muslim solidarity and for that matter Moulvis were also employed by the Congress; that the Congress did not wish to settle the communal disputes; that due to its high-handedness and the reign of terror, the Congress wished to impose Hindu Raj on the Muslims so that they could not practise Islam; that if the Muslims killed cows, the Hindus would kill them and burn their houses and assault their children, pigs would be thrown in the mosques, Azans would be denounced and interrupted, Muslim shops would be boycotted, they would not be allowed to use the village wells; and that official inquiries would always be biased against the Muslims.

It may also be noted that Sir Syed's All-India Muslim Educational Conference was also well aware of Hindu plans to relegate Muslim education; for decades of hard work for the growth of Muslim education had come under threat. In 1938, its fifty-second annual session was held at Calcutta and a committee was appointed under

Nawab Kamal Yar Jang Bahadar, in order to survey the educational system in India and to propose a scheme of Muslim education; a sub-committee under Sir Azizul Haq (Speaker of Bengal Legislature and Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University) toured India to collect the relevant information. The Report was published in 1942; in summary, the Report criticised the Wardha scheme of education - its author Zakir Husain was opposed by the Muslims - Muslims in the C.P. Assembly opposed the Scheme but they had been ignored. Its implementation was even worse, hurting the Muslim students and teachers in many ways. Small children were made to salute Gandhi's portrait and sing hymns and to respect Hindu Heroes. This scheme was secular in nature in order to divorce Muslims from their religion, culture and traditions. Some newly introduced books, also glorified the Hindu culture.

The Muslim League therefore kept up its utmost pressure on the Congress and the Government so long as the Congress was in office. Jinnah declared that Congress was not entitled to speak on behalf of the whole of India and therefore was not capable of delivering the goods; that the Muslims wanted no gifts and no concessions but full rights; that Congress was nothing but a Hindu body, presence of a few Muslims (misled and misguided ones) could not make it a national body. He criticised Gandhi for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism and to establish Hindu Raj. Jinnah also criticised Nehru, S.C. Bose, R. Prasad and Sardar Patel. He also pleaded for patience, asking Muslims to do all they could to organize the League so that 90 million Muslims might come under its discipline. Nevertheless, by the outbreak of second world war in 1939, the Muslim League had become the strongest single Muslim political party in India and also the second largest party in Indian politics.

The war and its impact on Indian Politics

A new phase in the growth of Muslim League began in 1939 by the outbreak of the Second World War. Although the official declaration of war on India's behalf was made in September 1939, preparations on a large scale had been under way at least since

February 1938. Military manoeuvres and air raids exercises had been giving the impression of a forthcoming war. From April to August, Indian troops had been involved in preparations for war at Aden, Singapore and Egypt. On 11, August the Congress Working Committee declared that it was opposed to any war and that it would resist any effort to impose war on India. On 27 August, the League's Council passed a resolution deploring the treatment meted out to Muslims and stressing that if the British desired cooperation, the demands of the League would have to be accepted. However, Bengal and the Punjab (Sikandar and Haq) fully supported the British war effort. On 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany and on the same day Linlithgow declared India's involvement in the war, without consulting the Congress party which was ruling eight of the eleven Indian provinces.

On 4 September, the Viceroy met Gandhi, Jinnah and the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes. Gandhi assured the Viceroy of his full sympathies in the war but he could not commit the Congress in any manner. Jinnah clearly told the Viceroy that Sir Sikandar alone "could not deliver the goods"; he asked the Viceroy for something in return to take back to Muslims to help him rally their support for the war. Jinnah wanted the Congress ministries to be thrown out of office and made it clear that the ultimate solution for India was its partition. Nehru (specialist on foreign affairs) was in China; on 11 September Nehru went to Wardha to attend the Congress Working Committee's discussions. A resolution was passed on 15 September condemning Fascism and Nazism, attacking the proclamation of war and the emergency powers and asking the Government to declare its war aims; Nehru had drafted this resolution. On 10 October, the Congress demanded that India must be declared an independent nation.

On the other hand, the League wished to have some safeguards from the British; on 18 September the League's Working Committee declared that the British could bank on Muslim co-operation only on two conditions: justice and fair play for Muslims in the Hindu Provinces and an assurance that no declaration would be adopted without the approval of the Muslim League - right to veto. On 26 September, Gandhi met the Viceroy; Linlithgow told him that the

Government could not disregard the legitimate demands of the Muslims. Gandhi wished that Britain should leave Indians to settle their problems, begging the Viceroy not to consult the Muslim League. But the Government was in trouble due to the war; Zetland (the Secretary of State) very much regretted the Congress stance on the war. On 2 October, Linlithgow met R. Prasad and Nehru who also demanded a high price (freedom for India and a share of power at the Centre). On 5 October, Jinnah met the Viceroy again and demanded "more protection" for Muslims. On 17 October, the Viceroy issued the statement of his Majesty's Government's policy confirming that the natural issue of India's progress was the attainment of Dominion status; that at the end of the war negotiations would be held for more advance. On 18 October 1939, the Viceroy assured Muslims that "full weight would be given to their views and interests". The Muslim League interpreted this statement as an emphatic repudiation of the Congress claim to represent the whole of India; that the Government had recognized the fact that the League alone truly represented the Indian Muslims and could speak on their behalf. Indeed it was a sort of veto given to the League.

The Congress rejected the Viceroy's statement; on 23 October its Working Committee condemned the Government and decided that it could not support the war effort. Moreover, the Congress High Command called upon the Congress ministries to resign. Jinnah on the other hand, asked for further discussions; he was authorised by the League to give an assurance of support and co-operation on behalf of Muslims to the Government for the prosecution of war. But Jinnah was waiting for a better deal. On 1 November, the Viceroy invited Gandhi, R. Prasad and Jinnah for talks; Gandhi and Prasad insisted that the question to be settled was: Britain's war aims. Jinnah was also given the same answer by Gandhi and Prasad. On 3 November, Prasad sent a long letter to Linlithgow that the Congress would not co-operate unless the British war aims were enunciated. Jinnah also wrote to Linlithgow saying that the Congress had refused to discuss any questions until the British Government clarified its war aims. On 5 November, Linlithgow reported the failure of talks, publishing the correspondence between him and the leaders, deploring the lack of agreement. In the meantime, the Congress ministries resigned one after another and the Governors

took charge of their administration under Section 93 (of 1935 Act). In any case, Linlithgow felt assured that his administration had enough resources to meet any emergency created by the rebellious Congress Party. At this stage Gandhi appealed to Jinnah to cooperate with the Congress. But Jinnah being a politician of the highest order wished to extract all he could for the growth of Muslim League; he knew too well that at this movement Linlithgow (as an administrator) had no choice but to give a due weight to the second largest party, the League, for the Congress was in a very bad temper.

It was perhaps the best opportunity for the Muslim League to strengthen its organization; after the resignations of Congress ministries, the Congress leaders had lost all the bargaining power they had acquired when they were incharge of eight Indian provinces (Assam, Bihar, Bombay, C.P.Madras, Orissa, U.P. and N.W.F.P.). It may be noted that the decision of the Congress to resign was widely regretted; it was noticed that most of its ministers resigned reluctantly. Many knew that under these circumstances the British would have to lean more on the support of the Muslim League and that the League, the Governors (incharge of Congress provinces) and the Viceroy would not like to see the return of Congress ministries, at least during the war and that the status quo would remain for a long time. And the result was that the League's popularity graph among the Muslims rose with a great deal of speed; wavers among the Muslims began trickling into the League. With good cards in his hands, Jinnah (on 5 November) asked the Viceroy for more safeguards for Muslims such as: (a) future constitutional advance should be examined and reconsidered de novo; (b) no constitution be enacted without the approval of Congress and the League; (c) the British Government should meet all reasonable demands of the Arabs in Palestine; and (d) Indian troops would not be used against any Muslim country. The Viceroy sent a reply (23 December) among other things promising that his government knew the importance of Indian Muslims and that full weight would be given to their views; and that the Government would consider all reasonable demands of the Arabs.

After getting some assurances from the Government, Jinnah once again turned towards the Congress, perhaps from time to time teaching them lessons for hurting the Muslims during its two and a half years rule. On December 2, 1939, he issued a proclamation calling upon the Muslims throughout India to observe 22 December as a day of thanks giving to mark their deliverance from the "tyranny, oppression and injustice" of the Congress regime in the provinces, a mark of relief that the Congress rule had at last ended. The resolution stated that the League do not accept the Congress claim that it represented all interests justly and fairly.

"the Congress Ministry [sic] both in the discharge of their duties of the administration and in the legislatures have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political rights; that in matters of differences and disputes the Congress ... invariably have sided with, supported and advanced the cause of the Hindus in total disregard and to the prejudice of the Muslim interests.

The Congress Governments constantly interfered with the legitimate and routine duties of district officers even in petty matters to the serious detriment of the Musalmans, and thereby created an atmosphere which spread the belief amongst the Hindu public that there was established a Hindu raj, and emboldened the Hindus, mostly Congressmen, to ill-treat Muslims at various places and interfere with their elementary rights of freedom."

Jinnah had truly read the Muslim mind; the resignations of the Congress ministries was a matter of jubilation for the Muslims, particularly in predominantly Hindu provinces. A few days later Jinnah clarified that he was not in favour of section 93 in the provinces but for the formation of truly popular ministries which would be able to do justice to all communities. He demanded the appointment of a Royal commission to investigate and report upon the allegations and charges against the Congress regime by the Muslims. Jinnah also advised his followers to behave with perfect calmness, observing no hartals, no processions or demonstrations, only expressing relief and gratitude in their hearts, not joy and triumph. On 22 December, "Deliverance Day" was observed by the

Muslims throughout India in a peaceful and disciplined way. But Nehru was shocked and the Congress now described Jinnah as "The Dictator of Malabar Hills". But the fact of the matter was that the Congress had not given top priority to settling the communal problems and giving a due importance to the League when it was in power. Early in 1940, Linlithgow visited Nagpur and Bombay and interviewed some of the political leaders and delivered an important speech in Bombay. He recognized the claims not only of the Muslims, but also of the Scheduled Castes, saying that his government was determined to see that justice was done to them and appealed to the leaders of political parties in India to sort out their differences by reaching an agreement helping the Government to end the political deadlock as soon as possible. The Viceroy also met Jinnah; the Quaid demanded that the coalition ministries be formed; that any legislation affecting the Muslims not to be enforced if the two-third of their members in a provincial Lower House were opposed to it; that the Congress flag not to be flown on public institutions; that an understanding was essential as to the use of Bande Matrum; and that the Congress must cease its wrecking tactics against the Muslim League. Jinnah told the Viceroy that the Congress did not consider Linlithgow's offer to enlarge the Executive Council. The Quaid was deeply pessimistic about the success of democratic institutions in India.

Linlithgow also met B.Desai who clearly stated that he could not make any commitment and that the Viceroy should get intouch with Gandhi. Linlithgow acquainted Desai with Jinnah's demands to sound the Congress response to Jinnah. Desai told the Viceroy that the Congress was ready to include in any ministry a Muslim nominated by the majority of Muslim representatives in a provincial Assembly; but that Minister must accept the principle of collective responsibility and ordinary Congress discipline. Desai stressed the importance which the Congress attached to majority rule and to collective responsibility in the cabinet. On 25 January 1940, Linlithgow met the premiers of Bengal and Punjab who were fully co-operating with him, even sometimes defying Jinnah and the League's mandate.

Sir Sikandar Hayat was told about the talks Linlithgow had with Jinnah and Desai; the Punjab Premier was against forcing the League's representatives into Congress cabinets. As for Communal disputes, Sir Sikandar suggested that committees might be set up in the provinces to protect minorities, with a right to approach the Governor direct and if not satisfied, they should be given the right to appeal to the Federal Court. A few days later (on 3 February) Linlithgow met Fazlul Haq and Sikandar together; both were ready to admit the Congress into their ministries and were of the view that the Congress should offer concessions to the minorities if it were given concessions at the Centre. Both of them impressed on the Viceroy the seriousness with which the League would view any concession to the Congress if unaccompanied by some satisfaction for their own demands. A few days later Jinnah was invited by Linlithgow; Jinnah told him that the Muslims feared that Congress governments might return to office at any time; and if their ministries returned to office under existing circumstances, there would be a civil war in India. The Viceroy promised to do something for the protection of minorities. Jinnah also referred to the efforts being made by the League to form a ministry in the N.W.F.P. Linlithgow welcomed the working of the constitution in that province. Jinnah wrote an article for London's Time and Tide (19 January 1940): "Let us first diagnose the disease, then consider the symptoms and finally arrive at the remedy"; that "there are in India two nations who must both share the governance of their common motherland". On 12 February, the Secretary of State made an appeal to the Congress leaders that the problem of minorities must be addressed by Indian themselves.

The Quaid kept up his pressure on the government; on 24 February 1940 he told the Viceroy that although the M.L. Working Committee appreciated the good wishes expressed for Muslims, their real demand of a definite assurance that no declaration would be made, nor any constitution be enforced or enacted by the Government without the approval and consent of the Indian Muslims, had not been accepted. That the Viceroy's assurances so far had left the position of the 90 million Indian Muslims only in the region of consultation and counsel, and vested the final decision in British to determine the fate and future of Muslim India. He again emphasized the need to find a solution of Palestine problem to the satisfaction of

the Arabs; that the Working Committee wanted a clear assurance on the above mentioned points so that the Muslims could give there whole-hearted support in the prosecution of war. Jinnah was again ready to meet the Viceroy to explain his position in details.

On 13 March 1940, Jinnah was again invited by the Viceroy for a meeting; he once again assured Linlithgow that the Muslims would not retard the war effort in case an assurance was given to the Muslims that no political settlement would be reached with the Congress without the approval of the Muslims. Linlithgow reacted favourably and promised to communicate his feelings to the British Government in London. Jinnah also made it plain that if the Government did not give him more security, the Muslims would be left with no option but to fall back on some form of partition of India; that Muslims were not a minority but rather a nation; that democracy for India was impossible. Jinnah was in favour of a Muslim area run by Muslims in collaboration with the British, despite the fact that it might mean poverty, but the Muslims would be able to retain their independence, self-respect, their religion and culture and would be able to lead their lives as they wished. He thought it was the only way to keep Muslims happy and satisfied, and that the Muslims sincerely believed that this was the only solution. The stage had, therefore, arrived where the Muslim League had to announce a clear-cut policy regarding the partition of India.

The Lahore (Pakistan) Resolution and Its Aftermath (1940-41)

On 23 March 1940, the Muslim League passed the Lahore resolution (later to be commonly known as the Pakistan resolution) demanding the creation of a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims. This "Pakistan resolution" entailed the dismemberment of India and its division into Hindu and Muslim states. This demand, officially from the Muslim League's platform, inevitably, was followed by a Pakistan and anti-Pakistan movement throughout India. The Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and other anti-Pakistan political and religious parties did all they could to prevent the Pakistan scheme from establishing its roots, but failed owing to the rapid growth of the Muslim League during the Second World War. All these developments will be discussed in the following pages; but we shall first of all mention (very briefly) the two-nation theory and several schemes for the redrawing of India's boundaries from time to time.

Genesis of Pakistan

Due to the presence of communal antagonism (as mentioned in details in previous chapters) between the two great communities in India (the Muslims and the Hindus) it had almost become impossible for them to live together in peace and tranquility. Eminent persons had been expressing the ideas such as the two-nation theory, a separate Muslim block and an alliance or federation of different states, Hindu-Muslim areas and Hindu-Muslim zones or provinces. In 1858, John Bright (a member of the British Parliament) suggested that instead of one compact Empire, there should be various

Presidencies and States. In 1879, Jamaluddin Afghani envisaged the possibility of a Muslim State incorporating the north-western Muslim majority provinces of India, Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan. (This information is based on I.H.Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, p.295). Sir Syed Ahmad Khan spoke about the progress of Muslims alone at a time when the Hindus of Benares were demanding that Hindi should replace Urdu and Devangri script the Persian script in all courts and government offices of that Province. This, inevitably had shocked Sir Syed who had so far been an enthusiastic supporter of Hindu-Muslim Unity and had done his best to promote such a unity. In 1884, Sir Syed used the word gawm(nation) for both Muslims and Hindus. Syed was worried as to who would rule India after the British had left this country; that it was not possible that the Hindus and the Muslims would rule India after the British had left this country; that it was not possible that the Hindus and the Muslims would share power; and that one of the nations would try to conquer the other. Obviously, Sir Syed had in mind that the Hindus would try to establish the Hindu Raj in India, for even majority rule meant a Hindu rule. Even though Sir Syed did not suggest a geographical separation, he clearly advocated the policy of separation and secession.

In 1888, Moulvi Muharrum Ali Chisti (owner and editor of the Rafique-i-Hind, a weekly journal of Lahore) strongly expressed his opinion that the Muslims were a nation and they should establish a political party; he also got into touch with Syed Ameer Ali on this point. It was perhaps under these circumstances that a "Muhammadan National Conference" was established at Calcutta in 1889, to protect Muslim interests, their national status and claims. In 1890, Abdul Halim Sharar (an eminent Muslim novelist and journalist) expressed similar ideas in an editorial of his magazine (Muhazzib); he suggested a kind of territorial rearrangement and exchange of population; that the Hindus and Muslim should distribute the districts between themselves. It was due to the fact that everyone in India was sick and tired of Hindu-Muslim riots and it was thought that this problem could be solved by separating the two great communities. Similarly, Theodore Beck and Sir Theodore Morison (1899) also confirmed the two-nation theory and rejected the principle of majority

rule in Hindu (the Hindu Raj). Morison suggested the concentration of the entire Muslim population of India in the area extending from Agra to Peshawar.

Eminent persons continued to talk about some sort of "redrawing" of India's boundaries, rearrangement, re-grouping segregation and separation of two communities. In 1905, Akbar Allahabadi (a well-known poet) suggested that the North of Jumna river should be given to the Muslims so that the two nations would be able to live in peace. The two Kheiri brothers (Abdul Jabbar and Abdul Sattar) also played a key role in propagating the idea of a separate Muslim State in India. They submitted a statement during the Stockholm conference of the Socialist International in which they urged a partition of India into a Hindu India and a Muslim India. In 1920, Abdul Qadir Bilgrami (Mohammad Azizuddin Ahmad Bilgrami) in a letter to Gandhi, advocated the partition of India between the Hindus and the Muslims; he gave a list of districts, surprisingly not too different from the boundaries of Pakistan established in 1947. Bilgrami was first to suggest the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Similarly, Moulana Hasrat Mohani (a great poet and a revolutionary) also feared (like other Muslims) that the Hindus would use their power to crush the Muslims. He was the first Indian to suggest a resolution for the Independence of India from the Congress platform in 1920. But in 1921, Mulana Hasrat spoke of an Independent India and of the place of the Muslims in it; an Indian republic on the style of the United States of America a bi-communal federal state with Muslim States united with Hindu States.

In 1923, Chaudhary Wahabuddin Kamboh of Amritsar suggested a plan to solve the communal disputes; his scheme is called "Nuristan Scheme" under which the Muslim provinces in the North-West were to separate from India to form a Muslim State, "Nuristan" (land of light). In the same year, Sardar Gul Khan (President of the Islamic Anjuman, Dera Ismail Khan) a Pathan from the N.W.F.P. during an inquiry on the question of further reforms clearly stated that the Hindu-Muslim unity would never become a fact; that geographical separation of the two communities was essential; and that North India should be a Muslim area and South India a Hindu area; 23 crores of Hindus to the South and 8 Crores of Muslims to

the North. In 1924, Mulana Obaidullah Sindhi suggested a federation where religion and state would be separated; each region would be known as "Swarajiva Republic" and would be a free member of the Federation (Federal Swarajiva Republican State). Delhi would be cosmopolitan City and other centres of the Federal government would be established in Agra and Lahore.

In 1925, Moulana Mohammad Ali suggested separation and the right to self-determination for the people of North India for economic, strategic, religious and cultural reasons. In the same year some teachers and students of the Aligarh Muslim University suggested a scheme of partition of India and the creation of a Muslim State. In perspective, once again, were the issues such as the Hindi-Urdu controversy, cow killing, Muslim share in administration, separate electorates, culture and religion. This scheme suggested that the Muslims should be given the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Bengal. In the Muslim minority provinces like the U.P., Muslim interests should be protected; arrangements should be made whereby transfer of population could be made possible. In 1928, Nawab Sayyid Sardar Ali Khan published a book, The Indian Muslims (by an Indian Muslim) in which he speculated a possible "subdivision" believing strongly in the two-nation theory. In the same year, Moulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi suggested the creation of separate Muslim State in India. The Aga Khan also contributed in the same direction; he suggested a plan for a large South Asian Federation, pre-1914 Bavaria was his model; each Indian province (State) was to have full freedom and independence. Every free state would be based on religion, nationality, race, language and history. The Aga Khan suggested the Muslim areas leading to become a State of their own. Similarly, F.K.Khan Durrani (editor of a journal called Muslim India) also had a dream of a Muslim India, after coming to the conclusion that Hindu-Muslim Unity was impossible. He was of the opinion that either Islam must reconquer India or Hindus must wipe out Islam off Hindustan's surface that states were based upon power and strength not upon pacts and agreements. In 1928, Murtaza Ahamd Khan Maikash (writing in the Inqilab of Lahore) also clearly came up with the idea of a Muslim homeland as the only solution of Hindu-Muslim antagonism; this Muslim state was to consist of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P.

In 1929, Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardy and Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan (in a joint note) suggested that Sind, The Punjab, Bengal, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan should have their Muslim governments and the rest of India be governed by the Hindus in order to have a balance of power in India. Nawab Zulfiqar also, during his address to the Khilafat Conference, suggested that the Muslims should be given areas in North India and in Eastern India Bengal should be divided. In the same year Sir Ross Masud (Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh University) during a meeting with Governor of the U.P. repeated Muslim fears of Hindu Raj; that the Muslims would be swamped in a self-governing India; and that the Punjab Muslims had long been thinking of union of the North Punjab Sind, Bluchistan and Afghanistan. In the same year, Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan of Malirkotla (and eminent Muslim in the Council of State, 1921-26, and member of the Muslim League the Muslim Conference and the Khilafat Conference) also suggested the creation of a separate Muslim State, commenting that the separation of the Ali brothers from Gandhi was in fact the separation of the entire Muslim (nation) community from the Hindu nation; and that the reality was that they two nations were already separate. He thought that it was not a time to ask for concessions or safeguards but a homeland.

In 1930, Allama Iqbal (a great poet and a great thinker and philosopher) during his presidential address at the annual session of the Muslim League at Allahabad, declared that western democracy could not be applied to India; that the Muslim demand for a separate state was justified; and that Muslims should be free to develop their culture in their own homeland. Iqbal added: "I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslim, at least of North-West India"

Later on (in 1937) Iqbal wrote a series of letters to Jinnah; he laid emphasis on the cultural problems of Muslim India stressing the need to tell the World (inside and outside India) that the economic problem was not the only problem in India; that form the Muslim pint of view much emphasis should be given to the cultural problem.

Allama Iqbal suggested that the Muslim League should also represent the Muslim masses, promising to give a better life to an average Muslim as problem of bread was becoming more and more acute; and that Nehru's socialist programme was not attractive for the Muslims "there is a solution in the enforcement of the Law of Islam and its further development in the light of modern ideas. But the enforcement of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States". Iqbal asked Jinnah: "Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived?" Iqbal hoped that Jinnah's genius would "discover some way out of our present difficulties". Iqbal also pointed out that the Communal Award (1932) had only recognized the existence of Muslims in India. He also referred to the Hindu Mahasabha's stand that a United Hindu-Muslim nation is impossible in India and that the only way to a peaceful India was a re-distribution of India's boundaries on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities.

It had been inculcated into the Muslim mind by the extremist Hindu leaders and their organizations that the aim of Swaraj was actually to revive Hinduism in all forms, all Muslims should be made Hindus by conversion, teachings of Quran should be abolished and all the Muslims of India should become Aryas by Shuddhi, no other Raj than Hindu Raj would last for ever in India. The Hindu fundamentalists suggested that the Muslims should give up their Islamic names by adopting names such as Ram Din, Krishna Khan etc. Or they would be driven out of India towards the Arabian desert or they would be drowned (along with their religion Islam) in the river Ganges; some Hindus even discussed the possibility of conquering the neighbouring Muslim country, Afghanistan, for the safety of India. The Mahasabha leaders like Moonje declared 'that Hindustan is for Hindus only, as France is for the French and Germany is for the Germans and England is for the English-men'. The schemes and ideas for the division of India were, therefore, presented from time to time; in 1931 Moulana Hasrat Mohani once again underlined the depth of Muslim fears of Hindu Raj during a meeting of the Muslim Conference and pointing out that the establishment of Dominion Status was detrimental to Muslim interests. Similarly at the Muslim Conference's platform, Moulana Shoukat Ali demanded a very loose federation eventually leading to the separation.

Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali has made a tremendous contribution in this direction; even though his first public statement on the need for a separate Muslim State was made in 1933, he has made a claim that such an idea came in his mind as early as 1915; that the North of India was Muslim and we would make it a Muslim State. However, as a student at Cambridge, Rahmat Ali issued a pamphlet entitled 'Now or Never' and coined the term Pakistan (initial letters of Punjab N.W.F.P, Kashmir, Sind and the last syllable of Baluchistan). Rahmat Ali ignored Bengal; his Pakistan would contain thirty million Muslims of India. But later on he suggested another separate State for Bengal and Assam (Bange Islam). It may be noted that it was the first appearance of the Magic word "Pakistan" which Indian Muslims considered a safe heaven; it was to be a panacea for the ills of Muslim of each and every class, freeing Muslims from Hindu exploitation (especially of Money-lenders), giving Muslims opportunities to restore not only the physical but also the moral authority of Islam, and Muslims would be free to live according to the Holy Laws of Islam. Rahmat Ali demanded a separate federation of predominantly Muslim units, in the name of Muslim brothers who lived in "Pakistan" (Muslim India). He also distributed pamphlets, tracts, handbills and other literature; in 1933 an eight-page pamphlet titled "what does the Pakistan National Movement stand for?" was published, underlining "The fundamentals of the political ideology" of the National Movement. Rahmat Ali also argued that the area claimed for Pakistan was already the home of a nation, the Muslims of Pakistan.

In conversation with Halide Edib (a Turkish lady journalist) some years later Rahmat Ali claimed an ancient history for Muslim nation saying that the Muslims had lived in India for over twelve hundred years, possessing a history, a civilization and a culture of their own; that the area was separated from India proper [Hindustan] by the river Jumna and it was not a part of India. Rahmat Ali wished to sever an artificial connection made by the British (this argument was later used by Jinnah saying that before the British, India was never united). He also argued that Pakistanis did not claim that India was now theirs on the plea that they had been the rulers of India for a long time and that the Hindus should also stop using the plea that Hindustan was theirs merely because they happened to be rulers in

the past. Also, on the basis of Western doctrines of right to self-determination, the Indian Muslims must have their separate homeland. It is also a fact that in 1933 when the Pakistan scheme was the subject of questions in the proceedings of the Joint Select Committee (of the Parliament) on Indian Constitutional Reforms, Muslim politicians described it "as a student's scheme" or as "chimerical or impractical". Perhaps it so happened that the Muslim delegates still believed that an agreeable solution of Hindu-Muslim disputes was possible. In 1935, Rahmat Ali wrote a long letter to the members of the House of Lords, appealing for support for the Muslims in their struggle for "Pakistan", condemning the ruthless coercion of "Pakistan" into the proposed Indian Federation (under the Act of 1935) also pleading that the river Jumna was a natural boundary between Hindustan and "Pakistan". To conclude, Rahmat Ali's contribution would always be appreciated due to the reasons that he coined the word "Pakistan" in 1933 whereas Pakistan came into being in 1947 and that probably he was the first to propagate the two-nation theory after publishing a proper solution.

Some more names must be mentioned for propagating the idea of partition of India. In 1937, M.H. Gazdar wrote to Jinnah suggesting a separate federation of the North-West India (Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab and the North Western Frontier Province) with a view to improving economic, political and educational progress of Indian Muslims. In the same year Syed Ali Jawwad wrote an article in The Pioneer titled "The League and the Congress" giving the proposition for an independent Muslim State, partition of India into two parts, namely Muslim India and Hindu India - a solution to the Congress-League struggle for power. It may be noted that when this proposal was published, the Congress was awfully busy in its anti-Muslim campaign, the Muslim mass-contact movement. In 1938, a movement for the unification of Muslim nations had been started (Siilsila-i-Jamiat-i-Vahdat Uman Islam) under the guidance of Syed Jalil Ahmad Sinyusi, with a view to creating more Muslim republics in all those parts of the world where Muslims were in majority. Three republics were proposed for India; Haidrya Republic (in the Muslim State of Hyderabad) Mohammadiya Republic (in Muslim Bengal) and Islamistan to be established in the Muslim north-west. In the same

year Jamiluddin Ahmad wrote a paper: "Is India One Nation?", favouring the division of India on the basis of religions.

A set of proposals was presented by Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad in 1938; Dr. Latif was a lecturer of English literature at the Osmani University of Hyderabad-Deccan and the founder of the Muslim Cultural Society. He too (like other Muslims) had come to the conclusion that India was not a nation but at the same time he did not believe that partition was the only solution. Dr. Latif divided India into four cultural zones for the Muslims and eleven for the Hindus. The four Muslim zones were to be: (1) North-West block (Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and the states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur; these six units would establish a federation and would become a "single autonomous state" - accommodating well over twenty five million Muslims, giving them a "free home of their own"; (2) North East block, comprising Eastern Bengal and Assam, giving thirty million Muslims "a free political existence"; (3) The Delhi-Lucknow block, extending from Patiala to Lucknow rounding up Rampur - accommodating twelve million Muslims of the U.P and Bihar; and the Deccan block. The Indian states would be distributed among the different zones on the basis of their natural affinities. The rest of India would form itself into eleven cultural zones; Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Hindustan proper, Rajput States (Rajputana, Gujrat, Mahratta) Canarese area, Andhra, Tamil areas, Malayalam, and a Hindu-Sikh zone in the North-West. Each zone would form a homogeneous State. A Royal Commission might be appointed to re-draw the boundaries of these zones. Sir Abdullah Haroon wrote a foreword for Dr. Latif's Scheme; Haroon also suggested the division of India into two separate federations, reflecting the strength of the two major communities; the Muslim Federation would consist of North-West Indian provinces and Kashmir. Abdullah Haroon, however made no mention of Bengal and Assam.

The year 1939 was very important so far as Indian politics was concerned (as mentioned in the chapter on World War and its impact on Indian political parties) Especially due to the growth of Muslim League and the "Pakistan" movement, the idea of partition was spreading with a great deal of speed, gaining popularity as the time went by. It may be noted that the Congress was in charge of eight of

the eleven Indian provinces and it was doing all it could to harm the Muslim interest. Therefore, various proposals for partition of India or the establishment of Muslim zones and separate states were also put forward by Mian Kifayat Ali, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Dr. Syed Zafarul Hasan and Dr. M. Afzal Qadri of Aligarh. We would discuss the schemes of Mian Kifayat Ali and Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (the Premier of Punjab). Mian Kifayat Ali (of Gurdaspur) published a book entitled Confederacy of India by a Punjabi; Sir Abdullah Haroon and Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan Mamdot offered to bear the cost of publication. The scheme of confederacy was based on the principle of separation, but it avoided the disintegration of India, simply meaning an internal partition. However, if this scheme failed, the Muslims were allowed to demand complete partition as their right. India was divided into five "countries"; the Indus region, the Hindu India, Rajistan, the Deccan States (Hyderabad and Mysore) and Bengal (minus its Hindu districts and plus parts of Assam). All these "countries" would be federations in themselves and should be re-assembled into a "confederacy of India".

Sir Sikander Hayat Khan published a scheme for the loosest of federations, with regional or zonal legislatures dealing with common interests. The scheme was published under the title "Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation". It gave maximum powers to the provinces and minimum to the Centre, recommending the demarcation of India into loose Federal Units, each representing the strength of the two major communities. India was divided into seven zones. Being a very important member of the Muslim League, Sir Sikander was well aware of currents and cross-currents of Muslim politics, and therefore was watching the speed with which the concept of independent homeland for the Indian Muslims was developing. He was also aware of the fact that if any such idea matured, it would have disastrous effects on his province (the Punjab). Sir Sikander, therefore, decided to prepare a scheme by himself and publicize it in due course, with the intention of diverting the Muslims from backing the Pakistan scheme. Sir Sikander told Sir Penderel Moon (who assisted him to prepare the scheme) that "unless positive proposals such as his were put forward for consideration other people would come out with something worse". The "something worse" to which Sir Sikander Hayat Khan referred

was the idea of Pakistan. Some months later, when P.Moon suggested to the Punjab premier that the Pakistan scheme might after all be the best solution, Sir "turned upon him, his eyes blazing with indignation and explained". How can you talk like this? you have been long enough in Western Punjab to know the Muslims there. Surely you can see that Pakistan would be an invitation to them to cut the throat of every Hindu Bania... I do hope I won't hear you talk like this again. Pakistan would mean massacre".

Sir Sikander's scheme was extremely important due to the fact that he was Premier of the Punjab, a distinguished Muslim political leader, a very important member of the Muslim League, and above all very close to the Viceroy and the British government. That is why the Governor of the Punjab had asked his secretary to assist Sir Sikander to prepare his scheme. Sikander's scheme (among other things) had full retention of British connection; he also submitted it to the Viceroy. But Sir Sikander's scheme was a complete failure. He sent it to the Quaid-i-Azam; but the League leader did not appreciate Sir Sikander's efforts and decided to ignore his scheme. As the League had not yet decided its final verdict on the subject of future constitutional advance, and the Punjab Premier (Sir Sikander) was a member of its committee which was to give its final decision on the aforesaid subject, the Punjab League was very critical of Sir Sikander's scheme. On its behalf Dr.A.H.Batalvi suggested a disciplinary action against Sir Sikander Hayat Khan. The Muslim Press was also disappointed by Sir Sikander and it too criticised his scheme. The Ehsan of Lahore deplored that there was no provision for the complete separation of Muslim India from Hindu India; The Inqilab pointed out that the scheme had failed to protect Muslim rights and therefore it was not acceptable to the Muslims. Sayyid Ali Rashdi of Sind (Secretary of the Muslim League Foreign Committee) at once condemned Sir Sikander's Scheme. Muslim politicians were generally critical of the Scheme because it had lowered their goal which envisaged full independence and they also considered it "disloyalty" on Sir Sikander's part. It may also be mentioned that Sir Sikander's scheme was also criticized by the Hindus by describing it "harmful and unworkable", the weak centre was not to their liking, and they also disapproved the creation of zones. However, it is

surprising that some Hindu critics called it "Sir Sikander's Pakistan Scheme". The Times of India raised question as to why Sir Sikander should have evolved a scheme which he knew had little chance of being seriously considered. Even the pro-unionist paper of Lahore, The Civil and Military Gazette rejected the scheme by calling it "crude and reactionary". Some Hindu dailies accused Sir Sikander of playing Jinnah's game, saying that it was a subtle attempt to create a Pakistan. The Tribune of Lahore also criticised the Scheme and suggested a democratic "Swaraj" for India.

In the end it may also be noted that some Hindu politicians and some British writers had also suggested the "division" of India or readjustments of its boundaries. Bhai Parmanand (popularly known as "devta swarup" meaning god incarnate) was a long life devotee of the Arya Samaj and also happened to be one of the most influential Hindu leaders of North-Western India. He believed that unity between the Muslims and Hindus was unthinkable. Parmanand suggested that "the only satisfactory avenue to unity is to effect complete severance between the two peoples; India could be partitioned in such a manner as to secure the supremacy of Islam in one zone and that of Hinduism in the other. Under this plan, some exchange of population would be inevitable. People with strong religious feelings who found themselves in the wrong region would have to migrate to the other. Parmanand like [Pandit M.M.] Malaviya, encouraged Hindu-Muslim trials of strength". Parmanand published his "Apbithi" in Urdu in 1923; he wrote that the police searched his house in 1912 and seized some of his private papers which included a rough draft of a letter addressed to Lala Lajpat Rai containing a blue-print of a constitution for free India together with a proposal to push the Muslims across the river Indus. In the same year Parmanand published another book entitled Arya Samaj awr Hindu Sangathan. Parmanand argued that "the solution lay in either the Hindus assimilating the entire Muslim population of the subcontinent or being eventually assimilated by the alien intruders". Similarly, Lajpat Rai (a veteran Hindu leader) suggested in 1924, a scheme of Muslim states in the provinces of Punjab N.W.F.P. Sind and Bengal. In a letter to C.R.Dass (leader of the "Swarajists") in 1925 Lajpat Rai commented: "I have devoted most of my time during the last six

months to the study of Muslim history and Muslim law and I am inclined to think [that Hindu-Muslim unity] may neither be possible nor practicable.... religion [Islam] provides an effective bar to everything of the kind.... I am not afraid of seven crores of Indian Muslims but seven crore plus the armed hosts of Afghanistan and Central Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey will be irresistible".

It was probably due to these fears Lajpat Rai suggested that "the Punjab should be partitioned into two provinces, the Western Punjab with a large Muslim majority to be a Muslim governed province and the Eastern Punjab with a large Hindu Sikh majority to be non-Muslim governed province....."

"Under my scheme the Muslims will have four Muslim states:

(1) the Pathan Province or the [N.W.F.P.] (2) Western Punjab, (3) Sind, and (4) Eastern Bengal". It is said (by K.K.Aziz) that "in clarity, detail and firmness this proposal was a landmark in the evolution of the idea of Pakistan. This is the first clear scheme of partition to appear of which we have full details and in some respects it goes beyond what any body had suggested before or was to suggest in future until we come to Rahmat Ali" A Hindu writer (Tara Chand) says: "The partition of India was not the product of the fertile imagination of Muslim undergraduate of the Cambridge University, nor even Iqbal's fantasy but the brain child of a hypersensitive Hindu stalwart [Lajpat Rai]". It may be noted that "within a year of publication of Lajpat Rai's scheme a palmist and astronomer, [C.L.Hamon under the name of Cheiro] confirmed the future emergence of a Muslim state in India".

In the concluding pages, the contribution made by some Englishmen is to be mentioned. John Bright, on a number of occasions (1857 and 1877) made it clear that "he foresaw several independent and sovereign states in India when British withdrawal had been effected". W.S.Blunt (1840-1922) also did not see any prospect for a united India; he saw the main line of division running between the Hindus and the Muslims; and in 1881-82 he pointed out the the hidden strength of the Indian Muslims and gave a hint about their future plans. Blunt also toured India in the winter of 1883-1884, having meetings with the Muslim intelligentsia. In 1932, Sir Reginald

Caddock" observed that if Norway and Sweden could not get to be united, how could it be expected that the infinitely greater diversities and divergent racial elements to be found in India could be welded into one self-governing and democratic whole". In the same year John Coatman wrote: "It may be that the die is already cast and that no united India as we understand today will ever emerge. It may be that Moslem India in the North-west is destined to become a separate Muslim State or part of a Muslim Empire. There is no reason yet to believe that this is so, but unless the process that we have been watching at work are checked and reversed, there is good reason for believing that this might be the ultimate outcome".

Towards The Lahore (Pakistan) Resolution

Even though several schemes for "re-drawing" the Indian boundaries were presented from time to time, it was during the early years of the Second World War that the idea of an independent Muslim State finally developed in the Muslim mind. To almost every scheme which came forward during this period, the word "Pakistan" was eventually attached with it. Due to Congress's mal-treatment of the Muslims in the predominantly Hindu provinces, the communal problem in India had become more difficult to solve. The Muslims had unequivocally rejected the all-India Federation Scheme as embodied in the act of 1935. Under the circumstances it was thought in certain quarters that a successful movement might lead to the creation of Pakistan. Some eminent Muslims who were interviewed by Lord Linlithgow were not happy with the situation; before and after the declaration of war, leaders like Sir ZiaUddin, Sir Mohammad Yakub, Sir Mohammad Yamin and Nawab Chattari pointed out that the communal problem was so acute that no solution was possible. Sir Abdullah Haroon and the Quaid-i-Azam now clearly demanded the partition of India. In October 1938, the Sind League held its conference; Jinnah referred to the breaking up of Czechoslovakia implying that Congress policies would divide India. Abdullah Haroon also hinted at the possibility of an independent federation of Muslim States; Sheikh Abdul Majid also declared that the Muslims would "fall back upon the Pakistan Scheme. A resolution was moved: "that India should be divided into two federations ...Muslims

may attain full independence. In December 1938, the League's session in Patna authorised the Quaid to explore the possibility of a suitable alternative which would completely safeguard the interests of Muslimans and other minorities in India".

On 26 March, The League's Working Committee met at Castle Mustafa (Meerut) and passed a resolution appointing a committee to examine various schemes and to report to the Working Committee their conclusions as soon as possible. The Members were :

1. M.A.Jinnah (President)
2. Sir Sikander Hayat Khan
3. Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan
4. Syed Abdul Aziz
5. Sir Abdullah Haroon
6. Sir Nazimuddin
7. Abdul Matin Choudhri
8. Sardar Aurangzeb Khan
9. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan (Convener).

On 8 April, addressing a meeting of the League's Council at Delhi, the Quaid pointed out that there were several schemes in the field, including that of dividing India into Muslim and Hindu India. He declared that the whole questions would be examined to produce a scheme which would be in the best interests of the Indian Muslims. In February 1940, the working Committee and the League's Council held their meetings in Delhi. The issue of a separate homeland for the Muslims figured prominently and it was decided to propose a final decision at the open session of the League in March 1940. However Jinnah publicly proclaimed that any constitutional settlement must recognize that India was not one nation but two, and that the Muslims would not accept the arbitrament of any body, (India or British) but would determine thier destiny themselves. In early March, the League sent a deputation under Raja Mehmoodabad to make arrangements for its forthcoming session in

the Punjab (Lahore). It may be noted that this time the League had made elaborate preparations; the press had speculated that his session would prove to be a landmark in the history of India.

It may be mentioned that in the middle of march (1940) the Punjab government had taken action against the "militant" Khaksar organization. Sir Sikander Hayat wanted the League's session postponed but Jinnah did not agree because the Quaid wished to announce the official policy of the League (Pakistan) as early as early possible; and the answer to the Congress was to be given publicly. Therefore, as planned, on 22 March, Jinnah arrived in the Lahore and went straight to Mayo Hospital to visit the wounded Khaksars. More than 60,000 Muslims were present to greet the Quaid in Lahore with shouts of "Quaid-i-Azam" Jinnah's address lasted for nearly two hours before a memorable gathering of 100,000 Muslims: "the Muslims are not a minority. The Muslims are a nation by any definition with the need for a homeland, territory and state if we are to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life". Jinnah said "Islam and Hinduism are not religions ... but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is only a dream that the Hindus and the Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality ...they have different epics, different heros and different episodes Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and likewise their victories and defeats overlap."

The main resolution was introduced by Fazlul Haq (Premier of Bengal) Khaliquzzamann seconded the resolution ; Moulana Zafar Ali Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan and Abdullah Haroon supported it. On 24 march when discussion on the resolution resumed, Qazi Isa Khan, Abdul Hamid Khan, I.I. Chundrigar, Dr.Mohammad Alam, Nawab Ismail Khan, Syed Abdur Rauf Shah, Syed Zakir Ali, Begum Mohammad Ali and Moulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni also spoke in support of the resolution and it was passed unanimously amid great enthusiasm. The Lahore resolution reads as follows:

While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the working Committee of the all-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated August 27, September 17 and 18 and October 22,1939, and February 3,1940, on the constitutional issue, this Session of the all-India Muslim League emphatically

reiterates that the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India act 1935, is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of the country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated October 18, 1934, made by the Viceroy on behalf of his Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and the plan on which the Government of India Act is based will be considered in consultations with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered denovo, and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the all-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustment as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the Musalamans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the Constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, culture, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This session further authorizes the working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally, by the respective regions, of all

power, such as defence, external affairs, communication, and such other matters as may be necessary.

It may be pointed out that some writers say that the Lahore resolution came as a response to Linlithgow's suggestion to Jinnah to state the League's "constructive policy". But as mentioned in the earlier pages it should be abundantly clear that the idea of partition was not new; but it had not been taken very seriously. The situation had, however changed dramatically during the Congress rule and after the declaration of War leading to the resignations of the Congress ministries. The Lahore resolution however roused widespread concern among the Hindus due to the fact that the timing of the resolution was a proof that Jinnah was a strategist of the highest order. By its resignations, the Congress had committed a suicide and the Viceroy and the British Government was not in a position (due to the War and Congress rebellion) to do anything to estrange the Muslim League, the second largest political party in India. The British, therefore, were not in a position to denounce the resolution to slice India into separate states. In the coming years, the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and some Hindu politicians pressurised the government to oppose the Pakistan resolution officially, but the British authorities had no option but to maintain the status quo as, no new move was advisable.

It may also be mentioned that the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs and other anti-Muslim leaders were shocked and alarmed and in fact it was the Hindu press which dubbed the Lahore resolution as a demand for the creation of Pakistan. The Lahore resolution had made no mention of Pakistan but an intensive campaign against the proposed division of India was noticed. Lengthy statements and criticism appeared as this latest news flashed all over the world. The Hindu Press came out with big headlines saying "Pakistan Resolution Passed by the League". The Congress described the League's demand as the "Vivisection of the Motherland ... cutting up a baby into two halves ... the cutting of the mother cow; some questioned the viability of Pakistan." Some top leaders of the Congress party explained that Jinnah did not mean it and was using only as a bargaining chip or an attempt to get maximum advantages under the threat of secession. Gandhi

commented that Jinnah had created a baffling situation; that the partition meant suicide and that the two-nation theory was an untruth, a sin, and a call to war. Some Hindu leaders declared Pakistan as an absurd scheme. Hindus and the Sikhs wrote articles on the Hindu ambitions to combat the scheme. The Sikhs issued statements to fight to the last ditch to avoid Muslim Raj in the Punjab, and demanding that the Punjab should be given to the Sikhs. Tara Singh declared that Jinnah had thrown a bomb-shell on the Sikh community. The Sikhs held several anti-Pakistan conferences in the Punjab declaring that Pakistan would be established in the sea of blood. Official reports added that the Sikhs had started the purchase of arms and ammunition in large numbers. In December 1940, the anti-Pakistan Conference was held in Lahore; a crowd of 20,000 non-Muslims gathered to form a United front against Pakistan; Mr. Anney of the Hindu Mahasabha presided and prominent non-Muslim leaders also delivered speeches. The Hindu Mahasabha also got in touch with the Viceroy pressing him to denounce the Pakistan Scheme. The same was demanded by other non-Muslim organizations.

The August Offer And After

On 19 April, the Viceroy wrote to Jinnah saying that the Government were in friendly and sympathetic relations with all Muslim powers to some of whom indeed they were bound by an alliance. In the meantime, due to the "phony war" in Europe (invasion of Denmark and Norway by Germany) Winston Churchill (June 1940) replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister with L.S. Amery as his Secretary of State for India; Lord Zetland opted for an early retirement. Amery suggested a revised plan: the Viceroy should meet all the leaders so as to expand his council. On 15 June, the League's working Committee held a meeting endorsing Jinnah's policy and authorising him to proceed with his negotiations with Linlithgow. It may be mentioned that Sir Sikander had been trying to short-circuit Jinnah by negotiating with the Congress. The Working Committee, therefore, decided that no Muslim League leader would negotiate with the Congress without Jinnah's permission. On 27 June, Jinnah met the Viceroy to say that the Lahore resolution had

become "the Universal faith of Muslim India"; the Viceroy assured him that no "interim or final scheme of new constitution would be adopted without the previous approval of Muslim India". The Quaid insisted that the Muslims should be equal partners in the government both at the Centre and in all the Provinces; that the Viceroy's Council be expanded to include Muslims, giving them parity with Hindus; and that the government should consider the Pakistan Scheme. After this meeting, Jinnah sent Linlithgow a memorandum.

The viceroy also met Gandhi and he was ready to give India a status similar to that of the self-governing dominions within one year after the war ended. But Gandhi was not satisfied. Linlithgow also met Savarkar and some other leaders. However, the Congress Working Committee (31 July) once again renewed its demand for full independence immediately. Under these circumstances, the new Secretary of State (Amery) agreed that a declaration should be issued, setting out the aims and intentions of the British government. Amery prepared a rough draft and sent it to the Viceroy; it was revised and amended. And the announcement was made by Linlithgow on behalf of the government on 8 August 1940, commonly known as the "August Offer". So far as the Muslims were concerned, it was declared that no system of government denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life would be forced upon Indians - there should be an agreement between the Congress and the Muslims. Other notable features were: Dominion status was the goal; Indians would be invited to join the Viceroy's Executive Council and the proposed War Advisory Committee. Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy saying that he had read the declaration and "slept over it", and that it was a mistake. The Quaid-i-Azam asked for clarification on a number of points but did not commit. On 14 August, Amery tried to clarify the August declaration. But the Congress rejected the August offer - "not even worth looking at". The League, however, considered the offer an advance and recorded its satisfaction. But the League's full co-operation in the war effort was stated to be conditional on Linlithgow's clearing some points with Jinnah. Accordingly, Linlithgow had a long meeting with Jinnah on 24 September. Jinnah demanded equal representation in the Viceroy's Council; that the Congress would not be allowed to join the Council unless the League approved of it. But the Viceroy did not give this

"veto" to the League nor did he make any commitment to give parity to the League. On 26 September, Jinnah wrote to Linlithgow saying that the Viceroy had not been able to satisfy him; two days later the League's Working Committee (in Delhi) declared that it was unable to accept the "August Offer". The Hindu Mahasabha, however, accepted the offer saying that the government had not accepted the Pakistan Scheme of the Muslim League.

On 27 September Gandhi again met the Viceroy; Gandhi issued a statement after the meeting that "the immediate issue is the right of existence - the right of self-expression - free speech". On 17 October, the civil disobedience movement began under Gandhi's direction. As a start, a few leaders (V.Bhave and Nehru) were hand-picked to deliver anti-war statements and speeches; later on, members of the Congress Working Committee, former ministers and eminent men like Moulana Azad and Rajagopalachari (Rajaji) also joined in. This anti-government move was followed by arrests; conviction and sentence to varying terms of imprisonment became a daily routine. Nehru was sentenced by a local magistrate to three consecutive terms of sixteen months imprisonment; but his offence was sedition, not that of formal disobedience. At a third stage, lesser Congress figures were drafted to the task; and in April 1941 the rank and file were enlisted. The peak figure of nearly 14,000 "satyagrahis" in prison reached in the following month. Sometimes the person released, courted further arrests. But this campaign provoked little public excitement; the idea behind this movement was to develop a popular and mass movement so that it might lead up to a national revolt, but the "satyagraha" was a total failure. In Bengal people were little attracted; the N.W.F.P was the least affected - Dr. Khan Sahib had been reluctant to participate in this Movement from the start. In April, some Hindu newspapers called for a cessation of the movement. The number of "satyagrahis" decreased as the time went by. However, Subhas Chandra Bose (the left wing leader) who was standing trial for certain speeches and articles and had been released from jail as a result of a hunger strike and disappeared from his house in Calcutta. Bose had escaped to Germany.

The Muslim League was opposed to the Congress movement; at this moment the Quaid-i-Azam was in the middle of consolidating its

strengthened so as to popularise the Pakistan Scheme. The slogan of independence of the Congress meant Hindu Raj which the Muslims despised. In November 1940, Jinnah, during his speech in Delhi, criticised the Congress claim that its movement had been launched for the freedom of India; on the contrary, it was "to coerce the British government to recognize the Congress as the only authority and representative of the people of India". The Quaid-i-Azam argued that the Congress wished to settle the issues with the British but they wanted to ignore the Muslims; that the Congress wished to grab power by blackmailing the British government; that the Congress demands were fundamentally opposed by Muslim India; that the League would play its part for the protection of the rights and interests of the Indian Muslim. In April 1941, at its Madras Session, the League once again repeated its opposition to the Congress movement describing it as an attempt to establish the Hindu Raj in order to relegate 100 million Muslims. The League reminded the government about the promises made to the Muslims by the Viceroy and the British government in London, that Muslims would be taken into confidence at the time of constitutional changes. The Muslim League also threatened to do all it could to protect its rights, that there would be no compromise on the Pakistan scheme.

The Liberal Party's Proposals

Some eminent leaders of the Liberal Party once again presented proposals to break the political deadlock in India. Sir Jagdish Prasad (former member of the Viceroy's Council) Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Chimanlal H. Setalvad and Sir Srinivasa Sastri had a great deal of experience and ability. In 1940, the Liberals presented some proposals to end the political impasse: that the British war effort should be whole-heartedly supported; that the government should declare that India would be a Dominion within two years after the war ended; that the Central government should be re-constituted to make it a "fully national" government; that the partition should be ruled out and separate electorates should be gradually eliminated - etc. On the invitation of J. Prasad, a Non-party Conference under the presidency of T. B. Sapru was held in Bombay in March 1941. The

Conference was attended by leaders and representatives of all parties but the Congress and the League did not co-operate. The Hindu Mahasabha sent its top leaders like Savarkar, B.S.Moonje and S.P.Mookerjee. A resolution was adopted stressing the need that India should not take advantage of Britain's difficulties during the war; that the Viceroy's Executive Council should be re-constructed transferring all portfolios to Indians (including Finance and Defence). The League criticised these proposals using the plea that their acceptance would mean the breach of faith with Muslim India and that it was an attempt to get the British government by hook or by crook to denounce and reject the Muslim League's demand for the partition of India.

But Sapru was not depressed; he had a long meeting with Linlithgow in April 1941. The Viceroy referred to his difficulties and expressed his doubts about the Working of the proposed enlarged Executive Council. As a matter of fact, the Viceroy was in no mood to disturb the Status quo; in April 1941, Parliament approved the continuance of section 93 (emergency rule) in seven Congress Provinces. L.S.Amery (in the House of Commons) referred to the Liberal Resolution by saying that it had been directed to the wrong address. He was not ready to make any new move during the war, also pointing out that there was no agreement between the two major communities. Gandhi criticised Amery on this point saying that it was a traditional policy of Britain to prevent parties from uniting; that "Divide and Rule" has been Britain's proud motto; that it was the British politicians who were responsible for the division in India's rank and file and the division will continue so long as the British sword held India under bondage. Gandhi's statement also implied that the two major communities could solve their problems, even if they had to fight for it; and that when the British were gone out of India, the Hindus would be able to use their power to subdue the minorities.

National Defence Council

But in the middle of 1941, due to serious changes in the war situation, Linlithgow decided not to follow his policy of "doing

nothing", a new move was essential. On 21 July, the Viceroy declared that he had decided to enlarge his Executive Council, including, the re-distribution and creation of some new portfolios (Information and Civil Defence); that the members of the Council would be raised from seven to twelve (with an Indian representation from three to eight). At the same time, Linlithgow announced that, in pursuance of the desire of the British government to associate non-official opinion as fully as possible with the prosecution of the war, it had been decided to establish a National Defence Council, the strength of which would be about thirty members and would include representatives of Indian States and other elements in the national life of British India. The idea was to establish a close link between the Central and Provincial war efforts; the Defence Council was to serve as a safety valve but it would not have any executive authority. The record reveals the fact that Linlithgow had been in touch with Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, asking him to become a member of the Defence Council; Sir Sikandar knew that it would lead to a clash with Jinnah, but showed his willingness to join.

When all other arrangements were completed, the Governor of Bombay (Sir Roger Lumley) wrote to Jinnah (on 20 July) that the Viceroy had established a National Defence Council and that Linlithgow "regards it essential that the great Muslim Community should be represented on that Council by persons of the highest prominence and capacity. He has accordingly invited the premiers of Assam, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind to serve as member of it He has considered whether he should invite you to let him have any suggestions as possible personnel for this Council, but being aware of your general attitude, he has concluded that it would be preferable not to embarrass you by inviting you to make suggestions". As anticipated by Sir Sikandar, the League at once condemned the government for by-passing the League. The Muslim Students Federation also strongly opposed and threatened the Muslims who had joined the Council without the League's prior approval. The Quaid-i-Azam also interpreted this move as a challenge to his authority; in August, Jinnah called the meeting of Working Committee in Bombay to deal with the issue. The meeting was held on 24 August amidst confusion and speculations about the membership of the Defence Council. Jinnah argued that the League

had been by-passed so as to divide the Muslim ranks and destroy the solidarity of the League. But the members of the Defence Council took the view that they were appointed to represent their respective provinces as Premiers, and not as the representative of the Muslim community. This point of view enraged the Quaid who managed to produce Roger Lumley's letter to prove that the reverse was the case. Now a great deal depended on Sir Sikandar Hayat; he proved to be very weak, and without offering much resistance agreed to submit his resignation from the Council. Sir Nazimuddin played a key role in persuading Sir Sikandar to resign.

Soon afterwards, in accordance with the working Committee's resolution, all the Muslim members (except Begum Shahnawaz and Sir Sultan Ahmad) tendered their resignations, for they were given no option but to quit the Council or leave the Muslim League. Fazlul Haq also resigned his membership of the Working Committee and Council of the League in protest against the President's (Jinnah's) "arrogant and dictatorial conduct". Begum Shahnawaz and Sir Sultan Ahmad were, therefore sentenced to five years' expulsion from the League. Begum Shahnawaz took the view that she was appointed by the Viceroy to represent Indian women, and not as a Muslim representative. For her action, she was strongly criticised even by the women's sub-committee of the League. The ban on her membership was lifted by Jinnah (a few months before the 1946 elections) when she tendered an apology, requesting Jinnah to lift the ban, also promising to serve the community selflessly and loyally. So far as Fazlul Haq was concerned, the Quaid-i-Azam appointed M.A.H. Isphani in place of Haq on the Working Committee. Later on, Haq resigned his League ministry in Calcutta to head a coalition of his Proja party and the Hindu Mahasabha led by its anti-Pakistan leader, S.P. Mookerjee; now "shere Bengal" was called the black sheep by the Muslims - Muslim students received him with black flags wherever he went. Jinnah was delighted to get rid of those men who were "guilty of the grossest treachery and betrayal of the Muslims" - the Nawab of Dacca was also "weeded out" as he had joined Haq's new cabinet. Moreover, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy and Khwaja Nazimuddin began their efforts to make life difficult for Fazlul Haq. Thereafter Fazlul Haq felt very uncomfortable and frequently expressed his desire to leave Bengal and quit politics

if he was appointed as an ambassador to Saudi Arabia. But Linlithgow did not pay any attention because Fazlul Haq was no longer in command of the Muslim following in his own Province; sending him to Saudi Arabia could have annoyed the Indian Muslims and the Muslim League once again. In conclusion, the Defence Council issue was a great victory for Jinnah's leadership and a significant defeat and a lesson for all those who had defied the Muslim League's authority.

From Cripps Mission To The Simla Conference

The Conservative British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill did not wish to break the India political deadbook. His position on India was extremely rigid; he had been extending his fullest support to the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, against the Congress's anti-British campaign. Churchill had refused to give any generous treatment to India under the Atlantic Charter saying that he had not become the British Prime Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. In 1947, seven year later, as the leader of the opposition, Churchill agreed to support the passage of the Indian Independence Bill in the Parliament when the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, assured him that both Hindustan and Pakistan had agreed to become the members of the British Commonwealth.

In India, after the resignations of the Congress ministries (1939) Linlithgow had succeeded in handling the situation; he held the opinion that due to the exigencies of war status quo should be maintained. The Viceroy, after learning about Sir Stafford Cripps's intention to visit India wrote to the secretary of State on 7 Feb. 1942; "Reuters report Cripps as saying that he might visit India.....I trust that you will dissuade him, and if possible prevent further reports about any such visit, effect of which in existing circumstances would be in my view disastrous"

Whether Churchill and Linlithgow liked it or not, the circumstances changed so rapidly that the appointment of a political mission to India became essential. Japanese Imperial Army's victories in Malaya, Singapore and Burma greatly worried the British government. The war was much closer to India than any time; the Indian gates were wide open for any invasion from the sea or overland. A section of the Congress was in sympathy with the

Japanese propaganda, urging Indians to rise in revolt against the British Raj. Due to this emergency, Churchill reconstructed his war cabinet; the Labour leader, Attlee became Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Cripps became leader of the House of Commons with an important portfolio in the cabinet - Lord Privy seal. Both the Labour and Liberal parties put pressure on Churchill to resolve the political impasse in India. The U.S. President, Roosevelt, also pressured Churchill to promise Indian independence. Churchill of course, could not go that far but something had to be done to satisfy the U.S., an important ally since the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor. China also pressured in the same direction; in Feb. 1942 when Marshall Chiang Kai-Shek visited India, China demanded that the British should give real political power and freedom to the Indians.

Under pressures, therefore, the war Cabinet's India Committee began its task to solve the political deadlock in India; Cripps was the most important member after Churchill and Attlee. The Muslim league was fully alert. Sir Firoz Khan Noon (Member for Labour, Viceroy's Executive Council) who was in touch with the Quaid-i-Azam sent a telegram to the Secretary of State (Amery) imploring that if the British government was contemplating to make a declaration creating Indian Dominion, the demand for Pakistan must be accepted in the same statement. Noon also conveyed that the Muslims were apprehensive about the Hindu intentions to establish the Hindu Raj; that the Viceroy's Council did not have enough Muslim representation. Sir Firoz also reminded the part played by the Muslims during the war and the Congress's anti-British campaign. Amery in his telegram to the Viceroy said "[the] proposed declaration includes Pakistan option as regards [India's] future. Amery also wrote to Churchill saying that the British could not afford to let down the Muslims. Churchill was convinced; he got in touch with his most important ally, the U.S. President, conveying to him that British government declaration of Aug. 8, 1940 implies that no constitutional change would be made without Muslims agreement; the Muslim India should not be sacrificed, especially with regard to the war effort.

In Feb. 1942, the Draft Declaration was prepared and sent to India for official opinion. The Viceroy, Linlithgow, soon received the opinion of Governor of the Punjab, Glancy, who was biased against the Pakistan scheme. Glancy told the Viceroy that the Muslim League would gain 'great accession of strength' due to the option clause in the Declaration (creation of Pakistan): the relations between the Muslims and the Sikhs would be further strained; and his Premier (Sikandar Hayat Khan) will resign along with his ministers creating a very bad situation. Linlithgow also feared that the Muslims in the Punjab would take advantage of the option clause deciding to remain separate from the predominantly Hindu Union.

After a good deal of correspondence and meetings, the war Cabinet decided to send Cripps to India; Churchill announced it on 11 March 1942. It may be mentioned that Cripps, a vegetarian and as austere socialist had long friendly relations with Nehru. Commenting on the situation, Cunningham (Governor N.W.F.P.) wrote to Linlithgow; "Hindus and Congress Muslims are pleased... that Cripps is a friend of Nehru and hope that difficulties will be solved in a way acceptable to Hindus and Congress". The Quaid-i-Azam was also well aware of this fact; on 23 March, on the anniversary of the Pakistan resolution, addressing a public meeting in Delhi, the Quaid conveyed his "message to the Muslims that Cripps had come to India on an official visit (not in personal capacity). Even though he is a friend of the Congress party, there is no need to be afraid on that score. The Muslims would not accept any scheme if it was detrimental to their interests; the Muslims are not a minority but a nation; and only the League represented the Muslims of India".

In the meantime, Cripps (leaving London on 14 March) arrived in Delhi on 23 March 1942. The next day Cripps had a meeting with the members of the Viceroy's Executive Council. F.K.Noon, commenting on the option clause pointed out that although the Muslims were in majority in the Punjab and Bengal, they were allotted less than 50% seats in the legislatures and if the non-Muslims were united on the issues of succession in the legislatures, the Muslim wishes would be overruled by non-Muslims, and therefore the Muslims would be cheated. In reply to a question, Cripps pointed out that the proposed

constituent Assembly had the power to redraw the provincial boundaries. This explanation pleased the Hindus. F.K.Noon, gloomy and worried, was of the opinion that these conditions were not favourable to the Muslims and that they would not be silent on these issues, especially after the war ended.

Cripps, met Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan before meeting the Indian leaders officially; he was a bit reluctant to do so in view of the fact that Sikandar and Jinnah had strained relations. However, it was arranged that Sir Sikandar would come to the Viceroy's House ostensibly to see the governor of Punjab and Cripps would meet him privately. The Punjab Premier was thus shown the Draft Declaration; Sir Sikandar did not anticipate any trouble in the Punjab. But the Governor of the Punjab told Cripps that Sir Sikandar might change his mind after a period of reflection.

Cripps began his official meetings with the Indian leaders on 25th March; the Congress President, Azad, met him at 3 P.M. Azad told him that the defence of India should be under the control of Indians. Azad was told that the Viceroy's Executive Council would be fully Indianized and the Viceroy would function as a Constitutional head. Cripps's next appointment was with Jinnah; Cripps told Jinnah that he had revised his views on the Pakistan scheme due to the growth of the Pakistan movement. Cripps thought that his document surprised Jinnah in the distance it went to meet the Pakistan case. The Quaid promised to put the matter before the Working Committee of the League and then get in touch with Cripps.

On 27th March, the Sikhs delegation consisting of Beldev Singh, Tara Singh and Jogendra Singh met Cripps, and Mr.Ogilvie (Secretary Defence Department, Govt. of India) and explained their view point later handing over a memorandum. The Sikh argued that the option provision had been put in by the British Government for the separation of the various provinces, and thus to facilitate the creation of Pakistan. They expressed their strongest opposition to the proposal to create Pakistan; the Sikhs warned that they would not submit to the domination of the Muslim Community of the Punjab; and the Sikhs made several other demands.

On the same day, Gandhi had a two and a half hours meeting with Cripps - not representing Congress officially. Like the Sikh delegation Gandhi too had anti-Pakistan bias, pointing out that the document Cripps had brought was an invitation to the Muslims to create Pakistan; Gandhi insisted that the document should not be published. It may mentioned that Jinnah told Cripps that it must be published before too long to avoid any leakage; and on this basis Gandhi gathered that Jinnah was going to accept the Cripps offer. On the other hand, Gandhi had to recognize the fact that the Pakistan movement had gained a great deal of momentum over the years. Cripps explained to Gandhi that his document was based on the conception of a United India, and only in case of disagreement between the Congress and the Muslims any question of non-accession would arise. He reminded Gandhi that the Congress had been saying in the past that once the British leave India, an agreeable formula could be worked out between the Hindus and the Muslims.

After the Sikhs and Congress leaders, it was now the Hindu Mahasabha's turn to ventilate its anti-Pakistan views. The delegation consisting of Savarkar, Dr. Moonje, Dr. Mookerjee and others met Cripps on 28th March. The most worried part of the scheme for Mahasabha was the right of non-acession. Cripps explained to the delegation (as he did to Gandhi earlier) that his document was not based upon the vivisection of India; and that hey could not pick and choose - the document must be accepted in toto - the right of non-accession was the main part of the document. Cripps gathered that the Mahasbha would reject his scheme, on the same point (province's right to succede) Cripps tried to convince Nehru and Azad on 29th March. "Nehru and other Congress leaders had said that they were prepared to envisage the possibility of Pakistan and that was all the scheme was doing". Azad and Nehru, perhaps with their hearts sinking argued that they could accept the scheme if the Muslim provinces would secede after five to ten years - not immediately after independence - calculating that the Congress would be able to tear up and scrap the Draft Declaration by that time.

Now the document was released to the press (29th March)- followed by a press Conference lasting two hours - a frank and free

questions from one hundred journalists. The Draft Declaration embodied three main points.

- 1 Immediately after the end of the war an elected body would be set up in India with the task of framing a new constitution. After fresh provincial elections had been held, the entire membership of the lower provincial houses would elect by proportional representation the British Indian members of the constitution-making body. The states would be invited to send representatives proportionately to their population, with the same power as members from British India.
2. His Majesty's Government undertook to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:
 - (i) The rights of any province that was not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its existing constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession, should it so decide. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to agree with a non-acceding province a new constitution, arrived at by a similar representative process, and giving it the same status as the India Union itself.
 - (ii) The signing of a treaty between H.M.G. and the constitution-making body. The treaty would cover all necessary matters arising out of the transfer of power; it would provide for the protection of minorities in accordance with British undertakings, but would not restrict the power of the Indian Union to decide its future relationship with the British Commonwealth. Treaties with Indian States would have to be reviewed.
3. During the war and until the new constitution could be framed the British Government must control and direct the defence of India as a part of their world war effort, but the task of organising the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India. His Majesty's Government invites the immediate and the effective participation of the leaders of the principal section of the Indian people in the councils of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations.

As regards the reception of the Draft Declaration from the Congress, Nehru had a meeting (lasting over two hours) with Cripps conveying him the impression that the Congress would not accept the proposals, mainly due to Gandhi (opposed the Declaration using the plea that it was a post-dated cheque on a bank which is obviously going broke.) The Sikhs were also hostile; Tara Singh was extremely upset' - and he threatened that the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikhs would pool their resources to oppose the Cripps proposals and the war effort, in case these proposals were implemented, Tara Singh demanded that the whole area south of the Sutlej plus the districts of Lahore (ies Lahore City). Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Jullundar, Hoshiarpur and Kangra should be made into a separate (Sikh) province. Tara Singh also threatened that the Sikh Community would never tolerate Muslim rule, open or disguised. The Sikh All Parties Committee sent a letter to Cripps on 31 March. In it, it was said that the creation of Pakistan had been made possible under the Declaration; that they would resist the separation of the Punjab from All-India Union using all means; and that the Muslims wanted to impose their personal laws and culture in the Punjab; that the Muslims are bent upon breaking the unity of India; and that the Sikhs would not submit to their authority. The letter also gave a detailed survey of a cordial relationship between the British and the Sikhs and the historical importance of the Sikh community in the Punjab.

On 2 April 1942, Azad and Nehru had a meeting with Cripps and gave him the official rejection of the Declaration by the Congress' working committee. The Congress party's main objection was that the Declaration had encouraged the partition of India whereas the unity of India was most dear to them. The working committee of the Hindu Mahasabha also rejected the Declaration; but it conveyed the impression that some parts of the Declaration were acceptable. It rehearsed its familiar objections: "India is one and indivisible: Muslims of Pakistan might unite with Pathanistan, Afghanistan and other Muslim nations which might lead to a civil war." It also demanded the independence of India. The Governor Bengal wrote to the Viceroy: "The Hindu Mahasabha have definitely rejected the Proposals, and thus emphasised that Party's attitude that it will be content with nothing but Hindu rule (Raj)".

As a matter of fact at this stage the Cripps proposals had been rejected by the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh political parties. The only major force left was the Muslim League. Sir Stafford Cripps had made his own calculation on this score; he thought that his major task was to secure the Congress acceptance, for if the Congress had given him the green signal, the Muslim League could not afford to stay out. Some eminent Muslim Leaders like Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan told Cripps that "the League had accepted the scheme as a whole and were prepared to embark upon the working out the details". Even if this was true, there were little chances that after giving it a great deal of thought, the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh leaders would review their attitude towards the Draft Declaration so soon. As pointed out earlier, the reason for the rejection was that these anti-Pakistan parties did not like the very essentials of the Cripps's scheme. The Viceroy's remarks testify this fact. Linlithgow conveyed to the Secretary of State: "I personally suspect that non-accession (the option clause) is the more serious stumbling block and that Defence is chosen as having better propaganda value".

It may also be mentioned that when the Mahasabha and the Sikhs conveyed to Sir Stafford Cripps that they were prepared to accept some parts of the Draft Declaration whilst rejecting the main essentials of the scheme (the option clause) Sir Stafford had replied that (as mentioned above) the acceptance in toto was required. But contrary to this Sir Stafford renewed his contacts with the Hindu leaders and thus began the second phase of negotiations - unnecessary, uncalled for and above all a fruitless exercise. Our study also reveals the fact that the Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League were completely ignored at this stage. Not even once Jinnah was taken into confidence.

Anyway, further negotiations with the Congress started on the pretext of elaboration and explanation of the Defence issue. The third main point of the Draft Declaration was: "During the war and until the new constitution could be framed the British Government must control and direct the defence of India as part of their war effort, but the task of organising the military, moral and material

resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India"

Shiva Rao, (Hindu labour leader and journalist) met Sir Stafford Cripps on 1 April 142 to make suggestions for some sort of compromise upon the Defence issue. On the same day, J.C.Gupta (retired Judge) met Sir Stafford; Gupta was intouch with Azad. He also advised that some measure of control over Defence should be given to the Congress. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was next to meet Sir Stafford. He too gave some suggestions regarding the Ministry of Defence; Sapru was intouch with Gandhi. Cripps now wrote to Azad who replied that he was ready to discuss not only the Defence issue but some other points also (Sir) B.S.Roy (Revenue Minister Bengal) and (Sir) C.Setalvad (retired Judge) also suggested (2 April) a compromise on the same issue on 2 April. Azad and Nehru met Sir Stafford Cripps and once again their main concern was the option clause " they feared the partition of India and definately thought that this encouraged it and that the principle of a United India was one for which they were prepared to go to any length" . As regards Defence issue, Cripps directed them to get in touch with the Commander-in-Chief for a meeting.

Churchill, the British Prime Minister, could not give Cripps a free hand to compromise with the Congress. In a telegram, the man in 10 Downing Street, warned; " I can not give you any authority to compromise on Defence without submitting issue both to the Cabinet and Ministers above the Line ". However, Sir Winston Churchill was pleased with one aspect of the negotiations: propaganda at home and abroad, especially for the Americans, more specifically for their President Franklin D.Roosevelt. In the same telegram to Sir Stafford Cripps Churchill pointed out : "Everyone admires the manner in which you have discharged your difficult mission and the affect of our proposals has been most beneficial in the United States and in large circles here"

The war Cabinet (in London) held its meeting; it was of the view that "the acceptance or rejection of the proposals set out in the Draft Declaration was not likely to turn on responsibility for defence. There could, of course, be no question of our accepting a nominee of the Congress to some office connected with the defence responsibilities

of the Government of India. But there was no reason why some suitable Indian, selected by the Viceroy himself, should not be appointed in such a capacity. This could be done without altering the terms of the Draft Declaration, and without impairing the Commander-in-Chief's responsibility for the control and direction of the Defence of India". As we have pointed out earlier, the Cabinet also noted with some concern the renewal of the negotiations: "It was also felt that the Congress leaders, by concentrating attention on responsibility for defence, were attempting to distract attention from the essential features of the scheme set out in the draft Declaration". Furthermore, the war Cabinet although approved further discussions, Sir Stafford Cripps was directed not to make any commitment without the approval of the Cabinet; that no change would be made in the published text of the Declaration. A telegram on these lines was sent by Churchill to Cripps concluding that: "It has made our position plain to the world and has won general approval. We all reached an agreement on it before you started and it represents our final position".

Sir Winston Churchill and the Cabinet in London was not the only hurdle for Sir Stafford. The man-on-the-spot, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, whose views were extremely important, was also not interested in further talks; Linlithgow tried to maintain the status quo, so far as possible leaving the postwar issues to the post-war leaders. The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State that the Congress pressures would "alter the sense of the Declaration in the direction of giving to an Indian non-official Member of the Executive Council some measure of control over Defence". The Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief conveyed that they would like to be directly in touch with the Cabinet on this issue. The Cabinet assured the Viceroy that "as long as the Commander-in-Chief retains his position on the Viceroy's Council and as long as his existing control and direction of the defence of India are not in any way weakened, there is no objection in principle to the appointment by the Crown of a new Indian Member on [your] Council, to co-operate in the sphere of military organisation". The Secretary of State later elaborated that the right man should be appointed as Defence Member: "You are in no way bound to select a Congress nominee. On the contrary the obvious kind of choice would be Sikandar [Hayat Khan] if he can be

spared from the Punjab. American opinion will recognize as reasonable our unfettered control through Wavell (C-in-C) over the whole operational field, India, Burma, Ceylon and the Indian Ocean".

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State, suggested to the Prime Minister to send a telegram to the British ambassador in the United States (Lord Halifax) for propaganda purposes "to give confidential guidance to the President or other responsible persons". Sir Stafford Cripps also sent a telegram to Lord Halifax (Lord Irwin): "I am sure you are in a position from your own knowledge (being a former Viceroy of India) to assure American public of impossibility of separating Indian and the British armies at this juncture (during the war)".

On the same issue, the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief also expressed their views directly to the British Prime Minister. The Viceroy sent a telegram saying that "the Commander-in-Chief and I feel that no very serious risks are involved in setting up and handing over to an Indian Member of [the Executive] Council a portfolio of Defence Co-ordination section. But we are both satisfied that in [the] existing circumstances it is not possible to take away from the Commander-in-Chief the substance of the Defence portfolio as now held by him in order to entrust it to a representative Indian". The Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell, also wrote to Churchill that "it would not be possible to separate my dual functions as civil and Defence Member without causing a complete dislocation of machine".

On the other hand, the pressure to appease the Congress party on the Defence issue continued. Messrs T.B.Sapru and M.R.Jayakar presented a memorandum to the Viceroy: "The adoption of an Indian Defence Member will have a great effect on Indian psychology it will inspire the people and the political effects of this step will be very wholesome". Intervention of Colonel Louis Johnson, a personal representative of President of the United States, Roosevelt, at this stage further pressured the British Government. He had met Nehru and supported the Congress on the Defence issue; newspapers attributed to Pandit Nehru the statements that the real question was: who was the boss in charge and the Chief,

the Indians or the British Commander-in-Chief. This was the fundamental issue; the Congress wished to have the fullest control. On 7 April 1942, the Secretary of State along with the British Minister of Information had, in a press Conference, made it clear that "the idea that you can hand over the general control of the Government of India today and, above the control of defence to an Indian member of the Executive Council is really out of question".

On the same day (7th April) Sir Stafford Cripps sent a letter to Moulana Azad explaining some technical difficulties on the defence issue and suggesting (a) "that the Commander-in-Chief should retain his seat on the Viceroy's Executive Council as the War Member and should retain his full control over all war activities of the Armed Forces in India subject to the control of His Majesty's Government and the War Cabinet, upon which body a representative Indians should sit with equal powers in all matters relating to the defence of India. Membership of the Pacific Council would likewise be offered to a representative Indian; (b) An Indian representative member would be added to the Viceroy's Council who would take over those sections of the Department of defence which can organisationally be separated immediately from the Commander-in-Chief's War Department and which are specified already (head 1). In addition to this, the member would take over the Defence co-ordination Department which is at present directly under the Viceroy and certain other important functions of the Government of India which are directly related to defence and which do not fall under any of the other existing departments, and which are specified (already) under head". Sir Stafford was hopeful that now the Congress would be able to accept his Proposals.

The issue of defence was further complicated by Col. Johnson. Wavell (the Commander-in-Chief) told the Viceroy that Col. Johnson had suggested that the defence formula should be modified to meet Nehru's point of view that the existing Defence Department to be transferred to an Indian's control with some changes. This was examined by the Viceroy's staff: H.V. Hodson, Ogilvie and Sir George Spence. Sir Stafford Cripps's new formula was also examined and was rejected. Later Cripps was consulted and a new formula was evolved which was also accepted by the Viceroy. The main points

were that (a) "the Defence Department shall be placed in charge of a representative Indian Member with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council; (a) a war Department will be created which will take over such functions of the Defence Department as are not retained by the Defence Member, a list of retained functions was agreed and will be expanded later". This new formula was to be communicated to both Johnson and Nehru.

But soon the Viceroy had second thoughts and changed his mind about the agreed formula. It may be mentioned that Lord Linlithgow was a shrewd Viceroy who was not going to be overpowered, outmanoeuvred or dictated by the Cripps-Johnson axis. Linlithgow had been the Indian Governor-General for seven and a half years a period longer than any other Viceroy in history except, of course, Lord Dalhousie who served for eight years (1846-56). The Viceroy had a meeting with Cripps and Johnson on 8th April. He told Cripps that he did not have time to pay attention in details to his formula; nor his advisors had examined it. But Linlithgow was on the offensive and conveyed to Cripps that there had been a serious invasion of the Viceroy's powers. The Viceroy said that he had been nervous about the list of functions to go to the war Department. The Viceroy also protested that his approval was not taken before the formula was shown to the Congress, for if he were now to disapprove their formula, his position would be intolerable, running the risk of being held up to the U.S.A. as the obstacle to a settlement. Linlithgow also complained that both the Commander-in-Chief and himself had been passed over. Cripps had several arguments such as that the matters had reached a climax where something had to be done: Reforms Commissioner, Hodson had seen the formula. "Hodson was not the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief had not seen it", said the Viceroy.

The Viceroy was privately opposed to the new formula but publicly he could do little. On 9th April, three telegrams were sent to the Secretary of State by the Viceroy. He feared that the new moves by the Congress were meant to drive a wedge between the British and the Americans by showing that the British were not willing to honour the agreed formula. Now the Viceroy took shelter by saying

that the Muslim League had not been brought into the picture. He also told the Secretary of State that whatever his views might be as to its wisdom or practicability, he was examining the formula fully recognising the importance of the war and relations with the United States, responsibility for any working details did not rest with him. He met Col-Johnson on the same day (9th April) making some essential modification in the formula. He also met Cripps and told him about the revision.

In the meantime, Churchill came to rescue the Viceroy; the much-needed and timely relief came in the form of a cable from the Prime Minister. In it, Churchill pointed out that H.L.Hopkins (special adviser and assistant to President Roosevelt) had conveyed that Colonel Johnson was not U.S.President's personal envoy in any matter outside his specific "mission dealing with Indian munitions and kindred topics on which he was sent. I feel sure that the President would be vexed if he, the President, were to seem to be drawn into the Indian constitutional issue [The Americans] are opposed to anything like intervention or mediation". With more authority and force, the British Prime Minister now got in touch with Sir Stafford Cripps. In his cable Churchill complained that the Viceroy's and Wavell's approval was essential for the latest formula; Col.Johnson was not a go-between appointed by Roosevelt. More importantly that Sir Stafford Cripps was not allowed to go beyond the Declaration.

The War Cabinet also found Sir Stafford's new formula ambiguous; certain points needed to be cleared up. The formula was described as derogatory to the Viceroy's and the Commander-in-Chief's positions. The Viceroy too advised Sir Stafford Cripps that he should not try to curtail the powers of the Governor-General. In a meeting, the Viceroy reminded Sir Stafford that the Congress had not accepted other parts of the H.M.G.'s Declaration not even most essentials of the Scheme. The Secretary of State (L.S.Amery) also sympathised with the Viceroy for being most generous and helpful throughout.

Now this political drama was in the final stage. Sir Stafford had not given up yet; he got intouch with Churchill again saying that his formula had not ignored the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief;

but on the contrary their views had been incorporated and that it should be accepted. Sir Stafford went to the extent of saying that the Government should not expect that any party would endorse the Declaration, as a whole as each would take exception to different points. He hoped (once again) that once the Congress party agreed to join the Government, the Muslim League would also come in. The Hindu Mahasabha had already agreed, with some reservations on the long-term policy; the Sikhs and the Depressed Classes would also join; Sir Stafford was highly optimistic. He also conveyed the same to the War Cabinet; that there had never been any departure from the Declaration; and that the matter would be decided by taking the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief into confidence. Sir Stafford was sad to note that his Cabinet Colleagues did not trust him; he was ready to quit at this stage if someone else took over from him.

Lord Linlithgow, on the other hand, was also not prepared to give in to Sir Stafford Cripps. He wrote to the Secretary of State implying that the powers of the Viceroy (under section 41) should not be curtailed in any guise. The Viceroy was sure that in case the Congress joined his Cabinet there would be a great fuss over this issue: "I shall have to be perfectly open and direct about it or I shall lay up for myself and [my] successor endless trouble. Nor will the point be an easy one to hold if all else is settled and the whole world is waiting for a new Government". The War Cabinet supported the Viceroy by telling him that his powers would not be curtailed during the war; it should be made clear to the Congress leaders. Churchill also added his support for the Viceroy; the Prime Minister cabled to Cripps (via India office and the Viceroy) that there could be no question of lack of confidence and that he sympathised with Cripps in this difficult situation but they had their responsibilities as well. Churchill told Cripps that he had gone (while negotiating with the Congress) beyond the mandate given by the Cabinet. He also asked for Wavell's point of view which Churchill knew too well would go against Cripps's and rehearsing the Viceroy's opinion. The Viceroy cabled (10 April 1942) to the Secretary of State saying that both Wavell and the Viceroy himself did not approve of the Cripps-Johnson formula.

On the same day (10th April) the Congress provided much relief to the Viceroy, the C-in-C and Churchill. President, of the Congress, Moulana Azad, wrote a letter to Cripps rejecting the Draft Declaration, among other things saying that the Defence Minister was given relatively unimportant powers; the Congress had demanded that the Defence Member should be incharge of the Indian defence in reality. In this long letter, Azad also pointed out that the Viceroy's powers had not been curtailed as promised earlier. It may be mentioned that Cripps had tried to Indianize the Viceroy's Council making the Viceroy only a figure-head (like the King in the U.K.— but did not succeed due to Lord Linlithgow's opposition; the Viceroy had protested to Cripps saying that it was his business and not Cripps's. Azad described this situation as "old picture again with even the old label on". The also complained that even India office (undesirable relic of the past age) was going to continue. Azad once again demanded full powers for the proposed national Government, a Cabinet government not the Viceroy's Council and full freedom and power to share the responsibility.

In his reply Sir Stafford pointed out that the defence of India was a paramount duty and responsibility of the British Government. He also made it clear to Azad that the British Government would not agree to make nay amendments in the constitution, especially during the war; and without that constitutional changes the Congress demand could not be met. Cripps also reminded that the British Government had made pledges to protect the rights of minorities and therefore could not go ahead without an agreeable formula. Azad did not accept Cripps's explanation; he wrote back saying that the British Government had not realised that it was in their own interest to have given free hand to Indian people regarding defence so that the war could be faught on popular basis. Azad charged that the British Government had not given up its "wrecking policy". It is interesting to note that both Azad and Cripps allowed each other to publish the correspondence; it was for the purpose of propaganda only. The next day, the Congress working Committee published its resolution rejecting the Draft Declaration.

Meanwhile, Sir Stafford Cripps got into touch with Churchill (10 April 1942). The Prime Minister was informed about the latest

situation: the Congress President's letter stating the reasons, for rejecting the Draft Declaration: "there is clearly no hope of an agreement and I shall start home on Sunday" This was a good news for Churchill who was much relieved. He was delighted to know that Cripps was coming back at once; Cripps was told that "a most cordial welcome awaits you". Churchill appreciated Cripps's efforts to reach a settlement in India; he also thought that the effects of these efforts would be beneficial not only in Britain but also in the United States that the British were sincere in their efforts. It may also be mentioned that even before the failure of the Cripps mission, the British ambassador (Lord Halifax) in Washington (7 April 1942) suggested: "If Cripps's discussions fail' it has been suggested to me by friends here that it would be of great value for the United States of America's public opinion if he (Cripps) could return this way and explain the situation". The Viceroy also knew too well the importance of propaganda:

"I need not emphasize to you the vital importance of publicity for our point of view at home and in America or desirability of making play with what is in effect reassertion of extreme Congress claims....inconsistent with statement in the Declaration"

The Muslim League also rejected the Draft Declaration on 11 April 1942. As pointed out earlier, the League was totally ignored in the second phase of negotiations which led to the amendments in the Defence clause of the Draft Declaration. It is noticed that the United States Government and the President Roosevelt's personal representative Col. L. Johnson also did not consult the League. However the League's resolution appreciated that the possibility of Pakistan was recognised by the Government but the creation of more than one union being rejected only to the realm of remote possibility and therefore was purely illusory. It rejected the idea of compelling the Muslims to enter the constitution-making body, based on the rejection of Muslim right to separate electorates; the method and procedure laid down for non-accession was rejected; and that Sir Stafford had made it clear that the Draft Declaration should be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole. The resolution also pointed out several ambiguities in the Draft Declaration.

In the meantime, a last-minute appeal came from the U.S. President to the British Prime Minister to make some more efforts to reach a settlement. But Churchill was not prepared to give one more life to Sir Stafford Cripps in India. He politely conveyed to the U.S. President that he could not decide such an important matter without convening a meeting of his Cabinet which was difficult at a short notice. "Meanwhile Cripps had already left India and all the explanations have been published by both sides". Furthermore, Churchill conveyed to Roosevelt: You know the weight which I attach to every thing you say to me but I did not feel [that] I could take the responsibility for the defence of India if everything has again to be thrown into the melting pot at this critical juncture. That I am sure it would be the view of the Cabinet and of the Parliament. I do not propose to bring it before the Cabinet officially unless you tell me you wish this done. Anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart and would surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of this terrible struggle {The War}

For the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, on the other hand, the business was all over. The Secretary of State, on 11th April, writing to the Viceroy commented:

" what a time you have had of it! And what a relief now that it is over!---- the longer he [Cripps] stayed out there [India], the more his keenness on a settlement drew him away from the original plan on which we had all agreed, and in the direction of something to which we were all opposed". Now the Secretary of State remembered about the Muslim League: "what puzzles me a little is that Cripps should have been prepared to go that far with the Congress without realising that this was the very thing against which Jinnah said the Muslim would rise in revolt". Coming to the propaganda value of the Cripps Mission, the Secretary of State said:

" For the first time America will have learnt something about the complexities of Indian affairs and of the intransigence of the Congress politicians and their underlying refusal to face the responsibility". L.S. Amery also had a message for the Congress party: " A United India can only be preserved by agreement and compromise and not by agitating against the British Government. If Congress drift into a position of definite antagonism, with a fifth

columnist outer wing, in which case we shall have to be absolute and firm in locking them all up"

The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, also shared L.S.Amery's views of exposing the Congress's hard-line attitude; "I venture to suggest full inside story should be communicated to the President [Roosevelt] as it's important that responsibility should be clearly placed where it lies". The Viceroy also suggested that a message on the similar lines should be sent to Chiang Kai-Shek through the British Ambassador in China (H.J.Seymour). The Viceroy also provided the material on the Cripps mission to be published in the White Paper and for the Debate in the Parliament, telegraphing the resolutions of the political parties, letters etc.

In summary, the Cripps Proposals failed to resolve the political deadlock in India. The result was that the animosity between the Congress and the Government continued. Similarly the gulf between the two great communities of India, the Muslims and the Hindus, was also widened. It may be mentioned that in the final stage of his mission, Cripps tried his utmost for his success even using Roosevelt's name for this purpose. Cripps failed to understand that his mission was only a propaganda exercise to show to the world that the British were sincere to have constitutional advance in India.

But it was fortunate from the Muslim point of view that the Cripps offer was rejected by all the major political parties. Our study reveals the fact that it was extremely difficult to translate the option clause into reality, the creation of Pakistan was not possible under the Cripps Proposals. Cripps wished to give extraordinary powers to the Central Assembly, even to redraw the provincial boundaries. Needless to say, the Hindu-Sikhs opinion in the Punjab wished to reduce Muslim majority (50% to 40%) so as to reduce Muslim influence in their majority provinces. Likewise, the Congress and Cripps wished to make the Viceroy's Council, a Cabinet dominated by the Congress with a view to vetoing the Muslim demands.

The Quit India Movement

After the failure of the Cripps Mission, the Congress was deeply frustrated and disappointed. Amery commented, "Congress seems to be going in the wrong direction under Gandhi's influence --- We should show no hesitation in jumping firmly on any one of them, from Gandhi downwards, who deliver really mischievous speeches we should not hesitate to take most extreme steps". The Viceroy was also "Keeping a very close eye on the Mahatama". What happened was that Gandhi had begun to publish a series of articles in the Harijan in which he urged the British to quit India.; "leave India to God.If that is too much, then leave her to anarchy". The working Committee of the Congress met on 6 July 1942 and passed two resolutions, the first called upon the Indians to refuse to comply with military requirements and the second demanding that the British rule in India must end immediately.

The Muslim League was also alarmed: "The League leader, Jinnah is said to be watching the situation and to have stated that, if any Congress movement is announced, he will at once call the working Committee of the League to consider the action to take . Congress movement will be blackmail", the Governor of Bombay wrote to the Viceroy. On 22 June, The Quaid declared that Gandhi had been trying to fool Muslims but had at last shown himself in true colours; he had never wished to settle the Hindu-Muslim question except on his own terms of Hindu domination. Jinnah criticised the 'Quit India movement, as blackmailing the British and coercing them to concede a system of government and transfer power to the Congress he was also critical of the Congress's "blackmail" tactics.

On 7 August, the All-India Congress Committee met in Bombay and endorsed the Working Committee resolution demanding the immediate end of British rule in India. It threatened to start a mass struggle under Gandhi. The Congress also decided to send appeals to the U.S., China and Russia for support. The British Government took action against this 'open rebellion', arrested Congress leaders and declared Congress as an unlawful organization. The Congress supporters, on the other hand, had begun their violent struggle against the British.

The Muslim League became more vocal after Congress's lawlessness and destruction of life and property. Its working

Committee passed a resolution saying that the Congress wished to "coerce the British Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy and thus disabling them from carrying out their moral obligations and pledges given to the Muslims". In September, Jinnah addressed a press conference describing the Congress attitude as 'insensible. He said that the demand for the creation of Pakistan was "reasonable and left three-fourths of India to the Hindus - Pakistan was not a scheme but was their birthright: "I could not play a role of recruiting Sergeant to collect men, money and materials without having any voice". The Viceroy commented that Jinnah "was quite uncompromising on the Pakistan issue so far as the Muslims are concerned, Jinnah is the only person that matters".

In the meantime, Rajagopalachari (Rajaji) had been trying to bridge the gulf between the Congress and the League. In April 1942, the Madras Congress party, under Rajaji's leadership recommended overwhelmingly that the Congress acknowledge the Pakistan claim of the League. The Congress rejected this initiative and Rajaji resigned from its Working Committee. In November (1942) once again Rajaji began his efforts; Sir Stafford Cripps wrote to the Secretary of State (Amery) that Rajaji should be invited to London. Amery consulted Linlithgow, even though he himself did not anticipate any positive result due to Jinnah's uncompromising attitude towards Rajaji. The Viceroy also commented that Rajaji's initiative had fallen completely flat in India. Amery, therefore, informed Cripps that Jinnah had refused to cooperate with Rajaji: "Jinnah's attitude is rapidly and dangerously hardening under the impact of various "schemes" ventilated in India". However the talks between Rajaji and Jinnah were held; the Viceroy cabled to the Secretary of State: "I do not gather that Jinnah has conceded anything. He is thought to have told Rajagopalachari that he must have the Congress behind him, plus guarantees for the acceptance of Pakistan in principle and plebiscite in the first instance". Moreover, Jinnah's point of view was that he was not going to sell Muslims for the sake of a temporary political settlement and a few crumbs of office during the war. He said that he did not want concessions or safeguards but Pakistan.

On 9th February, 1943, Gandhi started a 21-day fast; pressures were put on the Government of India and Churchill for the release of Gandhi, but to no avail. The Viceroy cabled to the Secretary of State saying that the Muslims did not support Gandhi. The League's spokesman in the Upper and Lower Houses made it clear that the League stood aside from all this business. Liaquat Ali Khan took the point that the Quit India movement had been started to achieve the Congress domination (Hindu Raj). Jinnah, on the other hand, "refused to attend the proposed Conference of prominent leaders at Delhi for Gandhi's release saying that the situation is really a matter for the Hindu leaders to consider and advise accordingly". The real question in Jinnah's mind was that the Congress should concede the demand for Pakistan. In April, the annual session of the Muslim League was held in Delhi; Jinnah "extended an open and almost final invitation" to the Congress to settle the matters with him on the basis of Pakistan.

In October 1943, Linlithgow's Viceroyalty ended; Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell became the new Viceroy. He declared that his prime object was the winning of war; the Cripps offer was still open; and the Congress should withdraw its policy of non-cooperation which was hindering India's progress. On 17 June 1944, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy for his release allowing him to get in touch with the members of the Congress Working Committee; Wavell refused permission asking him to announce a constructive policy first. Gandhi wrote again to Wavell on 27 July; Wavell replied that his policy was no change, business as usual.

The Gandhi-Jinnah Talks

After being rebuked by the Viceroy some eminent Congressmen turned again to the Quaid-i-Azam. By this time "the demand for Pakistan appeared to have become more clear cut than ever". The session of the Muslim League at Karachi (24-27 Dec. 1943) was a great success in this regard. Jinnah now insisted on a new slogan "Divide and Quit". Even Congressmen like Rajaji were convinced that some form of partition of India was essential; in 1943, Rajaji had prepared a formula to serve as a basis for Hindu-Muslim settlement.

Gandhi approved the formula and on 8th April Rajaji wrote to Jinnah accordingly. According to the formula, the Pakistan areas were to be demarcated by a commission where the Muslim population would be in absolute majority. As a matter of fact, Rajaji believed that if Hindus conceded Pakistan Muslims will in time cease to want it. Similarly, Gandhi was also not sincere in his efforts. The Governor of C.P. and Berar reported: "It seems clear that S.P. Mukerjee put his case very strongly to Gandhi and did not mince words he reminded Gandhi that he has said on one occasion that the indivisibility of India is his God and "vivisect me before you vivisect India". Gandhi stated to Mukerjee that he had no faith in the Pakistan scheme and that his endorsement of Rajapopalechar's formula is only a matter of expediency".

However, on 17 July Gandhi wrote to Jinnah suggesting that they should meet; Jinnah replied that he would be delighted to meet him in Bombay. The Working Committee of the League gave Jinnah full authority to negotiate with Gandhi. But being a politician of the highest order, Jinnah did not trust the Congress leaders. The Governor of U.P. wrote to the Viceroy: "Jinnah held that Gandhi had offered the Muslims a blank cheque, knowing that his followers would repudiate it". Likewise the Governor of Sind wrote to the Viceroy that "Jinnah himself entirely distrusts Gandhi, whom he thinks has not moved in any essential particularly from the position he took up two years ago.

Whether Gandhi and Rajaji were sincere or not their willingness to discuss the creation of Pakistan provoked bitter criticism all over India, especially in the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindu Mahasabha was also deeply critical; It argued that Gandhi and the Congress could not represent Hindus; and the Sikhs were also extremely apprehensive. "Indian provinces do not belong to Gandhi or Rajaji and could not be gifted to Muslims," the critics of Gandhi and Rajaji argued.

In September 1944, however a series of confidential talks and an exchange of correspondence between Gandhi and Jinnah took place. These negotiations failed to evolve an agreeable formula for constitutional advance. But it greatly enhanced Jinnah's prestige, for the demand for Pakistan was accepted by Gandhi in principle.

After the failure of Gandhi-Jinnah negotiations, more efforts were made by the Government and some eminent Indian politicians for constitutional advance. A conference of Governors was also held in August 1944; Wavell expressed the desire to convene a conference of political leaders. The Secretary of State also made a plan of his own in this direction - by-passing the Congress and the League; but Wavell rejected it being impracticable.

Meanwhile, In India an other political move, in the same direction, came from Sir Tej Bahadar Sapru, with the support of Gandhi. He formed a Committee and got intouch with Jinnah. The League leader did not attach any importance and therefore refused to co-operate. The Viceroy also thought that it was not possible for Sapru to produce a report of any value; the Sapru Committee was (in Wavell's words) almost entirely Hindu. Jinnah had described it as in appendage of the Congress party.

The Sapru Committee, however, continued its work; but in January 1945, a new political move was initiated to end the political deadlock. Bhulabhai Desai (leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly) who had been working in close co-operation with Liaquat Ali Khan got intouch with Wavell's private Secretary, Jenkins (later he became the Governor of the Punjab) and conveyed the Desai-Liaquat plan to form a joint Interim Government. The war cabinet, however, had doubts about Desai's credibility to deliver the goods. This was true. A telegram came from Mudie (Home member of Wavell's Council) saying that Jinnah knew nothing of Desai's proposals. But Desai told Wavell that he was confident that both Gandhi and Jinnah would approve of his scheme. The India Committee of the war Cabinet advised Wavell not to see Jinnah. Little later, however, Attlee allowed Wavell to talk to Jinnah and Desai for 'further elucidation', but as non-committally as possible.

Wavell decided to meet Jinnah first and if he reacted positively then he would meet Desai and would go to London in March for further discussion. Wavell wrote to the Governor of Bombay (Colville) to sound Jinnah if the Liaquat-Desai proposals were worth pursuing at all.

Colville replied that Liaquat Ali had no authority to negotiate with Desai and that Jinnah had denied that he had sponsored the move. But Jinnah was willing to meet Wavell; but due to ill-health Jinnah was in no rush to meet the Viceroy. Amery advised Wavell to defer his visit to London due to Jinnah's illness. Jinnah arrived in Delhi on 7 March to see Wavell; but he was still ill and therefore postponed the interview.

The Viceroy however left for London on 21 March. In the meeting of India Committee of the war Cabinet, Wavell indicated that so far as Jinnah was concerned Pakistan was the only solution; Wavell said although Jinnah was not very fit, his brain was as active as ever. On 27th March, the acting Viceroy reported to Amery that Jinnah was annoyed with Liaquat Ali for having discussions with Desai. Desai was not only repudiated by the Quaid-i-Azam but also by the leaders of the Congress and was soon relegated to background.

Now let us revert to the Sapru Committee so as to complete the story. Its recommendations were published on 8 April 1945. It not only rejected the idea of Pakistan but also abolished separate electorates for Muslims, which frightened the Muslim community. Jinnah criticised the recommendations of the Committee and said "the question of Pakistan is the first and foremost issue to be decided". The acting Viceroy had earlier cabled to Amery that Pakistan is the first and foremost issue whilst framing any future constitution.

The Simla Conference

In London, Wavell discussed the Indian problem with Amery, Cripps and the India Committee; it took two months to get a final decision: the Viceroy's plan of a conference of political leaders was accepted. It may be mentioned that although the Unionist party and Sir Khizer Hayat Tiwana were extremely important from the Viceroy's point of view, Wavell gave too much importance to their views. Our study reveals the fact that Wavell's and Glancy's (Governor of the Punjab's) deep and emotional involvement on Khizer's side eventually ruined the chances of success so far as the breaking of

political deadlock was concerned. When Wavell was in London, Glancy sent a 'request' that if political leaders were invited for discussions on the Viceroy's return and if there were to be a popular Government at the Centre, there should be a Unionist representative in the new Council. Wavell replied that he would rely on Khizer's help and advice. Glancy and Khizer met Wavell on his return to India and again emphasised the same point, even threatening to resign. Glancy and Khizer preferred the status quo, for they anticipated that if the League came into power at the Centre, the Unionist ministry might not be able to continue in the Punjab for long.

Reverting to the arrangements of the Simla Conference, on 4 June Wavell returned to Delhi and on 14 June he broadcast his proposals. Wavell announced that the Conference will be held on 25th June; 21 political leaders would be invited; the Executive Council would be fully Indianized (except the Viceroy and the C-in-C); and promised further progress if the Conference succeeded. The members of the Congress Working Committee therefore were released on 15 June; the invitations to political leaders were already sent.

Wavell suggested a meeting with the Quaid-i-Azam on 24th (5 p.m.); Jinnah cabled to Wavell asking him to postpone the Conference so that he could consult his Working Committee. Wavell did not agree and suggested that meeting of the M.L.W.C. could be held in Simla. On 20 June, Wavell told Amery that Jinnah would concentrate on the parity issue and that all Muslim members of the Council should belong to the League. On 24th June Jinnah met Wavell; he feared that the Sikhs and the Scheduled castes would vote with Hindus; and that the League had the right to nominate all Muslim members to the new Council. Jinnah conveyed to Wavell that the Unionists were traitors to Muslim interest. Wavell did not agree with Jinnah's point of view due to a soft corner for Khizar Hayat Khan.

On 25 June Wavell opened the proceedings of Conference with a speech of Welcome. A difference of opinion was seen as soon as the open debate began; on the status of Congress, Jinnah pointed out that it represented only Hindus. Dr. Khan Sahib protested; Wavell remarked that the Congress represented its members – and Jinnah

accepted this. The Quaid also pointed out that League would not agree to any constitution except on the fundamental principle of Pakistan; the Congress view was exactly the reverse.

On 26 June, the Conference met again; but little progress was made. On 27th June a further short session (an hour) was held but adjourned so as to enable Pant and Jinnah to continue conversations which they had begun the previous day. It may be mentioned that Jinnah ~~and~~ refused to meet Moulana Azad. On the same day Jinnah met Wavell; he once again repeated his demands that all Muslims must be nominated by the League and spoke against the inclusion of Unionist party in the Council. Jinnah wanted an Executive Council of 14 including the Viceroy and the C-in-C: 5 Hindus, 5 Muslims, one Sikh and one Scheduled Caste. On any other basis Jinnah said that the Muslims would be outvoted. The Congress was not prepared to accept this ratio. Wavell cabled to Amery that the agreement on party basis between the Congress and League was most unlikely.

On 29th June, the Conference met for the fourth time but the Congress and the League failed to resolve their differences. Wavell now proposed a new approach: each party would send him a list of persons they would like to be included in the Executive Council within a week. Jinnah did not like this procedure; he did not approve of Congress including Muslim names in its list. Hence the Viceroy knew too well that Jinnah would not send the list. On the other hand, the Congress Working Committee held its meeting on 3 July and on 7 July and Azad sent a list to Wavell. On the same day, Jinnah conveyed to Wavell the decision of M.L.W.C. that all Muslim members of the new Council should be chosen from the Muslim League subject to a discussion between Jinnah and Wavell. On 8 July Wavell held a meeting with Jinnah; the Quaid insisted on getting a commitment from Wavell that all Muslims on the Council must belong to the League. The Viceroy did not accept Jinnah's conditions and asked him again to send the names from the Muslim League. But Jinnah refused to co-operate saying that "the League would submit no list". Wavell did not wish the Conference to break down before every possible effort had been made. He, therefore, made his provisional selection for the Executive Council, using his

own judgment about the League's representatives, and got intouch with Amery for approval. The Cabinet held its meeting on 10 July. "The Lord Chancellor suggested that the Viceroy's proposal was not, in fact, in accordance with the original plan one of the two principal parties had refused to put forward any list at all; but the Viceroy despite that, proposed to go ahead with a list of his own". The Secretary of State for War opined that "it was essential to avoid any new Council starting off with the Muslim League in a free position and hostile". The Foreign Secretary summing up the discussion made it clear that the Viceroy could not go ahead without Jinnah's agreement. Amery appreciated Wavell's efforts but conveyed that the Cabinet did not approve of his new scheme.

The Viceroy, therefore, met Jinnah on 11 July and told him that provisionally he had selected four members of the League and one a non-League from the Punjab (Mohammad Nawaz Khan). Jinnah once again stuck to his guns, repeated his demands and refused to co-operate. Wavell thus communicated to the Governors that the Conference had failed and that the timing of Central and Provincial elections would be discussed in the near future. On 13 July, Wavell communicated to Amery that the Conference had failed and himself took the responsibility for the failure. The next day, Wavell announced the failure to the delegates of the Conference saying that "Unfortunately, the Conference was unable to agree about the strength and composition of the Executive Council". The Congress did not accept the Muslim League claim to have the sole right to select Muslim representatives. Rajaji said that the League's claim had not been tested by a general election. But Jinnah explained that the stand taken by him was different from that of the Congress; Congress stood for a United India whereas the League stood for Pakistan; Pakistan had been put in cold storage. Azad said the Conference had failed due to Jinnah's intransigence.

From General Elections to The Interim Government

The failure of the Simla Conference greatly strengthened the position of the Muslim League and its leader Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The Anti-Pakistan forces came under the League's attacks, especially Khizer Hayat Tiwana and Moulana Azad; On 22 July the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, reported to Amery that *Dawn's* propaganda was directed mainly against these two. The Governor of N.W.F.P. writing to the Viceroy commented: "The Muslim League leaders are elated at Jinnah's success, and consider that their own prestige has been considerably increased". The League leaders in the Punjab (Khizer's homeground) attacked both Khizer and the Governor of Punjab, B.J. Glancy. It may be of some interest to mention that Glancy was of the opinion that the Pakistan Scheme was "the most dangerous development". He, therefore, did all he could against the League and its claims and demands throughout his tenure (1941-46).

The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, too was against the Pakistan Scheme. In 1944, Wavell wanted to shelve the Pakistan issue. In January 1945, the Viceroy commented that "for the mass of the Muslim League it [Pakistan] is a real possibility and has very strong sentimental appeal. We can not openly demounce Pakistan until we have something attractive to offer in its place". In the same year, as mentioned in the last chapter, the Viceroy arranged the Simla Conference "to by-pass the Pakistan issue". But the Pakistan slogan became more popular as the time went by. Cunningham wrote to Wavel: "I find that the failure of the Simla Conference has made people think and talk more about the Pakistan issue".

We can not say that Jinnah had the prophetic sense but his estimates had almost been accurate. He knew too well what Glancy

and Wavell had been trying to harm the Muslim cause. Jinnah attacked Glancy-Khizer-Wavell trio for their attempts to shelve the Pakistan scheme; Unionist were branded as traitors. He also warned the Muslims that if Pakistan was refused the Muslims would be facing a permanent Hindu domination and tyranny. On the other hand, the League was preparing to fight the upcoming elections on the Pakistan issue; the Government too was now waiting to see whether the League's claim to Pakistan was justified. The League had openly claimed that it would win nearly all the Muslim seats, both Central and Provincial. Its opponents also acknowledged that the League's prestige would increase enormously in the coming elections. Wavell commented; "There seems little doubt that the League will win most of the Muslim seats at the elections".

The Unionist party, the Punjab Government, the Congress and the Sikhs were worried about the League's forthcoming victory. Glancy and Khizer were reluctant to face the situation on the pretext that the League would intensify its Pakistan propaganda. Glancy suggested several measures to counter the Pakistan propaganda; Khizer and Glancy also insisted that the Government should announce its policy against Pakistan. At a time when Jinnah and the other League leaders were loudly clamouring for elections, the Congress appeared to be lukewarm in the beginning. However, the Congress later became active and gave special attention to the provinces like the Punjab, the key province so far as Pakistan was concerned. Azad (Congress's Muslim President) was deputed to deal with the Muslim Provinces; but the Congress was well aware of the fact from the beginning that despite huge amount they were going to spend, little success was expected in return.

In the meantime, the general elections in Britain resulted in a victory for the Labour Party. On 26 July (a few days after the failure of Simla Conference) with an independent majority, the Labour leader, Attlee, became the Prime Minister; Lord Pethick-Lawrence became the new Secretary of State for India. The next important event was that on 15 August Japan surrendered and the World War ended. It may be mentioned that Sir Stafford Cripps (a great specialist on Indian Affairs) became a more powerful voice in the British Cabinet. Cripps now insisted that there must be a permanent

solution in which the question of Pakistan must form a major issue. He also declared that time should not be wasted and that new elections should be held in India. It may be pointed out that the last elections to the Central Assembly were held in 1934 and in case of Provincial Assemblies in 1936. Due to the World War and the Congress rebellion these elections had been subsequently postponed. However after the emergency was no more, the Viceroy had already been in favour of holding Elections, especially after the failure of the Simla Conference most probably with a view to verifying the Muslim claim (rather Jinnah's) to have Pakistan.

On 21 August, Wavell declared that the Elections would be held in India in the coming cold weather. On 24 August, the Viceroy left for London for consultations; on 16 September he came back to India. On 19 August the Viceroy made the following announcement.

"As stated in the gracious speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament, His Majesty's Government are determined to do their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion the early realisation of full self-government in India. During my visit to London they have discussed with me the steps to be taken.

An announcement has already been made that elections to the central and provincial legislatures, so long postponed owing to the war, are to be held during the coming cold weather. Thereafter His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that ministerial responsibility will be accepted by political leaders in all provinces.

It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to convene as soon as possible a constitution-making body, and as a preliminary step they have authorised me to undertake, immediately after the elections, discussions with the representatives of the Legislative Assemblies in the provinces; to ascertain whether the Proposals contained in the 1942 declaration are acceptable or whether some alternative or modified scheme is preferable. Discussions will also be undertaken with the representatives of the Indian States with a view to ascertaining in what way they can take their part in the constitution-making body.

His Majesty's Government are proceeding to the consideration of the content of the treaty which will require to be concluded between Great Britain and India.

During these preparatory stages, the Government of India must be carried on, and urgent economic and social problems must be dealt with. Furthermore, India has to play her full part in working out the new World Order. His Majesty's Government have therefore further authorised me, as soon as the results of the provincial elections are published, to take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which will have the support of the main Indian parties."

Later, in a personal message for Indian leaders, Wavell made it clear that the Government was determined to go ahead. Attlee (the British Prime Minister) also appealed to the political leaders to evolve an agreeable constitution. But the reactions of the Congress and League were not favourable. The Congress would have liked to have a promise of independence. The League wanted a clear acceptance of Pakistan; Jinnah made it plain that no plan would succeed in India except on the basis of Pakistan, and that it was the major issue to be decided by all those who were well-wishes of India, the sooner it was realised the better; the division of India was the only solution. In a statement to The Statesman Jinnah said; " I do not doubt the sincerity of the British Government; but I do doubt the sincerity of those who profess to see any hope of a settlement outside the granting of full Pakistan to the Muslims of India".

On 4 December, Pethick-Lawrence (the new Secretary of State) declared that he had, proposed to send out an all-party Parliamentary delegation to India to meet political leaders and convey the British desire to give independence to India. The Delegation arrived on 5 January; Prof Robert Richards was the leader of this ten-member delegation. Jinnah met the members of the Delegation and made it clear to them that he would not take part in the Interim government without a prior declaration accepting the Pakistan Scheme and parity with all other parties. He also insisted that Pakistan must be a viable state. Nehru, on the other hand although conceded the Pakistan Scheme, insisted on a plebiscite in border districts to confirm it.

Nehru added that the Muslims did not know what they were voting for.

In the meantime, both the Congress and the League fought the elections on Pakistan or no Pakistan issue. Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence: "Jinnah has spoken confidently about the prospects of the Muslim League, and I am told that he attaches more importance to the number of seats the League can win both in the Central Assembly and in the Provincial Assemblies than to the ability of the League to form Ministries in the Muslim majority provinces". It was to be proved soon: the elections were held in three stages; first for the Central legislature, then elections to the Provincial legislatures where ministries were functioning, and finally in provinces where ministries were not functioning, "with Governor's rule" (Section 93 provinces). At the end of 1945, the results were declared for the Central Assembly; the League had won all the seats which were to be filled entirely by the Muslim votes; and Jinnah wasted no time in declaring that this was a clear verdict in favour of Pakistan, and that the League was the sole representative of Muslim opinion, thereafter celebrating the Victory Day. The figures were: Congress (57) and the League (30). As regards the provincial legislatures, in Assam the Congress won all the General and territorial seats and the League won almost all the Muslim seats; Congress formed a Government with 58/108 seats. In Sind the League formed a ministry; in the N.W.F.P. the Congress won 30 seats (the League won 17) and formed a ministry. In the Punjab, the League won 79 of the 86 Muslim seats but the Governor was biased against the Pakistan Scheme and the League, and therefore once again Khizer Hayat Tiwana became the Premier with the help of Congress and Sikhs. In Bengal, the League won 113 of the 119 Muslim seats and formed a Government under Suhrawardy. Of the provinces under Governor's rule (section 93) the Congress won a clear majority in Bihar, in the U.P. Bombay Madras and C.P. and Orissa.

On 19 February 1946, the British Government announced that they had decided to send out to India a team of three Cabinet Ministers to seek an agreement with the Indian leaders on the principles and procedure relating to the constitutional issues. The members of the Cabinet Mission would be: Pethick-Lawrence,

Stafford Cripps and A.V.Alexander. On 15 March, Attlee told the House of Commons that he could not permit a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority, however important that minority might be.

On 24 March, the Cabinet Mission arrived in Delhi; the Mission spent the first week conferring with Lord Wavell, provincial Governors and members of the Viceroy's Council. The main problem seemed to be the Pakistan issue or in other words a United India versus Pakistan. Dr.Khan Sahib (Premier N.W.F.P) met the Cabinet Delegation of 1 April 1946. He opined that the Pakistan Scheme could not succeed; that the League had exploited this issue; that the N.W.F.P. would never join Pakistan. Nawab Mamdot (the PML leader) was the first Punjabi leader to be met by the Mission. He argued in favour of Pakistan saying that "Once Pakistan was established there could be readjustment of its frontiers". The Nawab maintained that Pakistan would be able to defend itself. It would include the areas which were the main source of manpower for the Indian Army at present and in the past.

But the Punjab Premier, Khizer Hayat Tiwana, and the Sikhs were openly opposed to the creation of Pakistan. Khizer Hayat pointed out that his conception of Pakistan was any regime where Muslims interests were fully protected; he opined that if Jinnah had been required at an earlier stage to define Pakistan, and if its financial and other implications had been worked out perhaps the demand for it would not have been so strong. Even now, Khizer thought, the government should themselves define how far they considered it right to go towards satisfying the Muslim demand. Their award should preferably be based on the existing provincial demarcation, because if once the process of realigning of boundaries were started no one knew where it would end. The Premier strongly opposed the Sikhs inclusion in Pakistan, if the new state were to be created. On the same day, the Akali leader, Tara Singh, together with Kartar Singh, Harnam Singh and the Sikh minister, Baldev Singh, also met the delegation. In the course of their talks with the Delegation, the Sikh representatives opposed the division of India. The Sikh leaders demanded the ending of the statutory majority of Muslims in the Punjab Legislature. However, if

there were divisions, the Sikhs demanded the creation of an independent Sikh State consisting of the whole of the Jullundur, Ambala and Lahore Divisions together with Montgomery and Lyallpur Districts. The Sikhs feared that the Congress, the League and the British would eventually agree to impose Pakistan on their community.

The Mission interviewed a number of other important Indian leaders. Maulana Azad met on 3 April; the Maulana argued that the Pakistan Scheme would be injurious and harmful and do the Muslims no good. Azad suggested that eight Congress representatives should be appointed as members of the Executive Council against two to three of the League's representatives. On the same day Gandhi met the Mission; he remarked that "Pakistan was a sin which he would not commit" repeating his thesis that Muslim population was a population of converts. Gandhi suggested that the Interim Government should be national in character and not on communal basis.

On 4 April, Jinnah met the Cabinet Delegation. He explained the two-nation theory and stated that India was not really one but was held by the British as one. He pointed out that through the Indian history,— from the days of Chandragupta, there had never been any government of India in the sense of a single government. After the British had come they had gradually established their rule in large parts of India. The Indian, princely states had remained separate and sovereign. After years of experience of India and its problems, Jinnah stated to the Mission, that he saw no solution but the partition of India. Jinnah also said that Pakistan would become a member of the British Commonwealth; That Pakistan should be a viable State—not mutilated—a live state economically after necessary territorial adjustments were made—but insisted on having Calcutta. On the same day, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayat Ullah met the Cabinet Delegation. He mentioned that the Congress had done its utmost to defeat and break the Muslim League; the consequence of their actions had been that the Muslims were united as never before, and had come to believe that the only feasible solution was the creation of Pakistan. He recalled that the last time a Secretary of State visited India, he and Jinnah had been in different camps but now they were

totally united; that Muslims like Maulana Azad had been won over by the Congress by flattery and bribes; that he had formally been opposed to the creation of Pakistan, but now there was no alternative but the creation of Pakistan; and that Pakistan would have its forces to defend on its won without taking any help from the outside world.

On 8 April, Suhrawardy, the Premier of Bengal met the Cabinet Delegation and pointed out that the League's victory at polls had testified that the Muslims were determined to have Pakistan and that their whole existence depended on its achievement. He contemplated that the East Pakistan would include the whole of Bengal and Assam and that a strong Pakistani state would be useful to the British leading to closer links between, the Muslim World and the British. He was of the opinion that the Hindus in Bengal were more content to live under the Muslims; that Congress had abused power but the Muslims were broad-minded in administration than the Hindus. He stressed that India was not a single nation. On the same day, Nawab Mohammad Ismail, I.I.Chundrigar, Maulana Syed Abdur Rauf and Choudhry Khaliq-Uzzaman also met the Delegation—these four visitors were also in favour of Pakistan; they pointed out that the Congress had begun discrimination against Muslims in the U.P. after the elections, attacking the Zamindari System. The object of the Muslims was not to acquire territory but to obtain a home to live a free life; at least a majority of Indian Muslims would be free from the Hindu domination, the Muslim delegation pointed out. Hussain Imam also met the Delegation and strengthened the Muslim case by stating that Muslims felt that they would not get a fair deal without having Pakistan—citing various examples of the Congress atrocities during their rule (1937-38). He said that the Congress wished to step into the shoes of the British and take to themselves powers that the British had exercised.

By 10 April, the members of the Cabinet Mission had the first round of talks with the major interested parties and were now planning the method of conducting closer negotiations between the two major parties, the Congress and the League. The outstanding issue was the "problem" of Pakistan; Cripps had prepared a memo. Turnbull, Croft, Abell, Wavell and the Delegation all contributed and

on that basis a telegram was sent to Attlee on two possible principles of agreements, "the first a unitary India with loose federation and the Centre, charged primarily with control of Defence and foreign affairs (Scheme A). The second based upon a divided India, the Pakistan element, consisting only of the majority Muslim Districts, Baluchistan, Sind, N.W.F.P. and Western Punjab, Eastern Bengal without Calcutta with Sylhet District of Assam (Scheme B)". Cripps thought that they could not press Congress to accept more than a smaller Pakistan (Scheme B)

On 16 April, Jinnah had a long interview with the Delegation; before this, a brief was prepared for the Mission that they would spare no effort to reach an agreed solution that the deadlock would not be allowed to continue for long; that full claim for Pakistan could not be accepted; Scheme B could be accepted: Sind, N.W.F.P., Majority districts of Bengal and Sylhet district of Assam, Muslim majority districts of the Punjab except Gurdaspur. It may be mentioned that in February (1946) indicating some "genuinely Muslim areas" Wavell had cabled to Pethick-Lawrence that "Gurdaspur (51% Muslim) must go to Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being a sacred city of the Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan". In the Interview Jinnah said that even if full Pakistan was granted to the Muslim League, the Hindus would get three-quarters of India; at worst they would lose Calcutta, part of Western Bengal and the Ambala Division; he also explained that the Unity of India was a myth A.V Alexander, however, said that the Scheme B was the maximum which they thought Congress could be persuaded to accept. But Jinnah insisted that first the principle of Pakistan must be accepted; Wavell later remarked that Jinnah had not moved at all.

On 17 April, Azad met the Delegation; Pethick-Lawrence thought that the Mission had now practically completed hearing the view points of various political parties and interests and were anxious to get on with reaching a settlement as soon as possible. The Members of the Delegation knew too well that the question of Pakistan was the prime issue which could only be resolved by an agreement between the Congress and the League. However, the Delegation assured Maulana Azad that they meant business any way; but the Congress was expected to show a spirit of compromise. Next in importance to

the settlement of the Pakistan issue, was the formation of a new Executive Council; the Mission had hoped that Wavell would be able to open negotiations for its formation at an early date. Pethick-Lawrence told Maulana Azad that after their return from Kashmir they would be seeing Jinnah again. Meanwhile, Gandhi and Nehru had conveyed to Stafford Cripps that the proposals of an all-India Union on a three-tier basis would not be acceptable to the Congress.

On 18 April, Sir Stafford Cripps prepared a memorandum, on the basis that there had been no support for Pakistan case except from the Muslim League; that only some safeguards for Muslims were thought to be enough; and that smaller Pakistan (Scheme A) had been rejected by the League and they could not see any justification for including predominantly non-Muslim areas into Pakistan. The argument for exclusion of non-Muslim areas from Pakistan was particularly pressed upon the members of the Mission by the Sikhs; and it was thought that Pakistan would not solve the communal problems. At the same time and on the same day, the Delegation sent a cable to Attlee saying that there was no prospect of a settlement of Pakistan issue and "we shall have to propound the basis of a settlement ourselves".

On 24 April, the Mission returned to Delhi after a short Easter recess in Kashmir and resumed its work. A meeting was held on the same day at a 4.p.m; it was decided that Sir Stafford Cripps should see Jinnah again and the League leader should be invited to meet the Delegation. Wavell now thought that if Jinnah rejected the further proposals they could fully justify the rejection of Pakistan. Cripps however met Jinnah and put before him a new plan of an interim Government and the new proposals for provinces in case they would like to opt out of the Union. Jinnah was in "an unreceptive mood at the outset and said that he thought it was no use discussing the question further". He also indicated that the Mission must take a decision by themselves if progress was to be made; he then raised the objection to an Interim Government being set up. The Congress also rejected this new plan. The Viceroy therefore suggested that the Mission members should decide the matter by themselves covering the whole ground including the Interim Government; if one party refused to co-operate, its places would be filled by others. It may be

pointed out that (Sir) W.Croft (Deputy Under-Secretary of State, India Office) and Turnbull (Secretary to the Cabinet Mission) were of the opinion that "if the Interim Government were allowed to pass into the hands of the Congress, this would be a direct breach of assurance given in the [H.M.G] declaration of August, 1940. They thought that a medium size Pakistan might be viable without British help but it should be given a separate option to remain in the Commonwealth.

On 26 April, however, the Mission switched back to the original three-tier scheme (plan A) and put it to Jinnah, as mentioned earlier, the League leader had rejected the Plan B (small Pakistan). Jinnah agreed to put the plan 'A' to the Working Committee of the League, if the Congress was ready to consider the scheme. Pethick-Lawrence commented that Jinnah was for the first time prepared to consider something less than a sovereign Pakistan; Wavell was delighted and felt that a decision should be taken quickly; Stafford Cripps thought that the talks on the basis of plan 'A' might produce some positive results; Cripps, therefore, met Maulana Azad on 26 April who suggested that further talks should be held in Simla. The Mission was now considering the composition of the Interim Government on 5:5:3 basis, parity between the Congress and the League and three should include one Sikh, one non-League Muslim and one non-Congress Hindu. Consequently letters were sent to the Congress and the League for "close negotiations" in Simla; each party was invited to send four negotiators to meet the Mission. The Congress nominated Maulana Azad, Nehru, Patel and Abdul Ghaffar Khan; the League decided to send Jinnah, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, Liaquat Ali, and Abdur Rab Nishtar. It may be mentioned that at this stage, Kartar Singh sent a letter to the Mission that the question of West Pakistan was not a League-Congress affair to the extent of which it was a Sikh-Muslim one and demanded that a Sikh representative must be invited to participate in the Conference of leaders at Simla.

In the meantime, some paper work was done for the upcoming Conference; Croft in a note expressed the opinion that Jinnah would not be pleased at the fact that Ghaffar Khan was included in the Congress delegation and that "he got the wind of the fact that move

to Simla was done partly to meet Azad's convenience.....Eventually he agreed, on being promised the use of an aeroplane." On 4 May, the Mission sent a cable to the British Prime Minister, Attlee, saying that : "Indications are that unless there is [an] agreement on [the] main constitutional issue, Jinnah and the League will not serve in [the] Interim Executive". It seems that Wavell wished to have a revenge from Jinnah for wrecking the first Simla Conference (1945); the Mission thus recommended that if the League stood out, Wavell should proceed to form the Council without the League; Muslims like Khawaja Nazimuddin might help. It may be pointed out that the Defence Council episode (1941) was probably forgotten by the Viceroy, when some Muslim leaders had accepted the membership of the Council without Jinnah's approval and they had to resign eventually.

The second Simla Conference took place between the 5th and 12th of May. Pethick-Lawrence welcomed the delegates telling them that the Conference was a final attempt to reach an agreement. Discussions then took place on the items of the agenda which had been drawn up by the Mission. The first day went quite well, there were no commitments on either side but a willingness to discuss the possibility and the implications of a Union. On 6 May, Jinnah's main point was that the Muslim provinces should be grouped together and have their own Legislature and Executive; he said that there would be no difficulty on that score. Nehru did not accept it and argued that this decision must be made by the provinces. Jinnah agreed to talk to Nehru saying that he had no desire to ask the British to stay in India. As regards the provinces right of secession, Jinnah was of the opinion that the Union should not be more than a period of five years in the first instance. But A.V. Alexander said that this was too short and that 15 years would be more appropriate. Jinnah then argued that there should be constitutional means of bringing it to an end. On 7 May, the Mission prepared a draft on points of agreement between the Congress and League and it was agreed that Stafford Cripps should meet Gandhi and Lord Wavell should see Jinnah on the question of Interim Council; Wavell should also meet Azad, Nehru and Patel. By now the gist of the long discussions so far was that the Congress had expressed a tremendous dislike for any group system; the League were prepared to accept a Union, if Congress agreed to

accept the groups, however reserving the right to discuss the Union machinery whether a Legislature was essential. The Congress negotiators on the other hand wanted a single constitution making body which was rejected by the League. The Cabinet Mission conveyed their main conclusions (so far) to the British Prime Minister.

On 8 May, Jinnah wrote to Pethick-Lawrence saying that the new suggested points of agreement were a fundamental departure from the original formula on which the League agreed to attend the Simla Conference; Jinnah said that he would not agree that there should be a single constitution-making body. On the same day, Gandhi wrote to Cripps saying that the Assembly would be free to throw out any of the items, and make amendments; he also rejected the parity between the Congress and the League in the Assembly saying that this was worse than Pakistan; but Cripps did not accept Gandhi's interpretation and Pethick-Lawrence wrote to Jinnah explaining that their new document was a "slightly amplified form and there was no reason for grumbling". But Jinnah still insisted on having three assemblies and that it should be made clear first which were the Muslim majority provinces. Azad also sent a letter to Pethick-Lawrence implying that the Congress insisted on "the necessity of having a strong and organic Federal Union" Commenting on the "grouping system", Azad asked as to why should the N.W.F.P. which was clearly a Congress province, be compelled to join the group (Muslim and Pakistani group) hostile to the Congress. Wavell then met Jinnah, but failed to change his mind. Jinnah explained to him that he was already under pressure from his supporters for accepting the principle of a United India.

On 9 May, the Conference met again; Nehru proposed a meeting between the Congress and the League; Jinnah agreed. But no progress could be made. The Conference reassembled on 11 May; Jinnah again demanded that first the Congress should agree to Groups of provinces as desired by the Muslim League and only then he would seriously consider a Union; that Groups were the essence of the proposals; that there should be separate constitution-making bodies; and that the Union would be limited to only three subjects (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications). On 12 May, the

Congress sent a note" on the points suggested for an agreement" strengthening its case against the League. But the gulf between the two parties was so wide that there seemed no possible hope of reaching an agreeable settlement. Nevertheless, the Conference met again on 12 May; Jinnah now pointed out that the two parties were fundamentally opposed to each other and that he had gone a long way in accepting a United India. Both Jinnah and Azad appreciated the efforts made by the Mission for an agreement. Thus in the end, the Mission regretted that the Conference had not led to any agreement and that a statement would be issued in a few days time.

As promised, on 16 May, a momentous document was published by the Mission. The League's demand for sovereign Pakistan was rejected; the interests of the Sikhs had been a major factor in the attitude taken by the Mission on this subject. The Cabinet Mission's plan envisaged a three-tiered Indian Union consisting of the Centre, empowered to deal with foreign affairs, defence and communications. After the Union constitution had been framed and all elections had been held, it would be open to any province to elect to withdraw from any group in which it had been placed. The provinces were grouped into three sections; section A comprising the Six Hindu provinces; section B, the provinces of the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and British Baluchistan; and section C, the provinces of Bengal and Assam. To draft a constitution for the Union and the provinces, a constituent assembly was to be formed immediately.

The publication of the plan was followed by broadcasts by Pethick-Lawrence and Lord Wavell; Cripps also addressed a press conference. On 18 May, Sir George Abell (Wavell's private secretary) received a message from Jinnah over the telephone; Jinnah wanted some time to consider the Proposals, but nevertheless conveyed the Muslim anger against the Cabinet Mission's Plan (CMP). On 19 May, Liaquat Ali Khan met the Delegation; he was told that the talks for the formation of the Interim Government should proceed. On 22 June, Jinnah issued a long statement describing the Mission's statement as cryptic with several lacunas, regretting the rejection of Pakistan Scheme but leaving the final decision to the M.L.W.C. and the Council. On 24 May, the Congress adopted a long resolution ; many reservations and

queries were raised about the Plan. But on the next day, the Mission issued another statment; the main point was that the Congress interpretation on grouping Scheme was totally wrong; that this was an esential feature of the Plan and could only be modified by an agreement between the parties. It may be pointed out that at the outset the Congress was extremly dishonest and wixhed to wreck the whole Plan.

But Jinnah, on the other hand, was making every possible effort for the acceptance of the Plan. Liaquat Ali Khan met Scott (Deputy Private Secretary to Wavell) on 1 June and conveyed the League's intention to co-operate in the formation of Interim Government; that they should be invited to fill their share even if the Congress refused to join; and that they expected parity in the Government on the grounds that Congress had accepted this in Simla. The same message was conveyed by Jinnah during his meeting with Wavell on 3 June; Wavell did not make any commitment but promised that the League would be given its due share in the Government. But on 4 June, the Viceroy gave an assurance to Jinnah that he would go ahead with the formation of Interim Government if Congres rejected the 16 May statement. And Jinnah conveyed this assurance to his Working Committee which tipped the scale in favour of accepting the 16 May statment of the Cabinet Mission.

On 6 June, a historic resolution was passed by the Council of the League accepting the 16 May statment; the resolution was sent to Wavell. Jinnah now wrote to the Viceroy asking for an agreed ratio on the Interim Government 5:5:2 (5 Congress, 5 League, 1 Sikh, 1 Christain or Anglo-Indian) He reminded Wavell that the League had accepted the long-term plan because of the assurance given by him about the formation of the Interim Government. Jinnah threatened that he would not tolerate any departure from the agreed formula and would resent any attempt to include Congress Muslim in the Congress quota. It may be mentioned that Wavell was working on the above mentioned ratio but Pethick-Lawrence pointed out that no assurance should be given to Jinnah on this issue. On 6 June, Pethick-Lawrence wrote to Attlee saying that Wavell had told the Congress that they would have to accept parity. But the next day, as advised by Pethick-Lawrence, Wavell wrote to Jinnah saying that he

could not assure him about the 5:5:2 ratio, Jinnah had mentioned in his letter to the Viceroy.

As a matter of fact, the Cabinet Mission had been pressing the Congress that for the sake of Indian Unity, giving parity to the League in the Government was no great concession; that the Interim Government was only a temporary arrangement, and it would not be used as a precedent for the future; and that decisions could not be taken against the Congress. But the Congress did not give in; the Hindu mind was constantly working against the Muslims. Nehru indicated to the Mission that his party was going to work for a strong Centre and to break the Group system and they would succeed. They did not think that Jinnah had any place in India. Now the Congress favoured a larger cabinet so as to outweigh the League. Gandhi was also determined to wreck the Grouping system leaving Jinnah to challenge their interpretation in the courts repeatedly.

On 11 June, Jinnah who was aware of the Congress mentality met Wyatt (Assistant to Cripps) and repeated his argument that he had persuaded the League to accept the statement of 16 May by promising that he would not join the Interim Government unless the League had been given parity with the Congress; that he would stick to his pledges; and that he had not given up the idea of Pakistan only suspended a sovereign Pakistan for ten years. He categorically stated that he would not meet the Congress leaders unless they had accepted the long-term plan (the statement of 16 May). The Mission again decided to resolve the matter by negotiations; Wavell therefore wrote a letter to Nehru and Jinnah with a view to by-passing the parity issue but discussing the best names for offices. Jinnah wrote back once again repeating his arguments about the parity issue and that the Congress must accept the long-term plan first. On 12 June, Nehru met Lord Wavell and gave him a list of 15 names; Wavell said that it would not be accepted by Jinnah. The Viceroy now suggested a new ratio of (Interim Government) 5:5:3 ; but it was not accepted by Nehru. Azad wrote to Wavell that they were still opposed to parity in any shape or form. Wavell tried to explain that there would be six Congressmen and 5 Leaguers how this could be called parity? The Viceroy also pointed out wrongly that the statement of May 16 did not make grouping compulsory hoping that the Congress would now

accept the plan. Later on, Wavell regretted his throughout the rest of his tenure.

On 16 June, the Cabinet Mission issued a statement setting out their own proposals for the composition of an Interim Government. A Council of fourteen persons (all mentioned by name) was to be set up; 6 Congress, 5 League, 1 Sikh, 1 Indian Christian and Parsi, Wavell issued invitations to the following; Baldev Singh, N.P.Engineer, Jagjivan Ram, Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali, H.K.Mehtab, John Matthai, Nawab Mohammad Ismail, Khawaja Nazimuddin, A.R.Nishtar, Rajagopalacharia, Rajendra Prasad and Sardar Patel. It was decided that if any person refused to accept the offer, the Viceroy would invite other person in his place.

On 17 June, Jinnah had a meeting with Pethick-Lawrence and A.V.Alexander; he seemed to have agreed with the Mission's statement but wished to have assurance that in case of communal disputes in the Council, Viceroy would take the final decision. The next day, Jinnah met Lord Wavell; he once again pressed for a guarantee about major communal issues not being decided against a vote of the majority of Muslims and also some understanding about the portfolios. Jinnah had a feeling that he had been let down by the Mission while making recommendations for the Interim Government. On the same day, Jinnah sent a letter to Lord Wavell saying that he would be dead against Zakir Hussain's appointment instead of a Congress Hindu; Congress had proposed this substitution. Jinnah was already against Jagjivan Ram's nomination, for he was a Congressman and not a representative of the Scheduled Castes; he also opposed the very procedure of appointments using the plea that his approval and consent was essential. The Viceroy however sent a letter to Jinnah and tried to assure him that the names in the statement of June 16 could not be regarded as final and that communal questions would be solved by an agreement not by majority vote of the Congress party.

By this time it was a known fact that the Congress would reject the statement of 16 June. Should this happened, Lord Pethick-Lawrence was of the opinion that Wavell should go ahead with the formation of Interim Government without the Congress and with the League's co-operation. On 14 June, Sir Stafford Cripps,

(commenting on the same issue) thought that Jinnah should clearly be asked to form the Interim Government. On 24 June as anticipated, Gandhi sent a letter to Cripps saying that he had advised the Congress not to accept the long-term plan (the statement of May 16) without connecting it with the Interim Government. It may be pointed out that the Congress wished to accept the long-term plan only if it was allowed to interpret its provisions in their own way, i.e., that provinces might elect to opt out of the sections in which they were placed before those sections had been actually formed. Lord Wavell was aware of their interpretation and he was convinced that this could not be regarded as Congress acceptance of the Plan; and that should that situation arose, the Mission would have to make this point as clear as possible to the Congress hierarchy.

On 24 June, Azad wrote a long letter to Lord Wavell rejecting the statement of 16 June and also pointing out the "defects" of the long-term plan; while adhering to their own interpretation, the Congress had decided to accept the long-term plan; Azad also enclosed the resolution of the Working Committee of 25 June. Wavell angrily commented on the resolution: "this ability of Congress to twist words and phrases and to take advantage of any slip in wording is what Mr. Jinnah has all along feared, and has been the reasons for his difficult attitude". As regards the alternatives for an Interim Government, Lord Wavell was in a dilemma; he honestly believed that the Congress was being dishonest about the long-term plan and that they had not accepted it; that it could not be fair and honest to the League if in these circumstances Congress was asked to form the Interim Government.

Now it was entirely upto the Cabinet Mission whether they regarded the Congress "acceptance" of the long-term plan as genuine or not, despite the fact that its evasion of essentials of the plan was known to them. Wavell was a soldier-Viceroy but the members of the Cabinet Mission were politicians who decided that the "clearly-worded" reply of Azad must be regarded as an acceptance of the long-term plan, even though they knew too well that Congress would accept the Plan as long as it was convenient to them to do so. However, Wavell still thought that "an acceptance by

Congress which they meant to break was worse than a refusal". The Mission had now decided to go ahead and "work this plan "but not to rush matters. The Mission now decided to tell Jinnah that in their considered opinion both the parties had now accepted the statement of May 16th; but since the Congress had rejected the statement of June 16th, negotiations for the Interim Government should be postponed for a short period.

But the League leader could not be outmanoeuvred. On 25 June, Jinnah met the Delegation; he pointed out that the Congress acceptance was subject to a particular interpretation. Lord Pethick-Lawrence told him that they were satisfied on this score. The Quaid-i-Azam was of the opinion that the Congress wanted to smash the sections and Groups (very essential parts of the long-term plan) and therefore the Mission should not accept their interpretations. He also reminded that it was agreed that if one party rejected the proposals for the Interim Government, the other party would be asked to form a Government. The Mission did not give in to Jinnah on this issue but requested him to co-operate with Wavell to resolve the political deadlock, also suggesting him to agree to the inclusion of a Congress Muslim. Jinnah then made a long statement on his attitude on that question. Finally, Wavell made it plain to Jinnah that he was bound to make a fresh attempt to form a Government representative of both the major parties since the Congress (in their opinion) had accepted the statement of 16th May. The League leader, therefore issued a long statement on this issue; Jinnah did not agree with Wavell that there should be a short interval before proceeding further for the formation of an Interim Government; and Jinnah demanded that the elections to the Constituent Assembly should also be postponed for it was undesirable to proceed with one part and to postpone the other. The Quaid-i-Azam insisted that the Mission had gone back on their word by postponing the formation of the Interim Government; that the constitutional plan and the formation of the Interim Government formed one whole, and it was undesirable that the formation of the Government should be delayed. But Wavell denied that they had gone back on their word and that he had no intention of postponing the elections to the Constituent Assembly, arrangements for which had already been made.

On 28 June, pending further negotiations with the Congress and League, Wavell decided to set up a temporary caretaker Government. On 29 June, the Cabinet Mission left India.

On 6 July, the Congress working Committee's resolution accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan was submitted for ratification to the All-India Congress Committee and as anticipated it was ratified. Azad told the Viceroy about this and he wished to have further talks about the Interim Government. But at the same time Azad conveyed to Wavell that they had not changed their position vis-a-vis nationalist Muslim, maintaining their national character in all circumstances. It was at this session (6 July) Nehru took over the Congress Presidentship from Azad; Nehru declared that it was not a question of accepting any Plan, long-term or short-term; it was merely a question of Congress agreeing to enter the Constituent Assembly and nothing else. At a press conference on 10 July, the new Congress President, further elaborated that the Congress had made no commitment regarding the Constituent Assembly and that the Assembly was a sovereign body. Referring to the question of grouping, Nehru said that the big possibility was that from any approach to the question, there would be no grouping at all. He thought that section 'A' would decide against grouping; that there was a four-to-one chance that the North West Frontier Province deciding against the grouping. Then Group 'B' would collapse; it was highly likely that Assam would decide against grouping with Bengal; Assam would not tolerate it under any circumstances whatsoever. Thus this grouping system would not survive at all. Nehru explained that every-body except the League was entirely opposed to the grouping scheme; there was a good deal of feeling against grouping in the Punjab. Sind also disliked this idea for the fear that the Punjab would dominate Sind, N.W.F.P. and Sind would be swamped by the Punjab. Nehru also declared that Congress was free to change, modify or scrap the whole Constitutional Plan.

This was too much to be digested by the League; Wavell wrote to the King that Nehru's provocative statements had given the League every reason to conclude that the Congress had no intention of carrying out the Plan. Writing to the Governor of Bengal, Wavell said: "It is unfortunate that Nehru when he gets in front of a crowd of

any kind, is apt to get worked up and to make statements which he often regrets later". It was not Nehru but the League also regretted as to why did it accept the constitutional plan based on the unity of India. Khawaja Nazimuddin told the Governor of Bengal that Nehru's statements had placed the League in a very difficult position; and that it was imperative that the British Government should declare that they stood by the Plan as a whole, without alterations and modifications of its fundamentals, the limited Centre, the grouping of the provinces, and not sovereign status for the constituent Assembly. Jinnah at once declared that the Congress had repudiated the whole Plan and that the British Government should take up the matter and decide the issue on its merits.

Jinnah was right in his arguments; in the House of Lords, on 18 July, the Secretary of State declared that having agreed to the statement of May 16, the Congress could not go outside the terms of what had been agreed; to do so would not be fair to the other parties. On the same day, Cripps (in the House of Commons) pointed out that it was an essential feature of the scheme that the provinces should go into sections and the right of the provinces to opt out of the groups could be exercised only after the first elections under the new constitution when the matter could be made a straight election issue

But these explanations and statements failed to change the Congress's Hindu mind. It was against this background, and left with no suitable alternative the League decided to review its attitude to towards the Cabinet Mission's Proposals. A meeting of the League's Council was therefore held on 27 July; Jinnah in his speech accused the Mission of bad faith and of having played into the hands of Congress; he said that he had no alternative but to adhere to his goal of Pakistan; that the Mission had gone back on its assurances and had refused to allow the League to form the Interim Government, definitely a breach of faith; and that the Muslim interests would not be safe in the Constituent Assembly. The League, therefore decided to withdraw its acceptance of the Mission's Proposals and to prepare a programme of "Direct Action" for the achievement of Pakistan. On 30 July, the Muslim League's Working Committee fixed August 16 as the "Direct Action Day"

throughout India. In a statement, Jinnah said that "never in the whole history of the League, we have done anything except by constitutional meansBut now webid good-bye to this.....method. Throughout the painful negotiations, the two parties with whom we bargained held a pistol at us; one with power and machine-gun behind it, and the other with non-co-operation and the threat to mass civil disobedience. This situation must be met" Wavell commented on the latest events: "it is very unfortunate that the Muslim League has felt compelled to pass the resolutions which it has; and I think Nehru's intemperate speeches have done almost more than anything to drive them [Muslims] to this position. It is more than one can hope that the Congress should approach the Muslims and offer them satisfactory assurances; and the lack of generosity among the Congress leaders makes one very doubtful about the future of a country which is guided by leaders with such a mentality".

In the meantime (by the end of July) elections were completed for the 296 seats of the Assembly, the Sikh seats were left vacant (details to come later). The League won 73 seats, all general seats, except nine. Nehru met the Viceroy on 30 July; Wavell expressed some concern on the latest situation pointing out that the Congress had a chance of showing real statesmanship and giving the League assurances which would bring them into the Assembly. Nehru did not regret and said they could not give assurance of Pakistan. On grouping system, Nehru gave his (well ventilated) own interpretations which seemed to Wavell to be pure casuistry to try and force different interpretations out of it. Since the Muslim League had refused to participate in the Assembly, the Viceroy was convinced that Constitution-making for the Muslim majority provinces would obviously be a farce. Wavell also thought that he should get in touch with the Congress and the League on the formation of Interim Government, hoping that Congress might ask him to postpone the meeting of the Assembly, until an agreement to resolve the deadlock had been reached.

Now we shall be reverting to the arguments for the formation of the Interim Government. On 31 July, Jinnah wrote to Wavell saying that he did not approve of the ratio recently suggested by the Viceroy (6:5:3), for the principle of parity was missing; and that Congress's

claim to nominate a quisling Muslim could not be accepted. Jinnah said that the League had every right to be consulted on the nominations of minorities representatives. The Secretary of State and the Viceroy on the other hand were anxious to form the Interim Government. On 31 July, Lord Pethick-Lawrence telegraphed to Wavell saying that it was "impossible to allow Jinnah's non-cooperation to hold up progress with formation of interim Government." On 1 August, the British Cabinet also agreed that the Viceroy could go ahead with the formation of Government even if the League did not cooperate. Wavell, however, decided to get in touch with Nehru and press him to make an offer to the League.

It may be mentioned that the League (at this moment) was full of complaints against the Congress. Liaquat Ali met Sir Arthur Waugh (member of the Executive Council) and told him that the "16th May plan had been accepted by the League after quite a hard internal struggle because it gave Muslims a chance to develop socially and economically in their own groups without the Hindu domination." The Congress, however, wanted a strong centre, adding to three central subjects "auxiliary" powers....these powers would enable the centre [Congress] to dominate the groups on the economic side.....Muslims should never improve their lot". Liaquat Ali Khan referred to Nehru's provocative statements regarding the grouping system and said it looked as if the Mission would be prepared to give in to the Congress. Liaquat Ali Khan was apprehensive that the Congress would not refer points of disputes to the Federal Court for interpretation or to an arbitrator for decision; and even if they did refer, they would not accept the decision of the Federal Court or that of the arbitrator; that the Muslims would have to surrender to the Congress; that the Cabinet Mission Plan would be scraped; and that the Muslims would be doomed to the fate of the Scheduled Castes, whom the Mission had so shamefully abandoned to the Congress. Liaquat Ali anticipated that Muslims would have to put up a fight because there was no alternative. He further said that the "Muslims might do down for ever, dragging others with them, but their struggle might result in the Muslim rebirth". He also suggested that some leading men from both Congress and the League should be invited to go to London to obtain from the British Government a clear verdict on the extent to which the constitutional Plan could, or could not be

modified by the Hindu dominated Assembly. The Governor of the United Provinces also wrote to Wavell saying that the Muslims were now in a thoroughly truculent mood. The Governor of Sind assessed the situation; he had a meeting with Ayub Khuhro and Ghulam Husain Hidaitullah, who also suggested that the British Government should take a tough line against the Congress by telling them that the British would intervene to enforce the grouping system. Both the League leaders from Sind suggested that all the Muslims in the Interim Government should be nominated by the League; and that after these measures had been taken, the Muslim would co-operate with the Government.

Meanwhile, the Viceroy continued with the arrangements for the formation of an Interim Government. On 6 August he wrote to Nehru inviting him to make proposals and also suggesting him to get in touch with Jinnah. Wavell also wrote to Jinnah telling him that he would not alter the ratio of 6:5:3 as suggested earlier and also telling him that the Congress might make a reasonable offer to the League of a coalition. On 8 August, the Congress Working Committee met in Wardha and decided to accept Wavell's invitation to form a Government. Two days later, Nehru wrote to the Viceroy that the League's cooperation for the formation of Government was difficult to get, but promised that he would try. Therefore, Jinnah and Nehru exchanged letters and held meetings but failed to resolve their differences; both of them stuck to their guns. On 19 August, Jinnah gave a detailed statement to the press that the League was not prepared to surrender; that the Congress had not accepted the long-term plan and had also rejected the short-term plan: that the League had accepted both the plans; and that there was no question of accepting Congress proposals. On the same day, Nehru gave Wavell, the names (provisionally) for the Interim Government: Congress (Nehru, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Sarat Chandra Bose, Rajagopalacharia, Jagjivan Ram; Minorities (Baladev Singh, John Matthai, Bhabha); Muslims (Azad, Asif Ali, Maula Bux, Ali Zaheer, Zaheeruddin.) Pethick-Lawrence and Wavell however were convinced that "it would be better not to fill seats with "stooge" Muslims thereby further exacerbate Muslim League feelings. On 20 August, after having second thoughts Nehru gave another list: Nehru, Patel, Prasad, Asif Ali, Rajagopalacharia, Fazlul Haq, Bose,

Matthai, Beldev Singh, Shafaat Ahmad, Jagjivan Ram, Ali Zaheer, Bhabha and Anthony. Wavell commented "Asif Ali and Shafaat Ahmad Khan are very poor specimens indeed. They have neither capacity nor character.....Fazlul Haq is corrupt even for a Bengali. I do not feel I can stomach his inclusion in the Ministry and no name could possibly be more provocative to the League. I shall tell Nehru that I refuse to accept him."

Nehru met the Viceroy on 22 August, Wavell told him that Fazlul Haq could let down the side very badly with his reputation and instability; and the Viceroy advised Congress strongly not to include his name and Nehru agreed to withdraw. The Viceroy also suggested the possibility of leaving the Muslim seats vacant; but the Congress was not willing to agree to this. The Congress desired that all five Muslim seats should be filled, otherwise the impression would be that it was a temporary Government waiting for the favour of the Muslim League, which would undermine the prestige and authority of the Government. The Viceroy, however suggested that the policy of the Interim Government should not be provocative towards the Muslims, reminding the Congress leaders that without the cooperation of the Muslim League there would be no chance of a United India or a peaceful transfer of power. Nor would the States be likely to negotiate freely with one-party Government. On 24 August, a press communique was issued giving the names of the members of the new Interim Government; it was also announced that two more Muslim members would be appointed later. Two days later, there was also a broadcast by Wavell; he described the formation of Government as a very momentous step forward on India's road to freedom and suggested that more efforts would be made to secure the Muslim League's co-operation. In case the League decided to co-operate, the Viceroy promised to give them a share of the most important portfolios. The Viceroy was delighted that the Sikhs had decided to participate in the Constituent Assembly and in the Interim Government.

It may be of some interest to know how the Sikhs came in the Interim Government. The Sikhs in the Punjab were first to show their resentment against the Cabinet Mission plan. They anticipated that under the grouping system their community would be dominated by

the Muslim majority; and that although there was no possibility of Pakistan in the near future, the grouping system still contained the seeds of Pakistan. Similarly, the Sikhs thought that the number of seats and the safeguards offered to them were inadequate and that they were deprived of all the special privileges they had so far enjoyed. The Mission had made it clear to the representatives of the Sikh community (on the day when the plan was announced) that it was the best arrangement for their community. It was pointed out that their unity of India would be maintained; a few more seats for them would not make much difference; and that due to their distinguished position in the Punjab they would not be ignored by the Muslims. But the Sikhs did not accept these arguments. Tara Singh and Baldev Singh wrote letters to Lord Pethick-Lawrence putting the above-mentioned arguments against the Mission's plan, and asking that it be modified to give veto power to the Sikhs in the Section 'B' Constituent Assembly. The Punjab Governor also recommended the Mission to conciliate the Sikhs by providing them with more safeguards. But Sir George Abell (PSV) and Menon (the Reforms Commissioner) were both in agreement that it would be risky to modify the May 16 statement. Accordingly Lord Pethick-Lawrence informed the Sikh representatives that the Mission was not going to modify or interpret its statement to meet the Sikh demands. He also pointed out that the Sikhs should be satisfied that the partition of India and the Punjab had been avoided. On June 6, the Mission again interviewed Tara Singh and Baldev Singh. Both parties rehearsed their old arguments; the Viceroy and the Delegation, however, assured the Sikhs that they could use all their influence to help the Sikhs to get a square deal. Despite these assurances the Sikhs were determined to resist the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission.

The Ali-India Sikh League met under Kharak Singh at Lahore, on June 4. Resolutions were passed against the Mission's proposals in particular, the system of grouping came under attack. It was declared that this system would undermine the existence of the Punjab as a unit in the Indian Union and therefore would do a great deal of harm to the position of the Sikh community. A few days later, a huge gathering of Sikh representatives took place at Amritsar (9-10 June 1946). It was argued that the Mission by its grouping system

had in fact recognized the creation of Pakistan; the non-Muslim areas had also been handed over to the Muslims thereby completely liquidating the position of the Sikhs in their Holyland. Speech after speech was made in condemnation of the Pakistan principle and the statement of May 16. Tara Singh asked his followers to get ready to make big sacrifices as there was no guarantee that their rights would be protected. Baldev Singh declared that a great majority of the Sikh community favoured a direct action to fight the recommendations of the Mission; the Sikh Minister promised that he would tender his resignation, if asked by his community. Ujjal Singh, a veteran Sikh leader, declared that his community was ready to fight the Mission's recommendations. Under no circumstances, Ujjal Singh said, were the Sikhs prepared to tolerate a Muslim Raj in the Punjab. His resolution condemning the recommendations of the Mission was duly accepted by the conference. Many other Sikh leaders also criticized the May 16 statement, using the plea that the Sikhs would become Muslim slaves if they accepted it. A Council of Action under the leadership of Colonel G.S. Gill was also formed to fight and lead the Sikhs to victory against the delegation's recommendations.

The Congress was, however, prepared to form a government without the League's cooperation; the League's rejection of the Mission's proposals and its behavior so far were considered a blessing in disguise. In the Punjab too, the League's rejection of the May 16 and June 16 statements had a very sobering effect on the Sikh community. Although the Sikhs had previously rejected every assurance of the government and repeatedly refused to accept the Mission's proposals, their tendency to line up with the Congress to oppose the League helped them to change their attitude towards the proposals and the Congress. In early July, the Sikh leaders had asked the government to put pressure upon the rulers of Sikh States for their amalgamation into a single group. But the government refused to consider any such proposal unless it came from the rulers of the Sikh States concerned. Thus it was the perfect time for the Sikh-Congress re-alignment; for the Congress too, in view of the League's exclusion from the government, it was important to win back the Sikh support. The negotiations for an accord were easy to conduct' the Sikhs were already in coalition with the Congress in the Punjab and the Congress itself had won a few Sikh seats in the

Punjab, and above all the Sikh Ministers had also been constantly in touch with the Congress leadership particularly with Nehru and Patel. In early August, the Governor reported that the Sikhs and the Congress were closer to an accord. Shortly afterwards a Sikh delegation left for Wardha, (where the Congress Working Committee was holding its proceedings) in order to negotiate certain concessions regarding the Congress attitude towards the Sikh demands; by this time the Congress had been invited to form the interim government. The negotiations eventually resulted in an assurance by the Congress

On August 9, the Congress decided that it would give Sikhs all possible support in removing their legitimate grievances and in securing adequate safeguards for the protection of their just interests in the Punjab. A few days later, The Panthic Board (the supreme body of the Sikh community) accepted this simply-worded assurance and decided to give up their opposition to the Mission's proposals. In fact the Congress had long been prepared to give this kind of assurance; but the Sikhs would not accept, insisting on the modification of the whole Cabinet Mission Plan. Thanks to the League's rejection of the Plan that they now accepted the Congress words readily.

The Congress-Sikh alliance and the formation of the Interim Government was a very bad omen for the Muslim League. The Governor of Madras reported to the Viceroy that the Muslim League had given the impression of "disappointment and bewilderment". The League leader gave statements (on 25 and 26 August) releasing the correspondence between him and the Viceroy and between him and Nehru. He described the Viceroy's recent statement "as a severe blow to the Muslims, and a most unwise step", reiterating that the only solution of India's problem was a division of India into Hindustan and Pakistan. Jinnah charged that the Viceroy had gone back on what was announced on 16 June and the assurances given to the League in his letter of 22 July; that Wavell had changed the formula vitally and substantially; and that the Viceroy's offer to the League was vague except that the Muslim League would have five seats nothing else was clearly stated. In conclusion, Jinnah said that if the Viceroy's offer was sincere he must translate it into reality. Chauduri

Khaliq-uz-Zaman also sent a message to the Governor of United Provinces that the Viceroy should do something to accommodate the League's point of view, especially on "grouping system", hoping that Jinnah might ignore the question of Nationalist Muslims. Khawaja Nazimuddin also urged Wavell not to permit Congress to put any other interpretation on grouping except what was meant by the Mission.

However, soon the Viceroy and the Congress realised that it would not be possible to ignore the League for long; the "Direct Action Day" of the League had led to serious Hindu-Muslim riots in Calcutta, resulting in heavy casualties to both sides; in a few days time over 5,000 lives were lost. It may be mentioned that "Forty eight hours before, Jinnah had urged Muslims to remain clam; "direct action day" should be a day of peaceful reflection, not a day for the purpose of resorting to direct action in any form or shape." Wavell flew to Calcutta to assess the damage done by the tragic happenings. After his return to Delhi (27 August) he met Nehru and Gandhi. In order to avoid similar trouble in the future, it was essential to form a coalition Government, Wavell conveyed to both Nehru and Gandhi. The Viceroy also emphasized the need of an assurance by the Congress on "grouping system" to meet the League's point of view. The Viceroy suggested that the Congress should say that they were prepared in the interests of communal harmony to accept the intention of the statement of May 16th; that the provinces could not exercise any option affecting their membership of the section or of the Groups if formed until the decision contemplated in the statement of 16 May was taken by the new Legislature after the new constitutional arrangements had come into operation and the first general elections had been held. Gandhi however thought that the matter should be decided by the interim Government. Wavell did not agree saying that it was a matter for the Congress to sort out for they had challenged the interpretation of the Mission. Gandhi then went off into long legalistic arguments about the interpretations of the Mission's statement. The Viceroy angrily remarked that as a plain man he knew perfectly well what the Mission meant saying that the compulsory Grouping was the whole crux of the constitutional plan. Nehru thought that this was simply bullying by the League; Gandhi also angrily said that if a blood-bath was essential, it would come

about in spite of non-violence. The Viceroy was shocked to hear these statements, by a preacher of non-violence and a so-called saint and the future Prime Minister of India. Next day, Nehru sent a letter to the Viceroy saying that they held that provincial autonomy was a basic provision and each province had the right to decide whether to form or join a group or not, and that any dispute as to the interpretations could be referred to the Federal Court. Gandhi also sent a letter saying that the Congress would not change its position on the Constitutional plan.

After a tremendous disappointment the Viceroy cabled to the Secretary of State saying that the Congress always meant to use its power and position to destroy the League and it would tear off the grouping scheme in the Constituent Assembly some postponement of the Assembly and that was necessary. Turnbull and Monteath observed the situation in a note; Turnbull reminded the Secretary of State that Wavell and Croft had expressed their doubts as to whether the Congress genuinely accepted the plan; that Wavell held the opinion that it would have been much better had the Congress rejected the statement of May 16th as a whole; and that it provided Jinnah plenty of justification in saying that he had been deceived by the Congress. Monteath was of the opinion that Maulana Azad's letter of 25 June should have been taken up: Azad had written that there were defects in the May 16th statement. This was in Monteath's opinion, a challenge for the Mission, but it was accepted as an acceptance. He thought that the League on the other hand, had accepted the unity of India which was fundamentally contradictory of the conception of Pakistan to which they had previously been wedded. It should have been appreciated by the Congress.

On 31 August, the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State saying that "the matter of Grouping in the Constituent Assembly is, I believe, now the crux of the whole problem, not only the Constituent Assembly itself but of [the] Muslim League participation in the Central Government. It is not a matter of niceties of legal argument but of practical consideration and also to the reputation of [the British Government]. Calcutta with its 20,000 casualties and more than 100,000 homeless has shown that we

cannot safely summon the Constituent Assembly until some agreed basis has been reached.' He further explained regretting that he should have warned the Government of the danger ahead and should have acted sooner; Wavell reminded the members of the Cabinet Mission that he was strongly opposed to treating the Congress acceptance of the statement of May 16th as genuine and was reluctantly persuaded to agree to it on an assurance that the safeguards in the statement would prevent the Congress from destroying the principle of Grouping without the consent of the Muslim League, and also by a belief that the British Government was determined to see that essential clause, which was the only one which persuaded the Muslim League to accept, would be protected. Wavell also reminded the Members of the Mission that he had requested the British Government to make this point as clear as possible in the form of a statement in the Parliament. Moreover, the Viceroy pointed out that Pethick-Lawrence's reply to Lord Simon in the House of Lords (18 July, 1946) had aroused suspicion that the British Government did not really mean to insist on this essential provision. Wavell thought that after Nehru's wild statements during his press conference on 10 July and the League's withdrawal from their acceptance of the statement of May 16th, he should have acted at once to get a clear decision on the grouping system. But at that time he was convinced that the Congress as a whole would not approve Nehru's interpretations; that he was extremely busy trying to obtain an agreement to form the interim Government. The Viceroy further added that his recent interviews with Nehru and Gandhi had led him to believe that the Congress still had no genuine desire of accepting the Grouping in the way the Cabinet Mission had intended. The Viceroy insisted that they must settle the point about Grouping before he could summon the session of the Constituent Assembly; until the British Government had done so, the most essential part of the Mission's work on the long-term plan would remain undone that the key-stone of the Arch was missing.

Meanwhile, on 1 September Nehru wrote to the Viceroy saying that they would welcome the co-operation of the Muslim League in the Interim Government; that the Muslim League could nominate five members if they wished; and that Nehru would reshuffle the portfolios so as to give the Muslims an equitable share of them. It will

be noticed in the following pages that later Nehru changed his mind and did not wish to give even one important portfolio to the League. However, on 2 September, the Congress-Sikh Government was duly inaugurated.

This new development further dismayed the Muslims; the Muslim League reviewed the case for starting a civil disobedience movement involving the non-payment of taxes alongwith a number of other options; the formation of the Congress-Sikh government was also bitterly criticised. On the other hand, keeping in view the precarious circumstances, Wavell pressured the Congress by telling them that he would not summon the Constituent Assembly until the grouping question had been solved and that he would not withdraw from his position. Writing to the Secretary of State, Wavell once again reminded him that the basic principle of the long-term plan (all members of the Mission would agree) was that while the Hindus could have their United India, the Muslims must have their Groups. If the Congress thought that by legal cleverness they could achieve both a United India and a destruction of the Muslim groups they were being extremely foolish. The Viceroy again suggested that a firm and determined statement by the British Government to this effect might change Jinnah's attitude; and that they must then go ahead with an approach to the League.

On 5 September, Wavell had a meeting with the Congress's strong man, Patel. Wavell told the Sardar that the first step was to reassure the League on the question of Grouping in the Assembly; that they need not fear the development of Pakistan, for if the discussion in the Groups was sensibly carried out, and the affairs of India were conducted with commonsense, the logic of circumstances would prevail, and the Muslims would see that Pakistan was not really a practical solution. Sardar Patel said that Jinnah was an impossible personality for negotiations; the Congress wished to negotiate with someone else saying again that the personality of Jinnah was the main hurdle. Patel (on the question of Grouping) thought that a province should vote as a Province and not according to the number of their representatives. Wavell said that this was entirely contrary to the intentions of the Cabinet Mission plan, and would defeat its main object. The Sardar then said that he had no

fears of the N.W.F.P. forming a solid group since the Pathans hated the Punjabi Muslims; and Sind and the Punjab did not get on; and there were Sikhs too, to be considered. The Viceroy remarked that these were very factors which would prevent anything very drastic in the way of a Pakistan being created. Patel then said that he was worried about Assam being overwhelmed in Section "C" and the Congress wished to have a rearrangement. The Viceroy also had a meeting with Nehru; he too was stubborn on the main issues like Sardar Patel.

The Viceroy did not give up and continued with his efforts to bring the League in the Interim Government. On 2 September, Liaquat Ali Khan had a meeting with Ian Scott; Liaquat wished to have certain assurances by the Congress; the setting-up of the sectional assemblies where provincial constitutions would be drawn up by the section as a whole; there would be no opting out before hand by a province only after the first elections were held; the Union Assembly would have no power to alter the Group constitution or Provincial constitutions. Liaquat Ali Khan accused the British of alliance with the Congress. On the same day, Sir Sultan Ahmad had a meeting with the Viceroy, almost the same points were discussed. Wavell pointed out that he was fully alive to the importance of Grouping and he had always held the opinion that the Grouping principle was the crux of constitutional plan. On 9 September, Jinnah's statement appeared in The Daily Mail reading that the "the slate must be wiped clean and we must begin from the beginning again"; he was ready to go to London for negotiations, if necessary; but he also threatened that he was ready to go to prison for the achievement of his objective (Pakistan).

On 14 September, Wavell sent a telegram to Lord Pethick-Lawrence saying that there were difficulties ahead in negotiations with Jinnah. His estimate was that Congress would be more difficult than the League; there was no doubt that Nehru and others having tasted power would not want to share it; and they could easily do something and say something that would make it impossible for Jinnah to come in the Interim Government. On 16 September, Wavell had a meeting with Jinnah; Wavell pointed out that the Congress was prepared to implement the long-term plan (meeting of Provinces in Sections). Jinnah did not accept this and said that the

soul of the long-term plan had been mutilated by the Congress. He further added that "the only good thing in it was the provision for Sections and Grouping; and the only guarantee of the Scheme possibly working out was that it should be implemented with honour and good-will. This the League had always intended to do, but the Congress obviously had not, and it therefore became impossible for the League to continue their acceptance". Jinnah also discussed the possibility of League's entry into the interim Government; but no agreement was possible. Jinnah needed time to put the idea to the Muslim League Council, which could decide to change the policy on long-term plan but the Muslim League's Working Committee could authorize immediate participation in the Government. He was ready to meet Pandit Nehru; Wavell also promised to consult Nehru so as to accelerate the process.

On 28 September, Wavell met Jinnah and explained the progress for his discussions with the Congress telling him that on the question of Nationalist Muslim, the Congress would not revise its altitude; in spite of this, Wavell advised Jinnah to join the Government "for it was in the interests of Muslims". It may be mentioned that in the meantime the Congress leaders indicated again that they were not going to agree to a Province like Assam being forced against its will to do anything; and that India was on the march to freedom; it was coming whether there was Hindu-Muslim agreement or not, meaning that the Congress might ignore the Muslim League altogether.

On 2 October, Jinnah had another meeting with the Viceroy; Wavell told him that he had failed to secure any concession from the Congress over the Nationalist Muslim issue and that he would not press them further over this. Wavell suggested again that the League should join the Interim Government immediately and without any conditions to protect Muslim interests; on the distribution of portfolios, Wavell promised that the League would get a fair share. On 3 October Jinnah sent various proposals to the Viceroy that the most important portfolios should be equally distributed between the two major parties; and that the question of the long-term plan should stand over until a better and more conducive atmosphere was created and an agreement had been reached on the main points and after the interim Government had been re-formed and finally set up.

Wavell accepted most of the proposals and promised to nominate a Leaguer as Vice-Chairman of the Coordination Committee of his cabinet, which was a most important post; the Viceroy now hoped that the League would reverse its decision on the long-term plan in the near future.

The next important meeting took place between Jinnah and Wavell on 12 October; Jinnah wished to have either External Affairs or Defence portfolio for the League. He finally suggested External Affairs and Home to the Congress and Defence to the League; There were only three important portfolios. On October, 13, Jinnah informed Wavell that the Muslim League's Working Committee had agreed to nominate five persons as members of the Interim Government, feeling that it would be fatal to leave the Interim Government in the hands of the Congress. Wavell informed Nehru about this who agreed to put it to the Cabinet. The next day, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan met the Viceroy for further discussions; Wavell remarked that both were very friendly. On 14 October, Jinnah eventually sent five names: Liaquat Ali, I.I.Chundrigar, Abudar Rab Nishtar, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Jogendra Nath Mandal.

The Muslim League's decision to join the Interim Government had already shown that they had reviewed their attitude on a number of issues, especially on the issue of Congress nominating a Muslim. It should have been, therefore, treated as a great sacrifice made by the League (like the League's acceptance of the Unity of India, embodied in the long-term plan). But, (as will be seen in the following pages) the Congress raised several hurdles; Nehru met Wavell on 14 October and said that it would be very difficult to shift Patel's portfolio (Home ministry). The next day, Nehru sent a letter saying that "the present portfolio of Sardar Patel should remain with him [it] would be an act of extreme discourtesy to him, if he was removed." For his own part, Nehru said that he would like to continue as Foreign Minister. On 15 October, Nehru complained and wrote to Wavell that the Muslim League had not sent their most suitable men in the Cabinet.

However the Viceroy issued a press Communique on 15 October that the King had been pleased to appoint the following to be the members of the Interim Government. Liaquat Ali Khan,

I.I.Chundrigar, A.R.Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Jogendra Nath Mandal; S.C.Bose, Shafqat Ahmad Khan and Syed Ali Zaheer had resigned; Nehru, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Asaf Ali Rajagopalachari, John Matthai, Baldev Singh, Jagjivan Ram and Bahbha would continue to serve; and the distribution of portfolios could be settled early next week and the new members would then be sworn in.

After this announcement one major problem was still left to be solved: the distribution of portfolios. On 16 October, Jinnah had a meeting with the Viceroy; he said that it would depend on whether Congress would get over the idea of the Muslim League coming in the interim Government as subordinates run by Nehru, and if they would accept the present constitution and not try to make the Government of their own. He urged that the Viceroy should be firm and fair in the distribution of portfolios. Jinnah also agreed that there must be an agreement on the long-term plan, as emphasized in the statement of May 25th. But the Viceroy was in a most difficult position; Patel had met him on the same day and seemed quite intransigent; he told the Viceroy that he was quite prepared to give up the Home portfolio and leave the Government altogether. Wavell disagreed and said that it was not the spirit in which to deal with matters like this. On 20 October, Patel wrote to Wavell complaining against Raja Ghazanfar Ali's speech that the League would fight for the achievement of Pakistan. On 22 October, Wavell told Jinnah (during a meeting) that he was having some difficulty with the Congress over the distribution of portfolios; the Viceroy still thought that the League should have one of the three important portfolios; Defense, External Affairs or Home. On the same day, the Viceroy wrote to Nehru saying that he could not accept the situation that the minority representative must all continue to hold their portfolios and that most important portfolio held by the Congress nominees must also remain with them. He desired that one, of the above-mentioned important portfolio should be made available to the Muslim League.

On the same day (22 October) Wavell had a meeting with Nehru: "[Nehru] emphasized the difficulties of moving any of the Minority representatives; he would be very averse to giving up the External Affairs portfolio himself". Nehru also said that it would be very difficult to persuade Sardar Patel to move from the Home portfolio. The

Viceroy however suggested to Nehru to make a special appeal to Patel on his behalf to take an other portfolio (Works, Mines and Power); but Nehru did not give in and suggested that it might be possible to move Bhabha from Commerce. The Viceroy seemed unhappy and wrote to the Secretary of State that the Congress had indicated that neither their own leading men (Nehru and Patel) nor Baldev Singh, Matthai or Bhabha should be disturbed; this would leave the Muslim League without any of the most important portfolios and that he had told Nehru that the League must have either External Affairs or Home or Defense, and also one of the two portfolios Commerce and Industries and Supplies: that the Congress did not like it. Wavell admitted that the conditions for a good start did not appear to be present.

On the next day (23 October) Nehru wrote to Wavell saying: "that it would be improper to make any change in regard to the three portfolios you mention.....In regard to the portfolio of Commerce a change may be possible." Nehru however pointed out that five other portfolios were available: 1 Education 2. Health.3.Posts. Telegraph and Air Services.4.Works. Mines and Power and. Legislative. At the end of his letter Nehru once again repeated that they could not accept any change with regard to External Affairs. Home of Defense, for in his opinion there were some others which were in many ways more important still. On the same day, Wavell replied to Nehru that he considered that the Muslim league were entitled to one of the three important portfolios and asked which of these three portfolios should be given to the Muslim League? The Viceroy also told Nehru that he had made it clear to Jinnah that the League's entry into the Interim Government was conditional on the acceptance of the statement of May 16th and explained in the statement of May 25th and that he must call his Council at an early date to agree to this. Wavell assured Nehru that Jinnah would come into the Interim Government with the intention of cooperation. But the Viceroy was not optimistic; he informed the Secretary of State that Nehru was not prepared to give in to the League on the question of portfolios; he also feared that the Congress would still do all they could to prevent the League coming in the Government.

Nehru promptly replied Viceroy's letter of October 23 saying that so far as they were concerned they had made it plain that the Delegation's interpretation was not their interpretation of the statement of May 16th. He once again refused to give any important portfolio to the League but offered the portfolio of Finance to the League. Wavell thanked him for his "generosity" but wrote to him saying that Home portfolio must be allotted to the League and that he would press the League to be more responsible in their public utterances. Nehru did not agree saying that Sardar Patel had told him personally that he would resign from the Government altogether if he was moved; and that the Congress would resign if the Sardar was troubled. Wavell now threatened that he might reconsider the whole arrangement. Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence saying that the Congress had threatened to resign if they had to give up the Home portfolio; he concluded that by these tactics the Congress were determined to keep the League out of the Interim Government. Wavell however thought that his next move would be to meet Jinnah and ask him if he could accept the Finance portfolio but he was not optimistic. Fortunately, the Quaid-i-Azam agreed to take Finance and Commerce and three other portfolios. So far as the portfolios were concerned the League leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, suggested the following arrangements: Finance (Liaquat Ali Khan) Commerce (I.I.Chundrigar); Post and Air (A.R.Nishtar); Health (Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan); and Legislative (Jogendar Nath Mandal). Mandal belonged to the Scheduled Castes and was a minister in the Muslim League ministry of Bengal and his nomination could only be taken as a deliberate riposte to the Congress retention of a Nationalist Muslim. But it was also the first intimation that the League was ready to offer protection to the minorities of the Punjab and Bengal, should they decide to remain in Pakistan.

The reshuffled Cabinet took office on 26 October. The Governor of Bihar (Dow) reported to the Viceroy: "From the tone of the Press it may be gathered that in this predominantly Hindu province there is general disappointment that the Muslim League have decided to enter the Interim Government. From the Hindu point of view Pandit Nehru and his colleagues were getting on very nicely; [but] the new Muslim members are criticized as being nobodies, and the inclusion

of an Ambedkarite [Mandal] from the depressed classes arouses particular anger."

Now the Viceroy was much relieved so far as the disputes were concerned about the formation of the Interim Government. Therefore, he laid emphasis on one point that the League must accept the statement of May 16th. Wavell had a meeting with Jinnah on 30 October; this long interview (lasting an hour and ten minutes) centered around this point. Wavell reminded Jinnah that it was a condition of the League's acceptance of office at the Centre, that it would accept the statement in question without further delay. He also warned Jinnah that the Congress would use this as a pretext to force the League out of Government. But Jinnah repeated all the arguments to the effect that the Congress acceptance of the statement of May 16 was not a genuine one and should never have been accepted as such; that the Council of the League would not reverse its decision unless they were satisfied that the Congress had accepted the literal interpretation of the Mission's Constitutional plan; and that the Council would say that nothing but the creation of Pakistan would satisfy them. Jinnah also told the Viceroy that he had received "piles of letters and telegrams" urging him to stand firm on this question.

In these circumstances it was extremely difficult for the Interim Government to discharge its duties effectively. Only four days after its formation, the Viceroy writing to the Secretary of State commented: "I hope your congratulations about the coalition will not prove to have been premature. It is going to be a very difficult task to keep it together.....Nehru and Liaquat are sitting together on the same bench.....Correspondents were however quick to notice that Nehru and Liaquat hardly exchanged a single word up to lunch time. The reason I gathered is that Nehru asked the Muslim League [Ministers] to come to a joint discussion in the Assembly business this morning.... and Liaquat refused. It is of course impossible to do business in the Assembly if the Members of the Cabinet on the Front Bench do not discuss things among themselves Liaquat had made it clear that the Leaguers will not attend the "tea party" Cabinet meetings and that they will consider among themselves the line to be taken on proposals before the Cabinet.....[Liaquat Ali Khan has]

made it clear that there was no question of accepting the leadership of Pandit Nehru." That the League would not recognize Nehru's status as Prime Minister, as declared by the Congress Party.

From The Constituent Assembly To The Evolution of Partition Plan.

The interim Government was reconstituted on 26 October 1946 when the Muslim League joined; the Viceroy proceeded to urge upon the League leader (Jinnah) the necessity for its representatives to join the Constituent Assembly. Wavell was "puzzled and worried" about the matter of getting the League into the Assembly which was provisionally scheduled to meet on 9 December. The Congress was pressing the Viceroy to summon the Assembly and to ensure the attendance of the League. And in case the League refused to attend the session of the Assembly, the Congress had decided to put pressure on Wavell to turn the League ministers out of the interim Government. The Congress was still insisting on its own untenable interpretation of the Cabinet Mission's statement of 16 May 1946, which was wrongly accepted by the Mission. Wavell also thought that the British Government was "both cowardly and dishonest in this matter", for it did not issue an un-equivocal statement fearing that it might upset the Congress. The Viceroy wanted the British Government to issue a statement to the effect that a "section should make the constitution for the provinces inside the section; and that a province cannot withdraw from the section (or Group if formed) until a later stage as laid down in the statement" of 16 May 1946.

On 5 November 1946, Wavell wrote to Jinnah about summoning of the League's Council with a view to accepting the statement of 16 May and also suggested him to meet B.N.Rau (constitutional Adviser to the Constituent Assembly). It may be helpful to mention that the Congress was not willing to change its stance on the statement of 16 May but was willing to refer the disputes to the Federal Court. But

Jinnah did not trust that the Court would be able to give any verdict against the Congress party; he had clearly stated that the Muslims needed further assurances. The Viceroy also thought that Jinnah was entitled to an assurance by the Government. Like Jinnah, Wavell was also suspicious of Congress's designs; the Viceroy often complained against the attitude of the Congress changing its mind and acceding its limits. Nehru often "blew up in charactersitic fashion" and denied the existance of a coaition Government at the Centre since the Muslim League ministers did not recognize him as Prime Minister and refused to attend his daily "Cabinet Meetings". And when Wavell reminded Nehru about the legal position, Nehru threatened to resign. But Liaquat Ali remained "calm" and pointed out that the League had every intention to cooperate with the Congress; that they were prepared to discuss the formation of coalition ministries in Provinces but would not recognize Nehru as Prime Minister. Liaquat Ali, However, told the Viceroy that it would be inadvisable to summon the Constituent Assembly on 9 December, in view of the tense atmosphere in India; it would only be further exacerbation of the Communal feelings. Liaquat's point of view was correct; even anti-Muslim League authorities like the Governor of Punjab and his Premier were of the opinion that the proposed session of the Assembly should be indefinitely postponed, using the plea that the Assembly could not long avoid controversial issues; and that it would make communal feelings worse and the maintenance of law and order more difficult. On 16 November, Liaquat Ali told Abell (P.S. to Viceroy that " it would be folly to call the Constituent Assembly".

Jinnah also stood for a boycott of the Assembly; on 14 November, Jinnah declared that "the only solution" was Pakistan and Hindustan, rather absolute Pakistan; anything else would be artificial and unnatural" that he tension would cease as Pakistan and Hindustan would be friends in this sub-continent; and that Indian States at a later stage would be free to join either Pakistan or Hindustan. On 17 November, Jinnah wrote to Wavell saying that the Congress had not accepted the statement of 16 May from the very beginning; Jinnah quoted the letter of the President of the Congress dated 25 June, Congress working Committee's resolution of 26 June, the Wardha resolution of 10 August and the statements of

Congress leaders to that effect. He also pointed out that Nehru fully supported the P.M. of Assam to defy the fundamentals of the statement of 16 May, with regard to the sections or grouping, clearly defying the Federal Court's powers. Jinnah opined that in a highly explosive atmosphere it would be neither advisable nor possible to hold the session of the Assembly; it would only exacerbate the present situation, it should be postponed sine die, concentrating on the measures to enforce law and order and to protect life and property. The Viceroy was also convinced that there would be "grave and widespread disorder in India" if the Assembly met without the Muslim League. He once again underlined the need for a clear statement by the British Government on the meaning of the part of the statement of May 16th which referred to the manner of work of the sections, so that the confidence of the League in the honesty of Government might be restored. The Viceroy's Private Secretary, Abell, also presented a note to that effect after he had a meeting with Liaquat Ali Khan. Liaquat had told him that the League could not enter the Constituent Assembly unless the Government "guaranteed that they meant what they said about the Group Constitutions"; that a civil war had already begun and the Government were not fulfilling their responsibility for India; that they should have dismissed the Bihar ministry for its involvement in killing the Muslims; and that the Muslim must have a complete Pakistan.

On the other hand, Nehru was not prepared to postpone the session of the Assembly; he wished to send the invitation to the members as early as possible. Nehru pressed the Viceroy to pressurise the Muslim League. On 19 November, Wavell had a meeting with Jinnah and asked him to negotiate with the Congress and attend the session of the Assembly. But Jinnah complained that the massacre of Muslims in Bihar had been completely organized by the Congress leaders; that the Congress wished to destroy the constitution, they were fooling the world; Wavell agreed with Jinnah on this point but could not say so. Jinnah wanted the British to give Muslims "their own bit of country, let it be as small as [the British] liked, but it must be their own, and they would live on one meal a day" insisting that the division of India was essential because any agreement with Congress was impossible. The Quaid-i-Azam said that to "call the Assembly would lead to a terrible disaster and that

he would not be able to control events in Muslim majority provinces. The Viceroy also had a meeting with the Muslim League ministers (Liaquat Ali, Chundrigar, Nishtar and Raja Ghazanfar Ali) asking them to use the Assembly to settle their differences. But they were of the opinion that the British Government were throwing the Muslims to the wolves (Congress).

But Nehru kept up his pressures on the Viceroy; he met the Viceroy to say that if the session of the Assembly was postponed, everybody would loose interest in it. Nehru questioned the League's membership of the Interim Government; he also issued statements to the press criticizing the Viceroy and threatening him. He also declared that the Assembly must meet, as planned earlier.

It may be noted that the Viceroy was also critical of the Congress policies; he clearly blamed Congress in his secret letters for destroying the constitution; that in Noakhali and Tippera disturbances the Muslims were massacred because the Congress supporters were deeply involved and some of the Bihar ministers acted recklessly and were irresponsible in encouraging or failing to suppress the incitement of revenge. Wavell also criticized Lady Stafford Cripps for accepting an invitation to stay with Nehru, when passing through Delhi on her way back from China; Nehru had asked her to stay and he considered this might be "helpful". Sir Stafford Cripps was President of the Board of Trade, an extremely important member of the British Cabinet.

The London Conference

On 23 November 1946, the Viceroy cabled the Secretary of State (Pethick-Lawrence) that the League would not attend the Session of the Constituent Assembly scheduled to be held on 9 December. He had told Liaquat Ali that the League could not stay in the Cabinet without accepting the statement of 16 May. In reply Liaquat told the Viceroy that they were prepared to resign but would not accept the long-term plan unless the British Government declared that "the provinces must meet in sections, that the representatives in the sections would decide, by a majority if necessary, whether there would be groups, and that the sections, again by majority if necessary, would frame the provincial

constitutions and the group constitutions if any." He argued that the only attraction in the Cabinet Mission's Plan was the possibility of forming Groups; that the Government "was afraid of the Congress and had not the courage or honesty to maintain their own Mission's Plan..... the Muslims had been thrown to the wolves". The Viceroy was also in favour of taking an immediate and important decision by the British Government. At this stage Lord Pethick-Lawrence sent a telegram (23 November) sounding the Viceroy on the possibility of inviting two representatives of the Congress and two of the League (from the Interim Government) to London in order to solve the political deadlock. The Governor of Punjab, however was of the opinion that it was too late to issue a statement by the British Government; it would not be effective, and the Congress would not accept it, and that the two communities were determined to battle it out.

The British Cabinet however (25 November) decided to invite two members representing the Congress, two representatives of the League and one representative of the Sikh community to London. But surprisingly Nehru was more interested in the controversial session of the Assembly and did not wish to go to London; the Congress was also not interested to discuss the Cabinet Mission plan once again. The Congress therefore, refused to participate; Baldev Singh also co-operated with Nehru on this issue. The British Prime Minister (Attlee) therefore personally invited Nehru to visit London. The Muslim League, on the other hand, had accepted the invitation; Jinnah and Liaquat Ali decided to go to London. Nehru also agreed to accept the invitation but made it clear that the Congress would not change its mind about the Cabinet Mission's Plan and its interpretations. Nehru's priority was (once again) the session of Assembly and for that matter he would like to return to India by 9 December. Nehru wrote to Wavell (28 November) saying that he was most reluctant to leave India but agreed only due to Attlee's appeal; that he would go alone for the Congress and Baldev Singh would also accompany him. Pethick-Lawrence sent a message that Attlee was grateful to Nehru and that arrangements would be made to enable Nehru to return by 9 December for the opening session of the Assembly.

It may be helpful to mention that Nehru and the Congress had accepted the invitation for the London conference only because it was "discourteous" to refuse in view of the British Prime Minister's personal request. Nehru was not going to London with a positive attitude to solve the political impasse, even though (according to the Secretary of State) the Congress from the outset had placed an interpretation on the Mission's Statement of 16 May which was contrary to British intentions. P.J.Griffiths (Leader, European Group, Indian Legislative Assembly) wrote to the Secretary of State (27 November) giving a true picture of the Hindu mind. His "Indian Political Notes No.2" reads among other things that the entry of the Muslim League into the Interim Government was most distasteful to the Congress ministers who had hoped that they would "sole reigning, hold the tyranny of Heaven"; that the British Government did not take a clear line on the statement of 16 May due to the fear of alienating the Congress; that the League's demands were not unreasonable; that Nehru often made speeches saying wrong things at the wrong time; that the session of the Assembly should be postponed; that the British Government should declare that the Cabinet Mission's Plan meant exactly what it said and that the curious interpretations put upon by the Congress leaders were not correct; and that the British Government would have to give an Award in favour of some form of Pakistan, ultimately accepting the partition of India and the establishment of two separate constituent Assemblies. It may also be noted that Sir William P.Spens, the Chief Justice of India (off the record) was also of the opinion that the League's (Jinnah's) interpretation of the statement of 16 May 1946 about "Grouping" was correct. Wavell also thought that the Congress had been dishonest and never meant to carry out the Plan.

However, the Conference met in London from 3 to 6 December 1946; Jinnah, Liaquat, Nehru and Baldev Singh, together with Wavell had arrived in London on 2 December. Jinnah met Maj.W.Wyatt (M.P.) on 3 December; the Quaid complained that he should have been allowed to form a Government when the Congress turned down the short-term plan of the Cabinet Mission. He stuck to the view that the Congress never accepted the long-term plan (C.M.P); that C.M.P. is dead—it was "a fraud and a humbug"; that the M.L. would not attend the session of the Assembly; and that only the

creation of Pakistan was the real solution, referring to the deliberate butchery of Muslims by Hindus in Bihar—no more arguments. Jinnah and Liaquat also met the Secretary of State (3 December) and repeated their arguments against the Congress attitude and anti-Muslim statements of Nehru and other Hindu leaders. Nehru also met the Secretary of State; he declared that it would be wrong for Bengal to settle the constitution for Assam or Punjab for the provinces of the North West Section; and that it would be wrong to try to appease Jinnah. On 4 December (in a meeting with P.M.) Pethick-Lawrence said that Jinnah was very bitter and determined against the Congress and he was not interested in the business of the Assembly. On 5 December, Mr. A. V. Alexander reminded Jinnah that it was the view of Cripps as a lawyer that any Court would interpret the statement of 16 May in the same sense as it was interpreted by the League and by the Cabinet Mission themselves. But Jinnah did not agree to refer the matter to the Federal Court, as the Congress had suggested. On the other hand, the British efforts to persuade Nehru to accept the plain meaning of the statement of 16 May were in vain and thus the conference failed to bring about an agreement. On 6 December, the text of the proposed statement to be made at the conclusion of the conversations was finalised, and before its issue, it was read to the Indian leaders.

The statement of 6 December was a great victory for the League and Jinnah's constitutional bent of mind. It declared that the Cabinet Mission's view, which had been confirmed by the legal advice, had always been, in effect, that of the Muslim League as to the power of sections to decide by majority vote. The interpretation "must therefore be considered as an essential part of the scheme of May 16. It should therefore be accepted by all parties to the Constituent Assembly". This view had been accepted by Jinnah, but the Congress had put forward a different interpretation. But the British Government urged "the Congress to accept the view of the Cabinet mission in order that the way may be open for the Muslim League to reconsider its attitude. After the statement had been read, Jinnah asked what the position would be if the Federal Court took a different view on this issue. He suggested that such a decision would not be binding on the League. Nehru, however, considered it an amendment of the statement of 16 May and went beyond it, and that

it had created a new situation for his party. But Attlee was not convinced by Nehru that any addition had been made. Baldev Singh said that the new statement would worsen the position of his community and that the Federal Court was now likely to take the same view. Pethick-Lawrence said that there was no change in what the Cabinet Mission had said all along. Jinnah met W. Wyatt and was "generally very pleased" saying that he had always been honest and was glad that the Government had been honest about the interpretation. Nehru and Baldev Singh returned to India, as planned, but Jinnah and Liaquat Ali stayed on for some longer time in England where the Quaid made a number of speeches in favour of his demand for Pakistan. Jinnah also held a press conference in which he clearly insisted on Pakistan also stating that he would not call the meeting of the Council until the Congress unequivocally accepted the statement of 6 December.

In the meantime, (on 9 December) as planned by Nehru, the Constituent Assembly met but the League members did not attend it. R.Prasad was elected President; Nehru moved the "Objectives Resolution" which envisaged the Indian Union as "an independent Republic". On 22 December, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution in which it reiterated its stand on the statement of 16 May and criticised the British statement of 6 December; the All-India Congress Committee also endorsed the stand taken by Nehru and the Congress Working Committee. This invited reaction from the League; Liaquat Ali issued a statement criticising the Congress. The Working Committee of the League met in Karachi and passed a resolution emphasising that the League's view of the interpretation of the statement of 16 May had been upheld by the British Government; that the Congress had not accepted the statement of 6 December; that the British Government should declare that the Cabinet Mission Plan had failed; and that the Constituent Assembly should be dissolved. The League decided not to reconsider its decision of July 1946 on the C.M.P.

Both Sardar Patel and Nehru criticised the League's resolution; Nehru said that the work of the Assembly would go on and demanded resignations of League's ministers from the Cabinet. But the League's view was that neither the Congress nor the Sikhs had

accepted the statement of 16 May. On 13 February, Nehru sent a letter to Wavell, once again demanding resignations of members of the League in the Interim Government or the Cabinet Mission's plan should be scrapped. On 15 February, Patel declared that the Congress would withdraw from the Government in case the League were allowed to remain in it and that the League must be out of the Government or change its Karachi resolution.

The New Viceroyalty And The transfer of Power

It is clear from the above-mentioned political events in India that Wavell was getting desperate as the time went by; at least for the last two years, the Viceroy had been trying to solve the political deadlock but did not succeed. The Simla Conference had failed to achieve its objectives and the Interim Government too was not a success: time and again there were problems for the Viceroy. The Cabinet Mission's efforts also came to a naught and most recently (December 1946) the British Cabinet also failed to solve the complex problems, mainly due to the Congress refusal to accept the facts. In September 1946, Wavell had floated the first of his plans, "The Breakdown Plan" based on assumption that a negotiated settlement between the League and Congress was impossible. He urged the British Government to decide upon a definite plan including the announcement of a date (March 1948) by which power would be transferred to such successors as they might choose, favouring a phased withdrawal. The British Government rejected this scheme. On 30 October, the Viceroy again pressed Attlee for a clear statement on how and when the British would leave India. While the Viceroy was in London (in early December) he once again pressed for a clear policy and a final date of the British withdrawal from India. But the British Prime Minister and his cabinet did not support Wavell's ideas; the Viceroy commented in his Journal that Attlee did not like him and was "not at all gracious". On 12 January 1947, Attlee informed Wavell that the Cabinet had rejected his plans; this letter was "cold, ungracious and indefinite". It may be noted that Wavell's plan was described as "defeatist proposal" but the British Cabinet agreed to impose a time limit instead of an exact date for the final transfer of power.

As a matter of fact, Attlee had been looking for a new man for the final phase, the Transfer of Power in India. The Prime Minister (Attlee) and his ministers especially Sir Stafford Cripps had difference of opinion with Wavell so far as the handling of Congress was concerned. The Congress had been secretly pressing Attlee to remove Wavell as early as possible. On 18 December while Wavell was still in London, Attlee offered the Viceroyalty to Lord Mountbatten, "who had the personality and qualifications required" - he was young only-forty six). A great-grandson of Queen Victoria, Mountbatten was a second cousin of the King. Mountbatten also insisted on the time-limit within which Britain would leave India. He had a meeting with Attlee (on 1st January 1947); on 16 January, the Prime Minister wrote to Mountbatten saying that Mountbatten should "not worry about the question of a precise date. We shall get a clear statement of timing". On 12 February (1947) Attlee sent two telegrams to Wavell that he proposed to make an announcement early next week as a part of a statement on policy in India; and that Lord Mountbatten would replace Lord Wavell during March (1947). The Viceroy (Wavell) told Attlee that his daughter's wedding was on 29 February and that it would be embarrassing for him if the announcement was made just before the wedding; Wavell preferred that it should be postponed to afternoon of 20th at the earliest, but sent "warmest congratulations and very best wishes" to Mountbatten. Wavell wrote in his "Journal": Mountbatten's "personality may perhaps accomplish what I have failed". His daughter's "wedding went well and smoothly"; in the evening Wavell had short meetings with Liaquat Ali and Nehru and handed them the British Government's historic statement of 20 February 1947.

Attlee announced (20 February 1947) that the British Government intended to transfer power by a date not later than June 1948, that Wavell would be succeeded by Mountbatten in March 1947 who would be entrusted with the task of "transferring to Indian hands responsibility for the government of British India in a manner that will best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India". The Conservative opposition was highly critical of the decision to withdraw from India by June 1948 on the plea that fifteen months was too short a period for dealing with the difficult questions of

framing constitutions and other matters related with transferring power to one or more authorities. As no other alternative was available, Attlee's statement was on the whole well received in India; Wavell saw Nehru (21 February) and pressed upon him the necessity of getting the Muslim League into the Constituent Assembly. Nehru was impressed by the statement and described it as courageous document. Wavell also met Liaquat Ali on the same day; "Liaquat said that the statement wanted very careful consideration, but was not hopeful of any Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. The Viceroy suggested that it might be best for him to invite Jinnah "to come to Delhi"; at this time Jinnah was sick and had gone to Bombay. It may be noted that on 21 February Nehru spoke of the possible partition of the Punjab and Bengal; if agreement was not reached. Later on, Jinnah declared that the League would not yield an inch in its demand for Pakistan.

In the Meantime, the situation in some Indian Provinces had also worsened. As we have already noticed, in Assam the Congress supporters had a strong feeling that their province should not have been grouped in section "C", under the Cabinet Mission Plan; the Muslims had also made preparations for a large-scale campaign against the Assam ministry. In Bengal, the anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan, Hindu Mahasabha went so far as to investigate into the feasibility of a separate Hindu province in West Bengal. In the N.W.F.P. the League had begun direct action, organising demonstrations against the Congress ministry; unruly mobs broke most of the windows of the Premier Khan Sahib's house in Peshawar - police did not obey orders to open fire on the Muslim League supporters. The provincial Government made large-scale arrests (including the most prominent personality of Khan Qayyum and the Pir of Manki Sharif) but failed to restore law and order in this predominantly Muslim province. But the greatest effect of the 20 February statement was seen in the Punjab. It may be mentioned that the League had won 79 out of 86 Muslim seats in the Punjab in the 1946 elections, but the Governor and other anti-Pakistan forces (Congress and the Sikhs) did not allow the League to form a ministry; and Khizer Hayat Tiwana once again became the Chief Minister of the Punjab. In January, Khizer declared the League's

National Guards an unlawful body; the League, therefore, met this challenge and started its anti-Khizer movement. This campaign was in full swing on 20 February; Khizer was deeply depressed by the 20 February statement and on 26 February he reached a compromise with the League and the League decided to call off its civil disobedience movement. Khizer Hayat resigned on 2 March (1947) after consulting with Sir Zafrullah Khan and his (Khizers) uncle. But the Congress and the Governor of Punjab did not like Khizer to leave the office. On 5 March, the Governor imposed section 93, taking direct charge of the administration. The Hindu-Sikh leaders were now inciting their followers to violence; Tara Singh raised the slogan "Pakistan Murdabad" and brandishing his sword shouted that the Sikhs would rule, no resister would remain; and that the Sikhs should be ready for a violent struggle to snatch the government from the Muslims and to finish the Muslim League. These statements led to communal violence throughout the Punjab. On 8 March, the Congress Working Committee (perhaps depressed by Khizer's resignation) passed a resolution demanding the partition of Punjab into two parts so that the predominantly Muslim portion might be separated from the predominantly non-Muslim portion.

In the meanwhile, a new crisis was brewing for the Congress; the finance ministry given to the League by the Congress was in the middle of preparing its first "poor Man's Budget". On 28 February, Liaquat Ali Khan presented to the Central Assembly his budget for the fiscal year April 1947 to March 1948. This was the first budget presented by a non-British Finance Minister; but at the same time it was the most controversial budget. It so happened that Liaquat Ali suggested a twenty-five percent tax on all business profits of more than on hundred thousand rupees. This was interpreted by Congress as an attempt to penalize the Hindu capitalists. The Congress was financed by Hindu capitalists who had in the past greatly benefitted from the Congress movements for the boycott of foreign goods. Sardar Patel had raised funds for the Congress and therefore the Hindu business community got intouch with the Sardar accusing him of betraying them. Patel pressurised Liaquat to withdraw his proposals; but Liaquat Ali stuck to his guns. Liaquat Ali was therefore accused of having driven a wedge between the right wing and the

socialist group within the Congress party. Now Patel and Rajaji made allegations that Liaquat wanted to harass industrialists and businessmen, majority of whom happened to be the Hindus. At this stage Hindu capitalists argued that in a United India poor Muslims would constantly demand a share in the wealth of the Hindus in the name of social justice and therefore the sooner they were separated from Hindus the better. Sardar Patel thus became a great supporter of the partition of India - also thinking that Pakistan would not be a viable state and could not last longer. Later on, Congress leaders openly said that the Muslim League could have its Pakistan if they wanted it but on the condition that they were not allowed to take away other parts of India which did not wish to join Pakistan. The Congress was, therefore, ready to concede Pakistan (consisting of only Muslim majority districts) and in early March 1947 Jinnah was also giving statements that God Willing (Insha Allah) Muslims would have Pakistan in the near future; that they (Muslims) would have to stand on their legs; that their ideology, their goal, their basic and fundamental principles were different from the Hindus; and that there was no common ground for unity and co-operation.

The Evolution of A Partition Plan

The last of the Viceroys, Lord Mountbatten, before coming to India was settling some issues with the British Prime Minister before accepting the Viceroyalty. He insisted that he be guaranteed re-employment in the Royal Navy when he returned to London, in an active post commensurate with the command he was being asked to give up and his seniority. His father had been First Sea Lord and Mountbatten too had set his eyes on the first sea Lordship. Mountbatten also insisted that he must be given the choice to choose his own staff; that he must have full powers to carry out the policy without interference by the British Government in London; in other words he was asking for plenipotentiary powers above His Majesty's Government (H.M.G). Eventually Attlee and his Cabinet granted Mountbatten these unprecedented powers. Armed with these favours, the new Viceroy arrived in Delhi on 22 March 1947. The nineteenth and the last Viceroy was Sworn in on 24 March; on 23 March Wavell left Delhi. Before leaving Wavell told Mountbatten

that he had two crises on his hands; the first was the demand from the Congress that the Muslim ministers of the Interim Government must be expelled - this was due to Liaquat Ali's Budget; and the other crisis was the Indian National Army trials.

Mountbatten lost no time in having a series of interviews with Indian leaders at which he sought to get to know them and to elicit their views on important issues such as the question of taxing business profits, to bring about a truce between the Muslims and Hindus, the Cabinet Mission Plan and eventually the partition plan. On 24 March, Nehru met the Viceroy and struck him as "most sincere"; Nehru agreed with Mountbatten "that it might be possible to frighten Jinnah into co-operation". Patel also met Mountbatten; the Viceroy described him as "most charming". Patel asked for the dismissal of Muslim League members of the Cabinet. Next was R. Prasad who also struck Mountbatten "as a most delightful man". Moulana Azad also met and the Viceroy found him "a charming old gentleman"; Azad laid the blame on the Congress for not accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan. Gandhi met the Viceroy on 31 March; he said that the British were responsible for the Hindu-Muslim animosity due to their policy of "divide and rule"; and that Jinnah should be invited to form the Government with Members of the League. Nehru once again met the Viceroy and linked the partition of Bengal with the partition of the Punjab. But most surprisingly, Nehru indicated that Gandhi's plan had failed to win support of his own colleagues in the Congress. His advice was no more considered by leaders like Patel and Nehru.

It may be noted that the objective of the British Government was to obtain a unitary Government for India according to the Cabinet Mission Plan and Mountbatten set about most expeditiously and zealously on this path. But during his meetings with Jinnah and his colleagues, the Viceroy became more and more convinced that there was no prospect of an agreed solution on that basis (for a United India). Liaquat Ali (on 3 April) told Mountbatten that Jinnah would not accept the Cabinet Mission plan (C.M.P); that he had come to the conclusion that it was impossible to work with Hindus as there was no spirit of compromise or fair play in Congress. Jinnah met the Viceroy on 5 April; Mountbatten described him as in "a most frigid, haughty and disdainful frame of mind". The ice was broken on the

next day (6 April); Jinnah claimed that there was only one solution: a "surgical operation" of India, otherwise India would perish altogether. The Viceroy said that he had not yet made up his mind. The Quaid told Mountbatten that Gandhi had no authority to speak on Congress's behalf, accusing the Congress leaders of constantly shifting their front; that the Congress was determined to inherit all powers. On 7 April Jinnah and Mountbatten met again; the Viceroy warned the Quaid that Congress had demanded that the League should either enter the constituent Assembly or be expelled from the Interim Government. But Jinnah did not give in, pointing out that it would be quite useless to enter the Assembly or even trying to put life into the Cabinet Mission Plan. He called upon the Viceroy to hand over power, preferably province by province and let the provinces decide how they formed into groups. Alternatively, Mountbatten could himself name the groups. The Quaid told the Viceroy that the only solution was Pakistan, "together with a splitting of the armed forces". The Viceroy once again discussed the Cabinet Mission Plan but Jinnah thought there was no point in discussing the C.M.P. At this stage Mountbatten was prepared give Jinnah "a truncated Pakistan, but not more quickly than possible for it would create chaos. But Jinnah did not wish to have a "moth-eaten" Pakistan; he therefore appealed to the Viceroy not to destroy the unity of Bengal and Punjab. But Mountbatten pointed out that if India were to be divided these two provinces would also be divided,. On 9 April, Jinnah and Mountbatten talked again; the Quaid once again insisted on "a full Pakistan", not a "moth-eaten Pakistan", a surgical operation cutting off the five provinces in the 'B' and 'C' areas and turning them to Pakistan - leaving the other six provinces to Hindustan - that Pakistan must be a viable state. Jinnah complained about the Viceroy's plans of ruining his Pakistan by cutting out half of the Punjab and Bengal including Calcutta, making it economically very weak to function and putting pressure on him to accept the C.M.P. It may be noted that Mountbatten was of the opinion that Jinnah "was ruining the position of India as a great power, and forever putting her down to something below a second class power". Mountbatten's desire was to hand over power to an united India with a strong centre. After having his sixth meeting with Jinnah, the Viceroy noted that it was impossible to argue with him that he was "a psychopathic case" and that Jinnah was demaging the Muslim

cause; but Mountbatten understood that imposing the C.M.P. would lead to a civil war.

Mountbatten discussed the transfer of power with Nehru who thought that if the British were to demit power Province by Province, they should have the right to decide whether to join a Hindustan Group, a Pakistan Group or even to remain independent, but he insisted on the partition of Bengal and Punjab before the other provinces were given their choices. About the N.W.F.P. Nehru suggested that fresh election should be held; Mountbatten also agreed with this Proposal but he was pressured by the Congress to remove the Governor (Caroe) for his so called sympathy for the League. Gandhi also met the Viceroy (12 April); Mountbatten told him that he had in mind two alternatives (a) C.M.P (b) a truncated Pakistan; that Congress should get in touch with Jinnah to give him assurances on the C.M.P. Gandhi wanted the High Court to interpret the C.M.P; he was ready to sign a statement denouncing the use of force to obtain political ends. Sardar Patel also met the Viceroy on the same day; Mountbatten told Patel that he favoured a strong Union but the next best solution was the C.M.P. but if Pakistan was to be created it would have to be a truncated one. Patel was of the view that as soon as the partition of Bengal was announced, the Muslims of Bengal would secede from the League in order to preserve the unity of Bengal and this might even be true for the Punjab; that Jinnah would be overthrown by the League. Mountbatten pointed out that he was now highly doubtful that there would be a United India and that Pakistan was looming before them. Moulana Azad also met the Viceroy, his view was that "a truncated Pakistan would spell disaster for the Muslims" and that by accepting this solution Jinnah would be committing suicide and the Muslims would revolt against him.

On 11 April, V.P.Menon (the trusted confidant of Patel) was asked to "put flesh" upon the plan for the transfer of power. On 12 April the Viceroy had a staff meeting; two plans were discussed (a) plan Union (modified C.M.P); and (b) Plan Balkan which gave choice to a province to decide its future which would result in a form of truncated Pakistan. Abell appointed out that the Congress would not accept the C.M.P. unreservedly. Mountbatten told his staff that

Gandhi's plan to offer the premiership to Jinnah had been turned down by the Congress leaders. Notes were prepared by the Viceroy's staff for the Governors Conference to be held on 15 April; if no agreement was reached, a decision would be on the basis of the small Pakistan; that principal leaders should be invited to Simla for discussions; and that a determined effort should be made to secure an agreement on the basis of C.M.P. That provinces would have the right to decide their own future; that arrangements would be made for the partition of Bengal, Punjab ect - general elections would be held in the N.W.F.P. The Governors Conference was held (15 April); Mountbatten pointed out that a quick decision would gave Pakistan a greater chance to fail on its demerits and that if limits of Pakistan were revealed, the League could revert to an United India; that Mountbatten would not "lightly abandon the C.M.P" - anything that resulted in torpedoing Pakistan was of advantage in that it would lead the way back to a more common-sense(a United India). It was pointed out (by Tyson) that Suhrawardy wanted Bengal as an independent province. Mountbatten concluded that Bengal would leave Jinnah, a Congress ministry would be returned in the N.W.F.P. and Jinnah's Pakistan would consist only of Sind and a part of the Punjab. The Viceroy thought this course was in the best interests of India.

On 16 April (second day of the Governors Conference) Lord Ismay (Viceroy's Chief of Staff) pointed out that Jinnah would take sooner whatever was given to him, however much reduced, rather to accept a United India. Krishna Menon (Nehru's close friend - later became India's High Commissioner in U.K) met the Viceroy and told him that the Congress would regret the creation of Pakistan but would not oppose it; he also offered his help to persuade Nehru to accept it. Soon Nehru and Patel also indicated that their aim was to liberate India as much as they possibly could. Acharia Kirpalani (President of the Congress) also met the Viceroy (17 April) he was of the opinion that the Muslim League would never come into the Indian Union; that "rather than have a battle we shall let them have their Pakistan" provided you [Mountbatten] will allow the Punjab and Bengal to be partitioned". Sardar Baldev Singh also met the Viceroy (22 April) and suggested to him that Jinnah should be pressured to be extent that he must give up the idea of Pakistan; the Sardar

thought that one way of putting pressure on Jinnah was to threaten to divide the Punjab. S.P. Mukerji (leader of the Mahasabha) also met the Viceroy (23 April) along with his plans and papers on the necessity for the partition of Bengal if the C.M.P. were to fail.

On the other hand, the Muslim League leaders were also expressing their views on the similar issues; Sir Terrence Shone (British High Commissioner in India from November 1946) met Jinnah on 16 April. Jinnah stressed on the necessity and inevitability of Pakistan using all his arguments for regarding the Muslims as a different nation; he was undaunted in his insistence on Pakistan also taking the plea that an unified India was an artificial creation; that India had never really been one, even under the Hindu and the Muslim Emperors. Suhrawardy had also met Shone (on 15 April) saying that Jinnah was adamant about Pakistan and the Constituent Assembly was practically "dead". The Chief Minister of Bengal "expressed the utmost distaste for a divided Bengal - the province could become an independent State of Wealth and importance and Calcutta was vital to Bengal". Liaquat Ali also met the Viceroy (19 April); when Mountbatten mentioned the C.M.P. Liaquat Ali told him that it was quite useless discussing the C.M.P. for the "League had a phobia against the mere words "Cabinet Mission". Two days later Liaquat told the Viceroy that he foresaw a worse fate for the Muslims in any form of a United India than even in a truncated Pakistan suggesting that two independent sovereign states should be set-up along with the two Constituent Assemblies. Liaquat Ali once again emphasised that the C.M.P. should not be mentioned in the future negotiations, for the League would be placed in an awkward position. Now the Viceroy was convinced that the partition of India was inevitable; but he thought it better if the provinces made this choice, not the British.

On 23 April, Jinnah attended the Viceroy's meeting in which Mountbatten explained the outlines of a plan whereby the provinces would be given the choice to decide their future. The Quaid wished to have this plan in writing with a promise not to show the document to any body except Liaquat Ali Khan. He said that the partition of provinces was bound to lead to trouble - it was not based on "wisdom and foresight". The Quaid also discussed the division of the

India Armed forces. In the end, Jinnah made it clear that it was impossible for the C.M.P. ever to be accepted, giving details of the negotiations which had taken place in the autumn of 1946. On the same day (23 April) Miss Fatima Jinnah met the lady Mountbatten (Edwina); Miss Jinnah was also determined and utterly committed like her brother against the Congress, saying that the Muslims, would fight for Pakistan if it was not given to them. She pointed out that the Hindus intended to subjugate and dominate the Muslims completely, giving a number of examples, with an unshakeable belief in Pakistan.

As for Bengal, Suhrawardy met the Viceroy contemplating a future for his province as United and an independent State assuring Mountbatten that he could get Jinnah to agree on that basis so it need not join Pakistan. Mountbatten told him that he "was ardently against all forms of partition; that he wanted above everything a United India". Jinnah also met the Viceroy; Mountbatten asked him what his views were about keeping Bengal united at the price of its remaining out of Pakistan. The Quaid said without any hesitation that he should be delighted. What was the use of Bengal without Calcutta; they had much better remain United and independent; he was sure that Bengal would be on friendly terms with Pakistan anyway. Jinnah also was in favour of Bengal remaining in the British Commonwealth like Pakistan. In this meeting, the Viceroy once again mentioned the C.M.P. much to Jinnah's distaste. Jinnah was of the opinion that "the leaders of the Congress were so dishonest, so crooked, and so obsessed with the idea of smashing the Muslim League that there were no lengths to which they will not go to do so; and the only way of giving Pakistan a chance is to make it an independent nation of the British Commonwealth with its own army". Jinnah repeated his fears that the Congress would not even accept the decision of the Federal Court, if it went against the Hindus; and he requested Mountbatten not to ask him to reconsider the C.M.P. again. Mountbatten frankly admitted that he had failed to shake Jinnah. On the question of the formation of the Muslim League ministry in the Punjab, Jinnah bluntly told Mountbatten that he entirely understood his point of view and respected his sincerity though he did not agree with his decision not to allow Nawab Mamdot to form a League ministry in the Punjab. After this meeting

the Viceroy and his Chief of Staff (Lord Ismay) concluded that Jinnah "was keen to get the principle of Pakistan settled once and for all, that he will acquiesce in what has come to be known as [a] truncated Pakistan, which excludes Calcutta", and that the Punjab and Bengal would be divided.

In the meantime preparations were made for Lord Ismay's visit to London with a plan of transferring power. On 1 May, Mountbatten asked the new Secretary of State, the Earl of Listowel (Pethick-Lawrence had resigned in April 1947) that a decision as to whom we were to demit power must be taken within a very short time. By 1 May 1947, the Viceroy knew that Jinnah would not consider the C.M.P. on the grounds that the Congress did not intend to carry it out fairly. Mountbatten told his staff that "he was beginning to think that Mr. Jinnah might be right in his belief, especially in view of a statement which Sardar Patel had made ... in connection with the interpretation by Congress of the C.M.P. Mountbatten therefore came to the conclusion that the C.M.P. was 'dead'. The leaders of all political parties and the Viceroy and his staff were now concentrating on the partition plan (Plan Balkan). It may be noted that Gandhi did not wish to see India partitioned; he called upon the Viceroy to turn the whole of India over either to the Muslim League or to Congress on the basis of immediate Dominion Status. But other leaders had accepted the "Plan Balkan." Mountbatten had tried to remove some Congress objections for example he decided to hold referendum in the N.W.F.P. although it was decided that elections would be held in that province to decide whether the province wished to join Hindustan or Pakistan. Jinnah did not approve of this last-minute change in the partition plan.

On 2nd May, Lord Ismay and Abell flew to London with the plan and a message from Mountbatten to Listowel to give him the authority to go ahead; that communal feeling was far more bitter. The India and Burma Committee held its meetings to consider the plan and eventually made some marginal amendments. Mountbatten wanted Bengal alone to have the right to go its own way whereas the India Committee felt that consistency demanded that this choice should be extended to all the provinces. Furthermore, London rejected the Congress demand that power

should be transferred to "the Union of India". The reception of general principles of the plan in Cabinet Committee meeting was favourable. After some minor changes the Cabinet approved the plan.

At about the time the discussions on the Plan Balkan were in progress in London, the Viceroy's staff in Delhi was considering V.P.Menon's suggestion: 'an alternative plan' in case Jinnah rejected the Plan Balkan. The reason for Jinnah's possible rejection, it was anticipated, would be the hope that by continuing to bargain, he would be able to obtain more than the truncated Pakistan offered to him in the Plan.

The alternative plan as suggested by Mountbatten was to demit power to a united India on the basis of Dominion Status and on the understanding that there would be safeguards which would allow Jinnah to form his Pakistan later. The plan proposed to demit provincial subjects to existing provincial governments and central subjects to the existing Central Government. In a telegram to Ismay, Mountbatten accepted that under the plan, Congress would gain the advantage of domination of central subjects but because the powerful provinces of the Punjab and Bengal would be governed by the Muslim League, the Congress would have to come to terms with the League and these provinces would retain a strong bargaining power. Mountbatten suggested that it would be in the power of the British Government to impose this alternative plan 'without the agreement of Indian leaders'. The proposal to impose the plan without the agreement of Indian leaders in fact was likely to affect only Jinnah, because Nehru, when told by Mountbatten about this plan to demit power to a United India, stated that the Congress would prefer this alternative to the Plan Balkan. The proposal meant handing over control of all central subjects, including the Army, to the Congress; and to hand over the Army would have been perhaps the most undesirable step for the British to take at that early stage of negotiations. Therefore London found it difficult to agree with Mountbatten. Moreover, the British ministers thought that the action proposed by Mountbatten would be a 'breach of pledges' given to the Parliament about the safeguarding of minorities. The Secretary of State believed that it was not desirable that Mountbatten should

make the threat to Jinnah. He suggested that it should be indicated to Jinnah that the proposed plan was capable of being operated, even without his co-operation. However, perhaps to Mountbatten's surprise, it was not Jinnah but Nehru who rejected his plan.

Mountbatten had invited Nehru to Simla to discuss some important issues, such as early transfer of power on a Dominion Status basis. While the discussions were proceeding the approved version of the Plan Balkan was received in Simla from London. Although the authorities there had made some very minor changes to the original draft, Mountbatten had a 'hunch' that the redraft from London might not be accepted by the Congress. Against the advice of most of his staff, the Viceroy gave Nehru a copy of the revised plan and asked what reception the plan might receive from the Congress. Nehru reacted very strongly against the proposals. It soon became clear that he objected to the clause which would allow an Indian province to become independent. His party was committed to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. Nehru seemed to be thinking that this clause would lead to a united independent Bengal. Discussing this prospect, Nehru claimed that there was not likely to be more than one percent of non-Muslims who would agree to the idea of an independent Bengal. The Congress leader made it abundantly clear that the Plan in that form would never be acceptable to his party.

This was perhaps the most difficult moment of Lord Mountbatten's Viceroyalty. When sending the plan to London he had informed the Cabinet that the plan had been drawn up after 'satisfactory' interviews with Indian leaders. Ismay too had told the Cabinet that Nehru was in general agreement with the plan. The ministers therefore anticipated no further difficulty because they had made 'only some very minor changes'. When the Viceroy telegraphed to Ismay about Nehru's latest reactions to the plan, and wished to withdraw his previous proposals in favour of some new ones, Ismay and others in London felt out of touch with these developments. The Cabinet decided that either a Cabinet Minister should get out to India or the Viceroy should come to London and explain the change. Mountbatten accepted the latter offer.

Before setting off, Mountbatten, in order to remove Nehru's objections to the Plan Balkan, decided to redraft his proposals. Nehru's main objection was to the clause which allowed an Indian province to become independent, the Viceroy omitted this option. In other words the number of choices offered to the provinces was reduced from three to two; under the re-drafted plan the provinces would not be given the option of remaining independent of either India or Pakistan.

According to Lord Mountbatten, he was prepared, after Nehru's rejection of the plan, to put to HMG any proposal without the prior approval of Jinnah and Nehru. On the Viceroy's instructions a draft Heads of Agreement was drawn up by V.P. Menon for further negotiations with Indian leaders. Some of the important points included in the Heads of Agreement were as follows:

- (a) Early transfer of power on a Dominion Status basis as an interim arrangement
- (b) In the event of a decision being taken that there should be one Central authority in India, power should be transferred to the existing Central Government;
- (c) The Governor-General should be common to both states, the existing Governor-General being re-appointed.

When the draft agreement was shown to Nehru, he indicated that it would not be unacceptable to the Congress.

The acceptance of Dominion Status by the Congress and Mountbatten's decision to transfer power earlier than June 1948 were perhaps the most important developments which had resulted from the Simla negotiations between the Viceroy and Nehru. The proposal for an early transfer of power on a Dominion Status basis had been submitted by V.P. Menon at the end of April. (The proposal was generally referred to as the Menon Plan). Mountbatten, who was most anxious to keep India within the Commonwealth, believed that successful negotiations on the Menon Plan would produce a sporting chance of India's remaining indefinitely in the commonwealth. When Lord Ismay proceeded to London with the Plan Balkan, he had taken

with him a summary of the Menon Plan as an appendix to the main Plan. It was agreed between Mountbatten and Ismay that the appendix would not be distributed to the British Cabinet until Indian leaders themselves requested for Dominion Status. As a result of successful negotiations with Nehru on the subject, Mountbatten directed Ismay to distribute the scheme to the Ministers in London.

It is of some importance that the Muslim League and Jinnah were unaware of the negotiations between Nehru and Mountbatten about an early transfer of power on the basis of Dominion Status. A proposal to inform Jinnah of these developments was rejected because it was thought that if Jinnah was told about these talks, he might publish a statement. While indicating his willingness to accept Dominion Status for India, Nehru had made it clear that he would not talk about this decision openly. The leftwing of the Congress Party presented the main difficulty to Nehru in agreeing openly to these arrangements. Thus a public statement by Jinnah on the subject was likely to wreck the negotiations between Nehru and the Viceroy. Mountbatten, therefore, decided not to raise the subject with Jinnah until after the announcement of his Plan.

In the event of partition, the Menon Plan suggested that until a government was established in Pakistan, power should be transferred to the Central Government as an interim arrangement. The proposal of one Central Government was an interim arrangement. The proposal of one Central Government meant that the Viceroy had decided to go back to the Cabinet Mission's Plan as demanded by the Congress and without consulting the Muslim League.

When the proposal for an early transfer of power to one Central Government on a Dominion Status basis was brought to the notice of the India and Burma Committee, it favoured the proposal of immediate grant of Dominion Status provided it was offered to the Muslim League and the Congress simultaneously. Mountbatten who did not share these views and had proposed not to raise the subject with Jinnah until after the announcement of this plan, tried to convince London by saying that after the announcement of his plan, he would explain to Jinnah that the transfer of power to the existing

Central Government would be merely a temporary measure until the Pakistan Government was ready to assume its responsibilities. In another telegram he reminded London that the revised plan would only be put into effect if it was acceptable to the Muslim League. But perhaps it should be mentioned that if Jinnah were to reject the plan, the alternative Mountbatten intended to put before Jinnah was to 'recommended to HMG to part with power under the Government of India (1935) Act to the existing Central Government'. In either case, the Muslim league had no choice but to accept that British decision to transfer power to one Central Government. In other words, the claim by the Viceroy that the revised plan would not be implemented without the League's approval meant little or nothing in practice. The alternative he was going to propose suggested an even stronger Centre.

The revised plan was sent to London before it was put before the Muslim League. It was pointed out at a meeting of the India and Burma Committee that 'the original proposal of Dominion Status had been designed to follow upon a partition of India'. It was the view of the Committee that 'unless the political parties in India were willing to adopt the Cabinet Mission's Plan and to collaborate in a Constituent Assembly for the whole of India, a plan for partition of India within the Commonwealth, the Ministers felt that the question of the possibility of the early attainment of Dominion Status by India or parts of India was one which should not have been raised until after the principle of partition had been accepted'.

The Viceroy, before his departure to London, spent a few days discussing certain aspects of Dominion Status with Indian leaders. He sent the Draft of announcement containing the revised plan to both the Congress and the Muslim League. The Draft announcement contained no surprises for the Congress President. His reply stated that the Congress understood that the Plan was a continuation of the Cabinet Mission's Plan with suitable variations to fit the existing situation. Nehru claimed that the Congress had fully accepted that Cabinet Mission's Plan and still stood by it. A note by Jinnah, giving the Muslim League's point of view about the Draft announcement, stated that

- (a) The Muslim League could not accept the Cabinet Mission Plan;
- (b) There was no agreement and the British Government were proceeding to transfer power in accordance with the white Paper of 20 February 1947; nor was there anything in this plan to preclude negotiations between communities for a united India. The Muslim League had already decided that India must be divided and Pakistan should be established;
- (c) The existing Constituent Assembly should not be allowed to continue—and two Independent Constituent Assemblies (for Hindustan and Pakistan) should be established and all powers should be transferred to them;
- (d) The Muslim League could not agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab.

During an interview Jinnah, along with Liaquat, refused to sign the Heads of Agreement, which was prepared by Menon in Simla as result to Nehru's secret negotiations with the Viceroy. Jinnah was against the idea of granting Dominion Status to be Interim Government; he favoured the grant of Dominion Status to both India and Pakistan. He wanted all powers, including defence, foreign affairs and finance to be transferred to the Constituent Assemblies of Pakistan and Hindustan. Reviewing Congress's suggestions that the existing Interim Government should function with Dominion Status, Jinnah pointed out in a later to Sir E. Mieveille, who was in touch with him about the proposal after Mountbatten's departure to London, "that In draft proposals not only is there no mention of the Interim government, but on the other hand it is assumed right through that it must be dissolved" Jinnah was against any change in the position, function or powers of the Interim Government either by convention or otherwise. Jinnah believed that the decision to grant India and Pakistan the status of Dominions should be dealt with after the announcement of partition.

Mountbatten left for London on 18 May for consultation on his new plan. He took V.P. Menon, the author of the new proposals, with him. During his stay in London, Mountbatten attended several

meetings of India and Burma Committee, and discussed with them the latest political developments in India. In respect of Dominion Status, the Viceroy proposed that an immediate announcement should be made of the intention to grant such status to India. He informed the Committee that the Congress leaders would not be successful in securing the agreement of their supporters to the acceptance of Dominion Status unless it could be shown that this would enable power to be transferred substantially earlier than June 1948, viz; well before the end of 1947. Attlee pointed out that there might be practical difficulties involved in the enactment of legislation to amend the Government of India Act and enable Dominion Status to be granted to the two parts of India within the time desired by Mountbatten. Moreover, it was pointed out that the immediate grant of Dominion Status to Hindustan would affect the special powers of the Viceroy (related to Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence). It seemed essential to retain these powers at the time for the protection of minorities, for the security interests of India and to ensure a just partition of resources of the Government of India.

After further consideration, the Cabinet Committee agreed in principle that legislation should be proposed with the object of handing over power in 1947 to two separate governments in India with Dominion Status. The Viceroy proposed that both Parties, the Muslim League and Congress, should be offered Dominion Status and if the League did not take a decision at a very early date, the British Government should propose, simultaneously with the transfer of power to the Dominion of Hindustan, to transfer power to an independent Government of Pakistan outside the Commonwealth. In other words, the Viceroy was suggesting that if the Muslim League disagreed with the proposal of Dominion Status, the decision to transfer power during 1947 should not be delayed. When Mountbatten informed Churchill about his proposal, the leader of the opposition, said that his Party might not agree to the passing of legislation under the terms which would leave Pakistan outside the Commonwealth. The opposition of the Conservative Party was likely to delay the passing of any legislation in regard to the transfer of power, and delay in the matter was the last thing Mountbatten wished at that stage; it was later agreed that the announcement of partition should say that Dominion Status would in any event be

conferred on both parts of India, but either side would be free to leave the Commonwealth subsequently if it wished to do so.

While the Viceroy was still in London, a proposal to grant Dominion Status to the province of Bengal, provided it remained united, also came under discussion. It may be remembered that Suhrawardy, the Chief Minister of Bengal, believed that the province might be kept united on the basis of joint electorates and a coalition government. Jinnah was also not against the proposal. However, the Congress did not favour the grant to the provinces, or parts of the provinces, of the option to become independent. On Congress's demand Mountbatten had omitted this choice. The Cabinet Committee had originally disliked the idea of reducing the choices for the provinces from three to two. They felt pledged to give the provinces the option of remaining independent if they so desired. In the Committee's view this was particularly applicable to the case of Bengal. On his arrival in London, the Viceroy told the committee that if the Congress and the League reached some agreement between themselves on Bengal before the announcement of partition plan, the plan would be redrafted accordingly. The Committee authorised the Viceroy to recast the statement so far as Bengal was concerned. In another meeting the Cabinet Committee made it clear that in event of the partition of Bengal, Dominion Status would not be granted to East Bengal alone, it would have to unite with one or other of the Indian Dominions.

During these discussions in London on the revised plan, the question of the League's possible refusal of the plan also arose. Mountbatten proposed that the plan should be carried through whatever attitude the Muslim League might adopt. The Cabinet Committee agreed, believing that Jinnah might be indicated that the consequences of refusal would be a settlement less favourable from his point of view, than that contained in the announcement.

Before his departure from London, the Viceroy was given a large measure of discretion to amend the details of the plan without prior consultation with the British government. Lord Mountbatten arrived back in Delhi with his plan on 30 May, and presented it to the Indian leaders in a conference which started on June 2. Mountbatten requested them to let him know by midnight that day, the reactions of

their respective Working Committees to the plan. Jinnah, when he came to see Mountbatten, protested very strongly on behalf of his Working Committee against the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. He repeated his proposal for a proper referendum in Bengal and the Punjab. Mountbatten replied that he was not prepared to make any amendment to the plan unless it was agreed by both parties. As it was unlikely that the Congress would agree with Jinnah's proposal, the Muslim League leader had little choice but to go along with the Viceroy's proposal about the partition of the provinces. Jinnah indicated that the formal acceptance of the plan by the All India Muslim Council would not come until June 9 when the Council was due to meet.

The Congress leaders, who had been committing themselves, step by step, to the plan put forward two fresh demands. They asked Mountbatten to allow a referendum in the N.W.F.P. to include a third choice of independence also. The demand was surprising because it was at Nehru's own request that Mountbatten had dropped the original proposal to allow every province to vote for Pakistan, Hindustan or independence. It soon became clear to the Viceroy that the demand was raised only to free Khan Sahib, the Chief Minister of N.W.F.P. from odium of being connected with the Congress during the referendum period. Nehru admitted privately to the Viceroy that N.W.F.P. could never stand by itself and Khan Sahib wished to join the Union of India at a subsequent stage. The second demand put forward by the Congress was not to allow Pakistan to remain in the Commonwealth, if Hindustan wished to withdraw from the association. Nehru objected strongly to the sentence included in the last paragraph of the plan which gave the right to secede from the Commonwealth to the Indian Constituent Assemblies. Mountbatten invited Nehru to see him before the meeting of the Indian leaders resumed. We indicated to Nehru that the first demand put forward by the Congress could be accepted only if all provinces were allowed the choice of remaining independent, and that it was not possible to give this choice to the N.W.F.P. alone, unless the Muslim League agreed to it; which Nehru admitted was out of the question. While discussing the other Congress demands, to have an assurance from the British Government that Pakistan would be excluded from the

Commonwealth, if the rest of India wished to secede, Mountbatten pointed out to Nehru that it was not within that British Government's power to decide to expel Pakistan from the Commonwealth; the decision involved the other members of the association too. The Viceroy, indicated that India might get Pakistan out of the Commonwealth either by persuading Pakistan to withdraw at the same time as Hindustan, or by raising the matter at a Commonwealth Conference and getting the other members to agree with that course. The Congress perhaps saw some logic in the Viceroy's arguments and withdrew its demands. It was further agreed between the Viceroy and the Congress that these controversial demands should not even be mentioned at the conference with the League leaders because it would only infuriate them. Mountbatten, in a telegram to Listowel, expressed the view that the second demand by the Congress was so dangerous that it might well have wrecked the whole chance of an agreement.

The replies Mountbatten had received from all three parties, i.e., the Congress, the League and the Sikhs, indicated that although they did not agree with the Plan, they would accept it. The Indian leaders were informed by the Viceroy that Parliamentary legislation setting up the two Dominions would be introduced in (the British) Parliament during the current session and the Act would contain a provision, enabling the Viceroy to bring it into operation at any time. It was Mountbatten's intention that the Act should be brought into operation not later than August 15, 1947. The decision to transfer power, without mention of the exact date, was announced by the viceroy in a radio broadcast on June 3. Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh followed the Viceroy by broadcasting their general acceptance of the plan. Before broadcasting a recording of the Viceroy's message in London, Attlee appealed to 'everyone' to give calm and dispassionate consideration to these proposals which had emerged from the hard facts of the situation in India. The plan to transfer power was also presented in the House of Commons by Attlee and in the house of Lords by Lord Listowel. Attlee informed Mountbatten that the statement had been 'well received in both the Houses'.

Both the Congress and the League had raised a number of objections to the plan; however the Congress was better off in the

sense that the plan included most of its demands. On Congress's objection, Mountbatten had omitted the option for provinces to remain independent and agreed to transfer power to Indian hands much earlier than June 1948. Mountbatten himself admitted that an early transfer of power might create difficulties for Pakistan, but he accepted it, without consulting the Muslim League. The decision, from the point of view of Muslims, who wished to have a strong Pakistan, was most disappointing and undoubtedly contributed to the creation of distrust among the Pakistanis towards the Mountbatten's Viceroyalty. Most politicians and historians from Pakistan regard the partition plan as 'an Anglo-Hindu Plan'. They consider it so because of the fact that it was revised by Lord Mountbatten as a result of consultation mainly between Nehru, Patel, V.P. Menon and himself, whereas Jinnah was neither invited nor informed of these negotiations in Simla. Even if it is not accepted that the plan was entirely an Anglo-Hindu one, it seems difficult to justify Lord Mountbatten's decision to keep the negotiations about an early transfer of power, a secret from Jinnah. It could not be denied that the decision was to affect the Muslims. If Jinnah was accepted by Mountbatten as the sole spokesman of the Indian Muslims, then he had the right to know the decisions which were being taken about the future of India. If Jinnah had not been ignored by Mountbatten at that stage of negotiations, the charge about his 'unfair dealings' with Nehru and Patel at the expense of Pakistan could easily have been avoided.

Although the plan provided for a separate Muslim State of Pakistan, it was a very truncated form of it. Most of the demands advanced by the Muslim League were not included in the plan.

For example, the League

- (1) wished power to be transferred to provinces as they existed;
- (2) favoured an independent united Bengal;
- (3) proposed plebiscites in Bengal and the Punjab;
- (4) wanted fresh elections in N.W.F.P.

The partition plan contained none of the above-mentioned proposals. Furthermore, the League was literally given no choice but to accept the final plan as it stood.

Pointing out the facts that the partition plan did not include some important proposals from the Muslim point of view, Jinnah in his broadcast of June 3, 1947 stated that 'we cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with some of the matters dealt with by the plan. It is for us to consider whether the plan... should be accepted...as a compromise or a settlement... the All India Muslim League Council expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal to partition the Punjab and Bengal, and stated that the Council 'cannot give its consent to such a partition'. However, they decided to accept the 'fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise'. The League accepted the plan because it appeared 'the only possible solution in the circumstances'. Some people thought that Jinnah expressed the view that 'the consequences of any other alternative would have been disastrous to imagine'.

The June 3 plan, like most things in politics, was essentially a compromise. The Congress achieved independence much earlier than June 1948, as it wanted, but it had to accept the division of India also. The Muslim League won its Pakistan but much to its regret, the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab were partitioned, leaving a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan. According to Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's plan was a case of hobson's choice. No one in India thought it was perfect. Accepting the fact, Mountbatten in a radio broadcast stated that "the whole plan may not be perfect but like all plans its success will depend on the spirit of goodwill with which it is carried out."

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